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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Thomas Groll
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
June 2012
Title: The Economics of Commercial Lobbying
This dissertation addresses the economic behavior and political influence activities
by lobbyists today by examining the existence, mechanisms, and welfare implications of
commercial lobbying activities and their optimal regulation.
In the second chapter of this dissertation, a novel model of lobbying is presented
that explains the behavior of commercial lobbying firms (such as the so-called K-Street
lobbyists of Washington, D.C.). In contrast to classical special interest groups, commercial
lobbying firms represent a variety of clients and are not directly affected by policy outcomes.
They are hired by citizens to advocate policy proposals to politicians that are beneficial to
the citizens but also have social implications. Using a model with a market for lobbying
services and agency relationships between lobbyists and policymakers it can be shown why
commercial lobbying firms exist. It can also be shown that self-interested policymakers, who
observe lobbying activities, may employ commercial lobbying firms in a socially inefficient
manner.
In the third chapter of this dissertation, the analysis examines the effective regulation
of commercial lobbying activities and focuses on the endogenous choice of regulatory
iv
institutions. The analysis uses the model of commercial lobbying presented in the second
chapter. I derive the institutional conditions under which a market outcome can be first-
best as well as the conditions under which a first-best institution will be self-stable. One
result is that current regulations may fail to be effective and cannot limit lobbyists’ and
policymakers’ incentives to substitute financial contributions for the socially beneficial
acquisition of information. Additional results explain why endogenous reforms may or
may not occur.
In the fourth chapter of this dissertation, the analysis uses a dynamic model of
commercial lobbying with lobbyists who undertake unobservable investigation efforts and
promise financial contributions. It is shown that repeated relationships with lobbyists
simplify a policymaker’s information and contracting problem and help policymakers to
escape a “cheap talk” lobbying game. The welfare implications of these interactions depend
on whether the policymakers’ information or contracting problem predominates. Further,
the policymaker’s information problem may actually improve welfare outcomes. Similarly,
financial contributions may also improve welfare outcomes.
This dissertation includes unpublished co-authored material.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The classical view of rent-seeking and lobbying is one of special interest groups
approaching policymakers to achieve desired policies. Examples would be a steel lobby
asking for import protection, firms asking for work permissions for immigrant workers,
or the National Rifle Association advocating for legal access to weapons. The economic
analysis of rent-seeking and lobbying has focused on the activities of such interest groups
that are directly affected by the policy outcomes they lobby for and usually neglect the
social implications of their actions. However, direct observation reveals that there is a
third actor. Most interest groups hire commercial lobbyists to present policy matters to
policymakers on their behalf. Commercial lobbying firms – usually law, consulting or public
affairs firms – present the political interests for a variety of clients for economic profit and
are not directly affected by the policy outcomes they lobby for. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that lobbying firms are prevalent in the political process in Washington, D.C., Brussels,
London, Paris, and Berlin, but the mechanisms and implications have been ignored in the
economic analysis.
This dissertation asks why interest groups, firms, citizens, or public entities hire
lobbying firms for political representation, how lobbying firms interact as intermediaries
between clients and policymakers, and how their activities affect economic markets and
political outcomes. In Chapter II the analysis focuses on the existence and welfare
implications of commercial lobbying in a simple general equilibrium framework. In Chapter
III the analysis addresses potential market failure and the distributional consequences
of commercial lobbying activities and derives the conditions for an optimal regulation
of such activities as well as the conditions for endogenous reforms. In Chapter IV a
dynamic model of commercial lobbying with unobservable information acquisition and not
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contracted financial contributions is presented that seeks to explain the observed repeated
personal interactions between lobbyists and policymakers.
Although the activities of commercial lobbying firms have received little or no
attention from the economic literature, they are influential and have distinct characteristics.
Empirical evidence shows that commercial lobbyists are more and prevalent in the political
process of Washington, D.C.1 Among the top 10 U.S. lobbying firms in 2010 were five law
firms and five government affairs consulting firms. The total reported revenues for all
lobbying activities at the federal level were $3.47 billion. The top 25 commercial lobbying
contracts in 2010 were between $1 and $10 million.2 These expenditures were related to
the political representation of lobbying firms’ clients and exclude their clients’ political
campaign contributions. Numerous commercial lobbying firms possess their own Political
Action Committees (PAC), and commercial lobbyists make campaign contributions to
politicians with whom they share engagements in political issues.3 Commercial lobbying
firms advertise their political experience, expertise in specific political and legal areas,
and political contacts.4 That they advertise their experience and contacts suggests that
most relationships between lobbyists and policymakers are personal and based on repeated
interactions. The analysis in Chapter II addresses the existence of commercial lobbying
firms, incorporates the observed expertise of commercial lobbying firms, and explains the
simultaneous provision of information and financial contributions by commercial lobbyists.
1Using the lobbying reports filed by lobbyists under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (1995) for their
activities at the federal level, Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011) show that the share of commercial
lobbyists amongst all lobbyists is increasing and that the growth in lobbying expenditures can be attributed
to commercial lobbying firms.
2The identities and revenues are from www.opensecret.org; a website from the Center for Responsive
Politics. Their data are collected from the individual lobbying registrations and reports filed under the
Lobbying Disclosure Act (1995) and provided by the US Senate Office of Public Records.
3See the website of the Center for Responsive Politics for the identities of lobbying firms with PACs and
Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011) for an analysis of lobbyists’ campaign contributions.
4Many lobbying firms advertise on their websites the number of employees with Congress or House staff
experience or the number of years their employees held public offices.
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In Chapter IV the analysis remains these elements but can also show how repeated personal
interactions between lobbyists and policymakers can arise endogenously.
The conventional wisdom of lobbying is that citizens or special interest groups may
have valuable information that an imperfectly informed policymakers wishes to learn. As
society we care about the quality of policy decisions and benefit from this information. For
example,
“[t]he practice of lobbying in order to influence political decisions is a legitimate and
necessary part of the democratic process. Individuals and organizations reasonably want
to influence decisions that may affect them, and their environment. Government in turn
needs access to the knowledge and views that lobbying can bring.”5
Unfortunately, private incentives to misrepresent information, policy contingent
campaign contributions, or political capture by special interests may limit the benefits of
lobbying activities and in turn may be even socially undesirable. In the last several years,
there has been more public awareness of about the influence of lobbying on the political
process. During that period, the influence has been discussed in public and legislation has
addressed the phenomenon and public concern. Exemplary is Tony Wright’s MP, Chairman
of the Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) of the British parliament in 2009,
statement regarding a parliamentary report on lobbying:
“Lobbying enhances democracy, but it can also subvert it. Government has accepted
that it should be more open to outside interests and ideas, and this has brought benefits.
But there are risks around influence and public mistrust of government, and these risks
have not been managed closely enough. [...] Transparency is key here. There is a public
interest in knowing who is lobbying whom about what.”6
5See part 1. of the Public Administration Select Committee’s report “Lobbying: Access and influence
in Whitehall” (2009) ordered by the British House of Commons.
6Tony Wright’s MP statement is taken from a press notice by the Public Administration Select
Committee (2009).
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One initial reason for the PASC’s report was the development of commercial lobbying
activities described as “lobbyists for hire” in the United Kingdom.7 The analysis in Chapter
II, III, and IV provides insights for these discussions by examining the mechanisms of
commercial lobbying activities and their welfare implications. Further, Chapter II and
IV address political capture by lobbyists; Chapter III addresses public concern about
commercial lobbying activities and the importance of transparency about information and
financial transfers from lobbyists to policymakers.
Another reason for the PASC’s report were previous regulatory changes in the
United States, the Lobbying Disclosure Act (1995) and the Honest Leadership and Open
Government Act (2007), and the European Union.8 The regulation of professional lobbying
activities differs widely across democratic countries and even within countries at the state
level.9 Countries with a higher degree of formal lobbying regulation, are, for example, the
United States, Canada, and recently Australia. For example, the U.S. Lobbying Disclosure
Act (1995) is intended
“[...] for the disclosure of efforts by paid lobbyists to influence the decision-making
process and actions of the Federal legislative and executive branch officials while protecting
the constitutional right of the people to petition the government for a redress of their
grievances.”10
However, most Western democracies have only limited forms of regulation or no
regulation at all. The cross-national differences in the regulation of lobbying activities
affects the availability of data and the lack of regulation reduces our knowledge to anecdotal
evidence about lobbying activities and the activities by commercial lobbying firms in many
countries. This dissertation is a starting point to examine the activities by commercial
7See part 10. of the PASC’s report “Lobbying: Access and influence in Whitehall” (2009).
8See part 7. of the PASC’s report “Lobbying: Access and influence in Whitehall” (2009).
9See Chari, Hogan, and Murphy (2010) for an extensive overview of lobbying regulation across countries.
10The Lobbying Disclosure Act (1995) – “Purpose and Summary”.
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lobbying firms, which have been widely ignored in the economic literature, and their welfare
implications. The intention is to provide theoretical insights that guide the public and
policymakers in their discussions about the need for regulation and publicly available data.
Especially the analysis in Chapter III focuses on the potential need for regulation and
examines the endogenous choice institutions regulating commercial lobbying activities.
In Chapter II a novel general equilibrium model of lobbying is presented that seeks
to explain some behavior of commercial lobbying firms and their implications for social
welfare. It is argued that commercial lobbying firms posses an expertise that allows them
to make predictions about the social desirability of policy proposals. This expertise gives
policymakers an incentive to allocate political access to lobbyists. Citizens with policy
proposals, which if enacted yield them private benefits, hire commercial lobbyists with
political access to increase the likelihood of realizing these private benefits from policy
proposals. In contrast to the previous literature of lobbying activities with information
acquisition and financial contributions (Bennedsen and Feldmann 2006, Dahm and Porteiro
2008a), the model can explain a simultaneous provision of information and financial
contributions when multiple agents compete for political access and decisions. Further,
it is shown that the policymakers’ relatively powerful position and ability to monitor
lobbyists’ verification efforts perfectly allow them to announce access rules that request
their desired mix of verification efforts and financial contributions. The socially optimal
mix will typically not be achieved as a market outcome because of market power and
externality effects. By focusing on the welfare effects, the analysis provides unique insights
that contribute to the lobbying literature.
The analysis of Chapter III addresses the optimal regulation of commercial lobbying
activities and focuses on a potential political conflict between citizens and policymakers.
The potential market failure presented in Chapter II provides the normative rationale for
deriving the institutional conditions for the optimal regulation of commercial lobbying
activities. Given the socially optimal institutions the analysis provides the conditions
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under which a first-best institution is self-stable. Further, it is shown that there is private
rent dissipation in the unregulated market equilibrium presented in Chapter II. This
provides the positive rationale for explaining a potential political conflict between citizens
and policymakers arising from commercial lobbying activities. The analysis provides the
conditions for endogenous political reforms because of distributional consequences and
provides some arguments for the political stability of unregulated lobbying activities. The
focus on optimal regulation and endogenous institutions regulating lobbying activities
provides unique insights that contribute to both the lobbying literature and the literature
of endogenous political institutions.
In Chapter IV the analysis provides explanations for repeated personal interactions
between commercial lobbyists and policymakers and examines the welfare implications of
these relationships. The analysis provides a dynamic general equilibrium model of lobbying
in which lobbyists provide verification efforts and financial contributions to policymakers in
exchange for political access. Citizens hire commercial lobbyists to increase the likelihood of
realizing private benefits. In contrast to the static model of commercial lobbying presented
in Chapter II, policymakers can only imperfectly monitor lobbyists’ information acquisition
and are unable to contract with lobbyists. The analysis shows that repeated personal
interactions solve a policymaker’s information and contracting problem if policymakers can
promise barriers to entry into the political access market, which essentially generate positive
rents for lobbyists. The welfare implications depend on whether policymakers solve an
information or contracting problem when they engage in such relationships. By explaining
repeated personal interactions, the analysis provides unique insights that contribute to the
lobbying literature.
Chapter II and IV include material co-authored with Christopher J. Ellis.
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CHAPTER II
A SIMPLE MODEL OF THE COMMERCIAL LOBBYING INDUSTRY
This chapter is co-authored with Christopher J. Ellis, who contributed through
analytical insights, feedback for the development of the theoretical model, and provided
editorial assistance. I was the primary contributor to the development and analysis of the
theoretical model.
II.1. Introduction
Direct observation reveals that there are two types of professional lobbyist engaged
in the business of political influence activities. The first type are the representatives of
classical special interest groups, such as trade associations, unions, and other organizations
that take political actions on behalf of their members. These lobbyists are directly
motivated, either ideologically or via financial gain, by the policy outcomes they lobby for.
Their focus is usually only on a subset of policies that are relevant to the interest group’s
organizing principle. Understanding the problems and activities of lobbyists representing
special interest groups has been the primary focus of most of the economic literature in this
area. However, there is clearly a second type of lobbyist, those employed by commercial
lobbying firms. These lobbyists are increasingly prevalent in lobbying activities and are
attracting significant public attention.1 In contrast to classical special interest groups,
commercial lobbying firms are typically not directly affected by the policies they lobby over,
nor do they have ideological preferences over policy outcomes. Commercial lobbying firms
act as intermediaries between citizens or special interest groups and policymakers; they
seek to make profits by selling intermediation services to their clients. These intermediation
1Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011) show that there has been a rapid growth of commercial
lobbying. The share of commercial lobbyists amongst all lobbyists has increased from 40 percent in 1999 to
60 percent in 2009. Indeed, the growth in overall lobbying expenses in that time period can be attributed
to commercial lobbying.
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services include direct advocacy to branches of government, legal and political consulting,
advice about the political feasibility of clients’ objectives, facilitating the formation of
coalitions and grass root organizations, legislative drafting, legislative witness hearing
preparation, and public relations. Until now the behavior of commercial lobbying firms and
their economic implications has not been analyzed in the theoretical economics literature,
and it is the intent of this dissertation to provide a simple general equilibrium model of
commercial lobbying.
Although the activities of commercial lobbying firms has received little or no attention
from the economic literature, they are influential and have distinct characteristics. Among
the top 10 U.S. lobbying firms in 2010 were five law firms and five government affairs
consulting firms. Their reported revenues from lobbying services at the federal level
were cumulatively around $252 million in 2010. The total reported revenues for all
lobbying activities at the federal level were $3.47 billion. The top 25 commercial lobbying
contracts in 2010 ranged between $1 and $10 million.2 These expenditures were related
to the political representation of lobbying firms’ clients and exclude their clients’ political
campaign contributions. Commercial lobbying firms advertise their political experience,
expertise in specific political and legal areas, and political contacts.3 That they advertise
their experience and contacts suggests that most relationships between lobbyists and
policymakers are personal and based on repeated interactions.4 These features are
incorporated into this analysis.5
2The identities and revenues are from www.opensecret.org; a website from the Center for Responsive
Politics. Their data are collected from the individual lobbying registrations and reports provided by the
US Senate Office of Public Records. The Lobbying Disclosure Act (1995) requires professional lobbyists to
register and report their activities at the federal level.
3Many lobbying firms advertise on their websites the number of employees with Congress or House staff
experience or the number of years their employees held public offices.
4This observation was confirmed by University of Oregon Associate Vice President for Public &
Government Affairs Betsy Boyd, who is in charge of the university’s political representation and registered
as a lobbyist under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (1995).
5The nature of the repeated agency relationship will not be crucial for the model in this chapter. A
dynamic version of the model will be presented in chapter 3.
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That lobbying is an important phenomenon is reflected in the increase in public
awareness and concern over the influence of special interests on the political process.
Pressure to regulate lobbying activities has grown in most democratic countries. The
regulation of professional lobbying activities has taken the form of public registers, codes of
conduct, and activity reports, such as those adopted recently in the United States, Canada,
and Australia.6 However, most Western democracies have limited or no regulation.7
Also, policy contingent payments to policymakers are widely illegal and the amounts of
campaign contributions are frequently limited. Additionally, there is a recent trend towards
increased transparency over policymakers’ personal income and other financial records.
This increased transparency is intended to provide the public with valuable information
about policymakers’ behavior. The public has also expressed concerns that professional
lobbying might not be transparent and may crowd citizens out of the political process.
The conventional wisdom of lobbying is that special interest groups or citizens may
have valuable information that an imperfectly informed policymaker wishes to learn. As
a society we care about the quality of policy decisions and benefit from this provision
of information. Unfortunately, private incentives to misrepresent information may limit
what a policymaker may learn from the signals sent by citizens or special interest groups,
and the quality of their policy decisions may suffer. Special interest groups and citizens
also make financial contributions to policymakers. These financial contributions might be
contingent on policy choices and affect negatively the political decision making process.
In sum, lobbying performs a socially desirable function by transmitting information to
policymakers but the concomitant campaign contributions may adversely distort policy
6The Lobbying Disclosure Act (1995) regulates lobbying activities on the federal level in the United
States. The regulation includes registration, frequent reports, and penalties for potential violations. In
Canada, the Lobbying Act (2008) extended the previous regulation and requires a registration of activities,
provides a code of conduct, and limits post-employment opportunities. In 2008, the Australian government
introduced a code of conduct and a public register to regulate lobbying activities.
7See Chari, Hogan, and Murphy (2010) for an extensive overview of lobbying regulations across countries.
The Center for Ethics in Government at the National Congress of State Legislators provides an annual
overview of lobbying regulations for U.S. states on its website.
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decisions. In this analysis it is argued that the existence of commercial lobbying firms who
specialize partially in information verification may serve to, at least partially, circumvent
this problem. Commercial lobbying firms maximize their discounted profit streams like any
other conventional business, and trade off potential profit increases today from information
misrepresentation against the decreases this will imply for future profits. These market
incentives, which shall be formalized as an agency relationship between policymakers and
lobby firms, allow for the credible transmission of information.
The introduction of commercial lobbyists as intermediaries between citizens and
policymakers introduces several new elements of interest, which are not present in the
analysis of lobbying by special interest groups. First, commercial lobbyists act as the agents
of citizens or special interest groups in presenting their policy proposals to policymakers.
Hence a market for intermediation services is introduced. Second, there are agency
relationships between the commercial lobbyists and policymakers. Here the policymakers
are principals who use access rules to motivate lobbyists to learn and transmit valuable
information in exchange for political access. In order to focus on the implications of
commercial lobbying a simple general equilibrium structure is provided with three types
of agents: Citizens, lobbying firms, and policymakers. All three agent types are assumed
to be rational and self-interested.8 The number of policymakers will be determined by a
constitution. Those not chosen as policymakers may decide to be citizens or lobbyists, and
this choice will satisfy a simple arbitrage condition. The model will be constructed such that
there is no rationale for the formation of classical special interest groups. Singleton citizens
pursuing their own private interests via the political process could in principle decline the
intermediation services of lobbying firms and make direct representations to policymakers,
that is be their own special interest group. However, it is shown that this is typically not
an equilibrium outcome in our model, and frequently it is not socially desirable. Policy
8There is no benevolent social planner except a fictitious one used to generate a benchmark for making
welfare comparisons.
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decisions will be assumed to have private benefits to the citizens that propose them, but
will also have spillover effects for the other agents in the model. These spillovers may
be socially desirable or undesirable and are not perfectly observed ex ante.9 The role of
commercial lobbying firms is to observe a signal correlated with the social desirability of
any proposal that they “verify”; they thus have the potential to pass along to policymakers
a portfolio of proposals some of which have been verified and some not, and amongst those
that have been verified a mix of proposals that they observed to be associated with positive
and negative signals. That is they may pass along a portfolio of a given expected quality in
the sense of the associated expected value of spillovers. Generally in this model more policy
proposals is a good thing, but more verification is also desirable. For a given number of
agents in the economy there will be an optimal mix of citizens, lobbyists and policymakers.
This optimal mix will typically not be achieved as a market outcome, which may involve
too much or too little lobbying, furthermore given that resource allocations are market
driven the second best constitution (number of policymakers) may be greater of less than
at the first-best optimum.
II.1.1. Related Literature
The analysis of special interest groups and lobbying activities has a long tradition.
Olson’s (1965) seminal work provides some fundamental insights about special interest
groups and their formation. The classical literature on rent-seeking focuses on special
groups’ activities to demand or influence political decisions in their favor. The idea of
“rent-seeking” - approaching policymakers for favorable policies at the cost of welfare losses
- goes back to Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974), and Buchanan (1980).10 A recent extensive
9This echos Buchanan (1980), who noted that profit seeking and rent seeking may be the same activity
and similarly motivated, but either can have socially desirable or socially undesirable consequences.
10Tullock (1967) was the first scholar describing the phenomenon of rent-seeking. The term “rent-seeking”
was introduced by Krueger (1974) who was not aware of Tullock’s work. Buchanan (1980) provides a more
detailed discussion about the definition and extent of rent seeking activities and their consequences.
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survey by Congleton, Hillman, and Konrad (2008) summarizes the different approaches
and directions in this field. For a long time, the “black-box” of rent-seeking was modeled
with a simple Tullock (1980) contest function, where the relative amount of rent-seeking
expenditures determines the likelihood for realizing private rents.
In response to the ad hoc nature of Tullock contest functions, two strands of literature
have emerged. One strand of literature focuses on campaign contributions to influence
policymakers, whereas another strand addresses the strategic use of information. Persson
and Tabellini (2000) as well as Grossman and Helpman (2001) provide surveys of both
strands. More recent contributions seek to combine these strands of the literature. Some
more recent empirical work focuses on the observed personal relationships between lobbyists
and politicians and provide further insights into lobbying activities. The next sections
provide some exemplary studies for each strand of the lobbying literature. The survey of
the literature reveals that to the best of my knowledge, no theoretical work has focused on
the features of commercial lobbying.
II.1.1.1. Financial Contributions
There is an extensive literature that examines the influence of campaign contributions
on policy outcomes. Starting with the seminal contribution of Bernheim and Whinston
(1986) these menu auction models assume that well-informed agents bid to have a less
informed policymaker adopt their preferred policies. Their model predicts that the
policymaker’s payoff is increasing in the level of conflict between interest groups.
Grossman and Helpman (1994) employ the menu auction approach to investigate
a model of endogenous formation of trade protection. In their common agency model
principals, special interest groups seeking trade policies, make contingent contribution offers
for desired policies and the government chooses policies to maximize its own outcome. The
government’s outcome depends on political contributions from special interest groups for
chosen trade policies, and reelection concerns determined by average voter welfare. It is
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argued that political contributions are made to influence policymakers’ decisions rather
than to affect electoral outcomes but that electoral outcomes constrain policymakers. The
degree of trade protection for special interest groups increases with the government’s desire
for campaign contributions relative to voter welfare.
Besley and Coate (2001) also consider a lobbying model with contingent contributions,
they combine a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, as studied in Besley
and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996), with the analysis of Grossman and
Helpman (1994). Besley and Coate (2001) present the following results: Competition for
political office and the associated lobbying rents leads candidates to choose identical policy
choices; however, voters can offset the influence of lobbies if they elect candidates whose
interests differ from those of the lobbies’. In their model, not all political equilibria predict
complete dissipation of rents.
II.1.1.2. Information Transmission
The other strand of literature assesses the role of lobbying as information revelation.
Two issues arise: First, special interest groups may desire to reveal their information
truthfully to the policymaker but may only do so imprecisely. Second, special interest
groups may misrepresent their information to strategically manipulate policymakers’
choices.
Crawford and Sobel (1982) provide an example of a model where agents may only
provide information imprecisely. An agent with private information can send a signal to
a less informed principal who has the authority to implement a policy that determines
the welfare of both. They show that in equilibrium the more informed agent informs the
principal that the true state lies within a given partition of the appropriate space. The
principal believes that the true state lies at the midpoint of the partition. The agent
cannot be more precise in their information revelation as the partitioning of the space
causes the principal’s beliefs to jump discontinuously punishing the agent for any attempts
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to strategically manipulate those beliefs, thus making the imprecise signal credible. The
closer the individuals’ preferences are the more precise is the signal that may be credibly
sent.
Potters and van Winden (1992) extend the analysis of strategic information with
“cheap talk” and focus on costly lobbying. An interest group has private information that
is relevant for the policymaker. The interest group has to bear some costs if it decides to
lobby the policymaker. A message from an interest group can provide a policymaker with
valuable information even in the presence of conflict, information independent costs, or
unsubstantial messages. Lobbying is more likely if the costs are lower and the benefits are
higher; the informational quality increases with the proximity of parties’ interests. Overall,
lobbying can increase parties’ welfare or be socially wasteful.
An alternative model with greater emphasis on the strategic manipulation of
information is provided by Krishna and Morgan (2001). They describe an environment
with two perfectly informed experts who can advise a decision maker. The experts are
biased and may misrepresent their information to the decision maker and achieve more
favorable outcomes. The decision maker has to decide who and how many experts shall
provide the desired information. Experts’ messages are sent sequentially and publicly.
If experts have similar preferences, then a second expert does not improve the decision
quality; if experts have opposing preferences, then it is beneficial to consult both experts.
For both cases, full revelation does not occur. Full revelation may occur if experts engage
in a back-and-forth debate.
II.1.1.3. Interaction of Political Contributions and Information Transmission
Other studies have focused of the interactions of political contributions and
information revelation as a means by which lobbyists influence policymakers. Early models
have modeled campaign contributions as means to gain political access to policymakers and
the gained political access as a channel for the transmission of the interest group’s private
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information. Austen-Smith (1995) develops a two-stage model where an interest group’s
contributions buy access to the policymaker in the first stage. In the second stage, the
access is used to present costless information. In one scenario, the policymaker is informed
about the interest group’s preferences. The analysis predicts a positive relationship
between the amount of contributions and the difference between the policymaker’s and
interest groups’ preferences. In the alternative scenario the interest groups’ preferences are
unknown to the policymaker. The policymaker can observe the value of political access
and forms beliefs about the interest group’s objectives. The beliefs are imprecise and there
is incomplete revelation of the interest group’s type.
Lohmann (1995) considers several heterogeneous interest groups seeking to influence
policy. The decisions about buying political access and providing information are
simultaneous. The information provided by an interest group to the policymaker is a public
good. The interest groups’ incentives to free ride decrease the contributions and lead to
incomplete rent dissipation. Interest groups with objectives close to the policymaker’s
obtain access at no cost, whereas extreme interest groups have to make positive payments.
Since there are several interest groups competing for influence individual contributions
are less effective. There is full revelation of information for cases with high dimensional
message spaces and where the information received by each interest group is independent.
More recent models focus on special interest groups’ strategic choice of information
transmission and financial contributions. For example, Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006)
argue that an information externality arises when competing special interest groups
attempt to influence a policymaker with policy relevant information about a single policy.
This information externality reduces an interest group’s incentive to provide information
and results in a specialization of interest groups in providing information or financial
contributions depending on the interest group’s information technology. In the current
analysis citizens have policy proposals with unknown spillovers that may be investigated
by lobbyists. The lobbyists’ findings are specific for each policy proposal so that there
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is an externality from an enacted policy but no informational externality. Dahm and
Porteiro (2008a) focus on the observed simultaneity of information acquisition and financial
contributions. In their model a single interest group’s gathered information may benefit or
harm its aspirations. So financial contributions may avoid a negative information effect or
complement information transfers depending on the lobbying game.
II.1.1.4. Empirical Literature
Recent empirical work by Blanes i Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen (2011) focuses on
the “revolving door” phenomenon. Former staff employees of Congress members may offer
their former work contacts and earn economic rents as lobbyists. Blanes i Vidal, Draca,
and Fons-Rosen (2011) find empirical support for the hypothesis that the work experience
as a staffer is a source for lobbying revenues and that these revenues are increasing in
the political contacts’ seniority and power of committee assignments. They show that
the lobbyists’ revenues decrease immediately and permanently when their former employer
loses political office. Eggers (2010) focuses on partisan lobbying and the revolving door
phenomenon. He uses the party affiliation of lobbyists with staff experience and politicians
in power as indicator for networks. The results show that former staff members’ lobbying
revenues are more affected by their own party membership and the current party in power;
whereas former politicians are more likely to earn lobbying rents because of their personal
relationships rather than party affiliation. Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011) focus
on the overall lobbying industry and try to disentangle whether lobbyists provide issue
expertise or contacts to policymakers. They find evidence that personal contacts as well
as lobbyists’ expertise matter. Their empirical findings support many of the assumptions
made in the presented model of commercial lobbying.
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II.1.2. Outline of the Chapter
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
basic model that incorporates the idea of commercial lobbying firms that sell their
intermediation services to their clients and interact with policymakers on their behalf.
Section 3 presents the social welfare optimum and the socially efficient constitution as a
benchmark. Individual incentives to oppose or support socially optimal institutions are
considered. Section 4 derives the market equilibrium with self-interested policymakers
who are informed about lobbyists’ verification efforts. The results are contrasted to the
socially optimal outcomes. Potential regulatory actions to achieve first-best or second-best
outcomes are discussed. Section 5 concludes with a brief summary.
II.2. The Basic Model
In the basic model of commercial lobbying the analysis examines the interactions
between citizens, lobbyists, and policymakers and characterize and compare the market
and socially optimal allocations.
Consider a society of population T . Each society member is potentially a citizen, c,
lobbyist, l, or policymaker, p. Each citizen receives a single policy proposal which if enacted
yields a private benefit and generates a social spillover which might be positive or negative.
The citizens may either attempt to present their policy proposals directly to policymakers
or indirectly via the services of a commercial lobbying firm. Any proposal that is heard by
a policymaker is automatically enacted and its payoffs realized. If a proposal is presented
via a commercial lobbying firm that lobby has the ability to investigate the potential social
spillover and reported its findings to the policymaker.
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II.2.1. Citizens
There are C citizens and each of whom has a policy proposal for policymakers which if
approved will yield a private benefit of pic > 0. Additionally, every realized policy proposal
has a spillover for society of ec. A spillover can be positive, with ec > 0, which would be
socially desirable, or negative, with ec < 0 and it is assumed that pic + ec < 0, which would
be socially undesirable. The exogenous probability of a positive spillover is ρ(e+). With
the complementary probability, ρ(e−) = 1 − ρ(e+), that a randomly drawn proposal has
a negative spillover. Overall, the expected social value of a randomly drawn proposal is
positive. This expected social value ensures potential progress through political decisions.
Citizens realize, if their own policy proposal is approved, the private benefit of the
proposal pic and additionally a share of aggregate spillovers from all policy proposals
approved by policymakers, A. Citizens may present their proposals directly to a
policymaker at no cost or hire for a fee of k a commercial lobbyist to present the proposal
on their behalf.11 A citizen can hire only one lobbyist, and the payoff for citizen c is
Πc =

pic + 1T
A∑
c=1
ec if c gains access directly,
1
T
A∑
c=1
ec if c gains no access,
pic − k + 1T
A∑
c=1
ec if lobbyist l presents c’s proposal, or
−k + 1T
A∑
c=1
ec if lobbyist l does not present c’s proposal.
(II.2.1)
11It is assumed that lobbyists are compensated for their overall services they provide to clients and not
just rewarded for success. The use of “lobbying success fees” - where the lobbyist’s compensation from the
client depends on the lobbyist’s success - is sensitive, since such fees are often illegal or restricted. Lobbying
success fees are illegal in connection to U.S. federal government contracts - see 10 U.S.C. 2306(b) - but
exceptions apply for lobbying Congress members - see the Lobbying Disclosure Act Guidance (2010) for
further details. Also, 43 U.S. states prohibit the use of lobbying success fees and 3 states restrict them -
see the Center for Ethics in Government’s (2010) “50 State Chart: Contingency Fees” for an overview.
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II.2.2. Lobbying Firms
There are L commercial lobbyists and each lobbyist represents a different lobbying
firm. Each lobbying firm accepts proposals from nl clients and charges a lobbying service
fee of k per proposal. Each lobbyist l receives political access of a˜lp from policymaker p.
Overall, the lobbyist l receives political access of a˜l =
pl∑
p=1
a˜lp from his pl political contacts.
The lobbying firm sells his political access to citizens. Besides policy proposals from clients,
a lobbyist may also provide financial contributions of f lp to each political contact.12,13 It is
assumed that lobbying firms have expertise which allows them to investigate the potential
spillovers of a policy proposal.14 This expertise takes the form of a verification technology
that returns a signal x, x ∈ {x+, x−}, and improves the quality of the lobbying firm’s
information about a proposal’s expected spillover. If the signal is positive, x+, then the
exogenous probability of a positive spillover is higher than without investigative effort,
ρ(e+|x+) > ρ(e+); a negative signal, x−, increases the likelihood of a negative spillover,
ρ(e−|x−) > ρ(e−). Investigated proposals with a positive signal have a greater expected
social value than unverified proposals; verified proposals with a negative signal have a
negative expected social value. The expected social value of a policy proposal can be
12Financial contributions are not linked to policy outcomes here, they exist as part of the price of access
paid by commercial lobbyists; for the implications of policy contingent financial contributions see Bernheim
and Whinston (1986), Grossman and Helpman (1994), and Besley and Coate (2001).
13The assumption that only commercial lobbyists make financial contributions is a simplification.
However, Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011) provide empirical evidence that lobbyists make larger
campaign contributions than their clients and that out-of-house lobbyists make larger ones than in-house
lobbyists. They also show that lobbyists’ campaign contributions are a standard practice and can be linked
to politicians with whom they overlap in lobbying and political issues.
14This assumption was confirmed in an interview with a professional lobbyist. Further, Bertrand,
Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011) construct a measure of lobbyists’ concentration in specific issues. They
distinguish between “specialists” who focus on a few issues and “generalists” who are involved with a
larger range of issues. They find that out-of-house lobbyists are more likely to be specialized than in-house
lobbyists and are less likely to be generalists.
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summarized as to the following:
ρ(e+|x+) (pic + s) + ρ(e−|x+) (pic − s) > ρ(e+) (pic + s) + ρ(e−) (pic − s)
> 0 > ρ(e+|x−) (pic + s) + ρ(e−|x−) (pic − s) (II.2.2)
where ±s is the magnitude of the spillover ec.
Verification is costly, and is represented by the increasing convex cost function F (ml),
where ml is the number of proposals verified. In addition each proposal, whether verified or
not, incurs the lobbyist a processing cost, represented by the increasing convex cost function
G(nl), where nl is the number of proposals processed. Additionally, the verification and
processing costs have the property F ′(0) = G′(0) = 0.
Lobbying firms also enjoy a share of aggregate spillovers, hence their payoffs are
Πl = knl −G(nl)− F (ml)−
pl∑
p=1
f lp +
1
T
A∑
c=1
ec. (II.2.3)
II.2.3. Policymakers
Each of the P policymakers has a given endowment of time that allows them to approve
a maximum of Ap proposals. Given that there are P policymakers, they can approve
A ≤ PAp proposals. The number of approved proposals is finite, and each policymaker
has to decide how to allocate political access across citizens and lobbyists. Policymakers
do not have an independent verification technology and cannot investigate presented
policy proposals. Nevertheless, each policymaker p can design rules a˜cp(.) and a˜lp(.) that
determine access for citizens and lobbyists. Financial contributions by lobbyists may be a
part of these access rules. The allocation of access must satisfy Ap ≥
cp∑
c=1
a˜cp +
lp∑
l=1
a˜lp. All
presented proposals are implemented by policymakers.
Policymakers receive an ego rent from holding office, θ, potentially receive financial
contributions, f lp, from their lp lobbying contacts, and enjoy a share of aggregate spillovers.
20
The valuation of financial contributions is parameterized by α with α ∈ [0, 1], which may
be interpreted as the degree of dishonesty of a policymaker. The payoff for policymaker p
is then
Πp = θ + α
lp∑
l=1
f lp +
1
T
A∑
c=1
ec. (II.2.4)
II.3. Social Welfare Optimum
The analysis begins with a characterization of the social welfare optimum, which acts
as the benchmark for our analysis. The social planner maximizes ex ante social welfare
by choosing the allocation of all resources in society; this includes choosing the number
of policymakers and level of lobbying activities. There are two potential social welfare
optima, with either a positive or a zero level of commercial lobbying.
II.3.1. Description of Social Welfare
Let a social planner care about the sum of individual payoffs.15 This can be described
by
Πs =
C∑
c=1
Πc +
L∑
l=1
Πl +
P∑
P=1
Πp
= Al
[
pic − k + 1
T
A∑
c=1
ec
]
+ (N −Al)
[
−k + 1
T
A∑
c=1
ec
]
+Ac
[
pic +
1
T
A∑
c=1
ec
]
+ (C −N −Ac)
[
1
T
A∑
c=1
ec
]
+Nk −
L∑
l=1
F (ml)−
L∑
l=1
G(nl)−
L∑
l=1
f l +
L
T
A∑
c=1
ec
+Pθ + α
P∑
p=1
fp +
P
T
A∑
c=1
ec, (II.3.1)
15The description of social welfare follows a utilitarian welfare function with identical weights and payoffs
describing individual utilities. A social planner is concerned about efficiency with respect to the largest
possible sum of payoffs.
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where N is the total number of proposals passed to lobbying firms for potential political
representation; Al is the number of policy proposals presented by lobbyists; the remaining
N − Al proposals are passed to lobbying firms but are not presented to policymakers.
Citizens may access policymakers directly. There areAc proposals presented by citizens; the
remaining proposals are neither presented directly or indirectly by citizens. The financial
contributions f l are transfers from lobbyists to policymakers.
In expected terms, (II.3.1) can be reduced to
E [Πs] = Apic −
L∑
l=1
F (ml)−
L∑
l=1
G(nl) + Pθ + (α− 1)
L∑
l=1
f l + E
[
A∑
c=1
ec
]
. (II.3.2)
A social planner, who wants to maximize social welfare as given by the sum of
individual payoffs, discards proposals with negative verification signals and accepts all
other policy proposals. To summarize, the expected spillovers are
E
[
A∑
c=1
ec
]
=
(
Ac +
L∑
l=1
ul
)
s
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)]
+ρ(x+)
L∑
l=1
mls
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)] , (II.3.3)
where ul is the number of proposals presented by lobbyist l that have not been verified.
II.3.2. Optimal Verification and Financial Contributions
First, the social planner identifies the optimal distribution of political access across
citizens and lobbyists, the optimal portfolio of policy proposals consisting of verified and
unverified proposals, and the optimal amount of financial contributions from lobbyists to
policymakers.
The social planner employs all political resources to approve policy proposals, A =
PAp, because of the positive expected value of a marginal approved policy proposal.
The maximization problem consists of the objective function from (II.3.2), the choice of
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verification efforts and financial contributions undertaken by lobbyists, ml and f l, as well
as the allocation of political access given a number of citizens, lobbyists, and policymakers.
The problem is to
max
nl,ml,ul,rl,f l,Ac
E [Πs] = PAppic −
L∑
l=1
F (ml)−
L∑
l=1
G(nl) + Pθ + (α− 1)
L∑
l=1
f l
+
(
PAp − ρ(x+)
L∑
l=1
ml
)
s
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)]
+ρ(x+)
L∑
l=1
mls
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)] (II.3.4)
s.t.
nl = ml + ul + rl, (II.3.5)
where nl is the number of clients’ proposals, ml the number of verified proposals, ul
the number of unverified but presented proposals, and rl the number of proposals that
disappear in a lobbying firm. (At the social welfare optimum, ul = rl = 0.)
The first-order conditions are
∂E [Πs]
∂ml
= −∂F (m
l)
∂ml
− ∂G(m
l + ul + rl)
∂nl
+ρ(x+)s
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)] ∀ l (II.3.6)
with ml > 0 because of F ′(0) = G′(0) = 0,
∂E [Πs]
∂ul
= −∂G(m
l + ul + rl)
∂nl
+ s
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)] ≤ 0 ∀ l, (II.3.7)
∂E [Πs]
∂rl
= −∂G(m
l + ul + rl)
∂nl
≤ 0 ∀ l (II.3.8)
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with rl = 0 because of ml > 0 and G′(.) > 0,
∂E [Πs]
∂f l
= α− 1 ≤ 0 ∀ l, (II.3.9)
∂E [Πs]
∂Ac
= s
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)] > 0 ∀ c. (II.3.10)
The second-order conditions with respect to verification are
∂2E [Πs]
∂ml
2 = −
∂2F (ml)
∂ml
2 −
∂2G(nl)
∂nl
2 < 0 ∀ l. (II.3.11)
and are satisfied because F (.) and G(.) are increasing and convex.
Given the described optimization problem and first-order conditions, the following
can be stated.
Proposition 1. If there is a corner solution for (II.3.4), then all proposals shall be verified
by lobbyists and all access is granted to lobbyists, who present only those proposals with
positive verification signals. Each lobbyist presents ml∗ = PA
p
ρ(x+)L
proposals.
If there is an interior solution, then lobbyists verify m∗ proposals and present those
with positive verification signals. The remaining political resources are employed to approve
unverified proposals presented by citizens.
Potentially the optimization problem for the social planner has two different solutions
with respect to verification. If the number of policymakers is rather small and policymakers
can approve only a relatively small number of proposals, then the social optimum is at a
corner and only those proposals that were verified and received a positive verification
signal are enacted. All political access is allocated to commercial lobbying firms. If the
number of policymakers is rather large and relatively many proposals can be approved,
then the social optimum is interior and the verification of proposals is determined by the
marginal trade-off between the costs and benefits of verification costs. The policymakers’
remaining resources are employed to approve unverified proposals presented by citizens.
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Since unverified proposals have the same expected benefit whether they are presented by
lobbyists or citizens but lobbyists have to bear processing costs.16 The political capture
of policymakers by lobbyists occurs only for a corner solution with a relatively fewer
policymakers.
If there is an interior solution, then the optimal number of verified proposals, m∗, is
a function of the spillovers’ magnitudes, the quality of the verification technology, as given
by the improvement in information about spillovers, and the costs of commercial lobbying.
If the magnitude of spillovers, s, increases, then information becomes more valuable to
distinguish between proposals with positive and negative spillovers and it is optimal to
invest more resources in verification. The same holds for the verification technology. If the
technology is more effective at distinguishing between proposals, then it is more valuable
to invest resources in verification. The comparative statics for an interior solution can be
summarized by
m∗ = m
 s︸︷︷︸
(+)
, ρ(x+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
, ρ(e+|x+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
, ρ(e−|x+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
, ρ(e+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
, ρ(e−)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
 . (II.3.12)
The optimal investigation efforts m∗ for an interior solution are invariant to the
number of lobbyists, L, and policymakers, P . This does not hold at a corner solution,
where the number of policymakers and lobbyists determine the amount of verification.
The amount of verification at a corner solution depends positively on the number of
policymakers, P , and individual political resources Ap. It is decreasing in the number
of lobbyists, L, and the likelihood for a positive verification signal ρ(x+).
Using proposition 1 and (II.3.9), the following can be stated.
Lemma 1. If α < 1, then financial contributions from lobbying firms to policymakers are
welfare decreasing and the optimal amount would be f∗ = 0. However, if α = 1, then
16For all unverified proposals it is true that ∂E[Π
s]
∂ul
< ∂E[Π
s]
∂Ac
.
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financial contributions are pure transfers from lobbying firms to policymakers and do not
affect the choice of verification efforts and the allocation of political access.
If policymakers discount financial contributions, then these payments are not pure
transfers and are therefore socially wasteful.17 However, if financial contributions are pure
transfers, then these payments are lump sum transfers and do not affect the social optimum.
II.3.3. Optimal Number of Policymakers and Size of Political Establishment
It has been shown that the solution to the social planner’s problem could be
constrained by the number of policymakers and lobbyists. To extend the analysis, the social
planner may choose the number of lobbyists, citizens, and policymakers. In a sense this
describes the design of a socially optimal constitution, and it identifies whether commercial
lobbying is socially desirable.
The costs of assigning a citizen to be a lobbyist or policymaker are the foregone private
benefits pic and spillovers ec from the citizen’s proposal. The benefits from increasing the
number of policymakers are Ap more approved proposals and the compensation for holding
office. The social planner only wants citizens to become lobbyists if they are going to verify
all of their clients’ proposals. If the expected social benefit of an additional citizen, pic +
E[ec], outweighs the social benefits from investigations, which is then true for all lobbyists
and verification effort levels, it follows that the social optimum involves zero lobbyists. If,
conversely, the verification benefits from commercial lobbying outweigh the benefits of an
additional citizen, then the number of citizens must be equal to the number of proposals
that lobbyists can verify. The proportion of proposals verified that received positive signals
must then equal total access to policymakers.
17The financial contributions are discounted by the degree of dishonesty. A policymaker with a lower
degree of dishonesty, low α, discounts financial contributions more than a more dishonest policymaker.
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II.3.3.1. Social Optimum without Commercial Lobbying
First, suppose that the marginal benefit of an additional lobbyist is less than the
marginal cost. This has to be true for all lobbyists and therefore commercial lobbying
does not take place. The expected social value of an unverified policy proposal is positive.
To maximize social welfare, a social planner employs all political resources to approve
proposals. Expected social welfare is then
E[Πs] = min {PAp, C}pic + Pθ + E
min{PAp,C}∑
c=1
ec
 , (II.3.13)
where society consists of citizens and policymakers. Solving the social planner’s problem
to maximize the sum of payoffs, the following can be stated.
Proposition 2. The socially optimal solution in the absence of commercial lobbying
requires that the political resources equal the number of available policy proposals and
citizens – i.e., PAp = A and PAp = C. All policy proposals are approved.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To realize its social value each proposal must have a proposer, a citizen, and a
policymaker to enact the proposal. It follows that at the social welfare optimum the
number of citizens must equal the total political access.18
Given T = C + P and proposition 2, the socially optimal number of policymakers in
the absence of commercial lobbying is
P ∗ =
T
Ap + 1
(II.3.14)
and the number of citizens is
C∗ =
TAp
Ap + 1
. (II.3.15)
18It is assumed that the citizen’s social contribution is larger than a policymaker’s. Otherwise it would
be optimal to have only policymakers in the population.
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The optimal expected social welfare in the absence of commercial lobbying is
E[Πs∗] =
T (Ap (pic + E [ec]) + θ)
Ap + 1
(II.3.16)
with an expected spillover of E[ec] = s [ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)].
II.3.3.2. Social Optimum with Commercial Lobbying
Now suppose that the marginal benefit of an additional lobbyist outweighs the
losses from a marginal policy proposal. This implies that commercial lobbying is socially
beneficial and the following can be stated.
Proposition 3. In the case of welfare enhancing commercial lobbying, the optimum
requires that all political resources are employed to approve proposals, PAp = A. Lobbying
firms verify all policy proposals from citizens, ml∗L = C. Only policy proposals with a
positive verification signal are passed and approved by policymakers, ρ(x+)m∗ = PA
p
L .
Proof. See the Appendix.
If commercial lobbying is welfare enhancing, then the social planner requires that
all policy proposals are verified. The selection of the potentially best policy proposals
maximizes in expected terms the quality of political decisions. This “cherry-picking”
process excludes citizens from political access and reduces their political role to the
provision of policy proposals.
Given T = C+L+P and proposition 3, the socially optimal number of policymakers
in the presence of commercial lobbying is
P ∗∗ =
ρ(x+)Tm∗
ρ(x+)m∗ +Ap +Apm∗
, (II.3.17)
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the number of lobbyists is
L∗∗ =
TAp
ρ(x+)m∗ +Ap +Apm∗
, (II.3.18)
and the number of citizens is
C∗∗ =
TApm∗
ρ(x+)m∗ +Ap +Apm∗
. (II.3.19)
Optimal expected social welfare with commercial lobbying is
E[Πs∗∗] =
T (ρ(x+)m∗ (θ +Ap (pic + E [ec|x+]))−Ap (F (m∗) +G(m∗)))
ρ(x+)m∗ +Ap +Apm∗
(II.3.20)
with an expected spillover of E[ec|x+] = s [ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)].
II.3.4. Comparison of Potential Social Optima
The previous results identified potential social optima with or without commercial
lobbying. Which of these is the social optimum depends on the deep parameters of the
model. Here the analysis characterizes the differences between the two potential outcomes.
Comparing the number of policymakers, the following can be stated.
Proposition 4. The optimal number of policymakers is greater in the absence of
commercial lobbying than in the presence of commercial lobbying – i.e., P ∗ > P ∗∗.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the absence of commercial lobbying policymakers approve all available proposals,
and there is no policy proposal filtered by the lobbying industry. More approved policy
proposals require more political resources and therefore more policymakers. Whereas in
the presence of commercial lobbying there are less policy proposals passed to policymakers
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because of a verification filtering effect by lobbyists. As a consequence, less policy proposals
are presented and approved, which can be done with fewer policymakers.
If we define the political establishment as the sum of policymakers and lobbyists
(Washington insiders), the following can be stated.
Lemma 2. Iff Ap > ρ(x−)m∗, then the optimal size of the political establishment is smaller
in the absence of commercial lobbying – i.e., P ∗ < P ∗∗ + L∗∗.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Given the optimal number of citizens, lobbyists, and policymakers, the analysis
characterizes the socially efficient outcome. The comparison of E[Πs∗] R E[Πs∗∗] can
be summarized by
(P ∗ − P ∗∗) (θ +Appic)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+Ap
(
P ∗E [ec]− P ∗∗E [ec|x+])︸ ︷︷ ︸
(?)
+L∗∗ (F (m∗) +G(m∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
R 0,
(II.3.21)
which can be broken down into the three terms indicated in equation (II.3.21). The
first term is the pure private gains from additional policymakers, that is the ego rents
earned by the policymakers themselves, and the additional private benefits realized because
more policymakers can approve more proposals. The second term gives the benefits from
improved information when lobbyists exist, but these are moderated by the fact that more
lobbyists imply fewer policymakers. The third term simply recognizes that commercial
lobbying is costly. It can be concluded that if the second term is absolutely larger than the
sum of the first and the third, that is if lobbying improves information sufficiently, then
commercial lobbying is socially desirable.
II.4. Market Outcome
In the previous section the analysis characterized the social optimum. Here, the
analysis characterizes the market equilibrium and ask if the market outcome is socially
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efficient, that is whether or not it yields the same allocation as the social optimum. The
basic structure of preferences and technologies is the same as in the previous section.
However, resource allocations are now determined by market mechanisms. The market
outcome consists of a perfectly competitive lobbying market, in which citizens demand
and lobbyists supply lobbying services, a market for political access governed by agency
relationships between lobbyists and policymakers, and the market for allocating labor
between lobbyists and citizens which is perfectly arbitraged. Policymakers grant political
access to lobbyists in exchange for informational and financial resources, and lobbyists sell
this political access to their clients.
The information structure as follows, ex ante no agent observes the spillovers.
However, all society’s members know the exogenous probabilities of ρ(e+), ρ(e−), ρ(e+|x+),
ρ(e−|x+), ρ(e+|x−), and ρ(e−|x−). Citizens do not observe the lobbyists’ actions or
interactions between lobbyists and policymakers. However, they can observe realized
political access a˜l and the number of clients nl of each lobbying firm l. Policymakers can
observe both the verification efforts of lobbyists and the signals generated. The number of
policymakers is determined by a constitution and is common knowledge.
Policymakers do not have independent verification technologies, but perfectly observe
and correctly interpret the verification signals generated by lobbyists. This has the
interpretation that policymakers are competent and ask lobbyists for “hard facts,” which
consist of research reports, from which they may deduce lobbyists’ verification activities.
Policymakers may then demand a level of verification by each lobbyist, possibly together
with a financial contribution, in exchange for political access.19
The analysis describes the incentives to form a commercial lobbying market, and how
self-interested policymakers employ commercial lobbying firms both to improve the quality
of information and as a means of extracting rents from society.
19Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006) adopt a set up in which a policymaker asks interest groups to provide
independent information from a reputable third-party. They cite in its support Milgrom and Roberts (1986),
Laffont and Tirole (1990), and Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002a, b).
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II.4.1. Citizens
Each citizen takes the distribution of political access as given and decides whether or
not to participate in the political process. A citizen can approach a policymaker directly at
no cost. If access is granted, then the attempt was successful and the proposal is approved.
However, some approaches may be unsuccessful, hence the citizens must calculate the
probability of gaining access in computing their expected payoffs which may be defined by
A˜c
C −N
[
pic +
E [ec]
T
]
≥ 0, (II.4.1)
where A˜c is the total access granted to citizens by all policymakers and N is the number
of all lobbying clients, and C − N is the number of citizens competing for the granted
available access.
As an alternative citizens may hire commercial lobbying firms to present their
policy proposals. These citizens cannot observe the lobbying activities and have to form
expectations about the likelihood that their proposals will be presented. The expected
payoff from hiring a lobbyist would be
a˜l
nl
[
pic +
E [ec]
T
]
− k ≥ 0 for every l. (II.4.2)
A citizen can always decide to be politically inactive, in which case the policy proposal
would expire, and the citizen realize a private benefit of zero and a share of all policy
spillovers. If all political resources are employed to approve policy proposals and if
citizens must make their choices of whether to present their proposals prior to lobbying
firms engaging in any verification activity, then citizens enjoy the same share of expected
spillovers independent of their choices.
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The citizen’s decision reduces to
∆E[Πc] =

A˜c
C−N pi
c if c chooses the direct approach,
a˜l
nl
pic − k if c passes the proposal to lobbyist l,
0 if c decides to be politically disenfranchised,
(II.4.3)
and if citizens expect political capture by lobbyists, then the choice alternatives reduce
to hiring a lobbying firm or being politically disenfranchised. As a result, the individual
demand for commercial lobbying would reduce to
a˜l
nl
pic − k ≥ 0 for all l. (II.4.4)
Given the market structure for commercial lobbying, each citizen has the opportunity
to become a lobbyist. The decision, whether to enter the industry or not, depends on
the citizens’ and lobbyists’ expected payoffs. More specific whether E[Πc] R E[Πl]. It is
assumed that this market is perfectly arbitraged.
II.4.2. Lobbyists
Policymakers device access rules to divide their time between lobbying firms and
citizens. The access rules define a portfolio of verified and unverified proposals to be
presented by any given lobbying firm to any given policymaker, and also any required
financial contributions. Since policymakers can observe lobbyists’ actions, they can enforce
access rules by denying political access when necessary.
Given the access rules, each lobbying firm determines its optimal size and whether
to remain in or leave the industry. It is assumed that there are sufficient lobbyists such
that each may neglect the effects of their own entry-exit decision on aggregate spillovers.
The opportunity of exit is the outside option for each lobbying firm. The firm’s problem
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is characterized by
max
nl
E[Πl] = knl −G(nl)− F (m¯l)− f¯ l (II.4.5)
with E[Πl] ≥ E[Πc] and identical spillover shares as its participation condition. Each
firm l must provide verification effort of m¯l =
∑pl
p=1 m¯
lp and financial contributions of
f¯ l =
∑pl
p=1 f¯
lp to its pl political contacts. The first-order condition with respect to the
number of clients is
k =
∂G(nl)
∂nl
(II.4.6)
with nl > 0 because of G′(0) = 0. The first-order condition determines the number of
clients a firm is willing to accept.
II.4.3. Policymakers
Each policymaker takes the lobbying service fee, k, the size of each firm, nl, and the
number of lobbyists, L, as given and determines the distribution of his political resources,
Ap, and the access rule for lobbyists. The access rule consists of a required level of
verification effort, mlp, the number policy proposals to be presented, and a given financial
contribution, f lp, for each lobbying firm.
A policymaker has to respect the lobbyist’s participation condition and cannot force
his lp lobbying contacts to realize economic losses. Further, the policymakers play a Nash
game between themselves. Each takes the actions of others as given, and does not request
more or less resources to influence the behavior of other policymakers. It is assumed
that policymakers have some degree of dishonesty, and so α ∈ (0, 1].20 Perfectly honest
policymakers, with α = 0, are discussed as a special case later. The expected payoff for a
20The assumption was made for technical reasons. The behavior of perfectly honest policymakers is
discussed in the Appendix A.1.
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policymaker is
E[Πp] = θ + α
lp∑
l=1
f lp +
1
T
E
 ∑
c∈A−p
ec
+ 1
T
E
[∑
c∈Ap
ec
]
. (II.4.7)
Given that all the policy proposals that will be presented have a positive expected
spillover effect, then each policymaker always exhausts political access.21 Any unverified
or positively verified proposal increases his share of expected spillovers. All proposals
with negative verification signals are ignored. Further, each policymaker may ignore some
unverified proposals, rlp, because of time constraints. Political access is granted by each
policymaker as long as lobbying firms provide the requested verification efforts, financial
contributions, and policy proposals.22 A policymaker knows that a citizen would provide
only a single unverified proposal, but a lobbyist could provide verification efforts and
financial contributions. Therefore, a policymaker has no incentive to allocate access to
citizens as long as lobbyists provide enough proposals.
The policymaker’s optimization problem is characterized by
max
mlp,f lp,a˜lp,rlp
E[Πp] = θ + α
lp∑
l=1
f lp +
1
T
E
 ∑
c∈A−p
ec

+
1
T
[
ρ(x+)
lp∑
l=1
mlp
]
s
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)]
+
1
T
[
lp∑
l=1
(
a˜lp − ρ(x+)mlp
)]
s
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)] (II.4.8)
subject to lobbying firms’ proposal constraint with Lagrange multiplier ωlp
nl = a˜lp + ρ(x−)mlp + rlp +
∑
h6=p
mlh +
∑
h6=p
ulh +
∑
h6=p
rlh lp (II.4.9)
21If there is political capture by lobbyists, then Ap =
lp∑
l=1
a˜lp.
22The number of unverified presented proposals can be written as ulp = a˜lp − ρ(x+)mlp.
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and the lobbying firms’ participation condition with multiplier λlp
nlk−f lp−
∑
h6=p
f lh−F (mlp+
∑
h6=p
mlh)−G(nl) ≥ E[Πc|private ben.] for every lp.23 (II.4.10)
The first-order conditions and associated complementary slackness conditions are
∂E[Πp]
∂mlp
= ρ(x+)
s
T
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)]
−λlp∂F (.)
∂mlp
− ρ(x−)ωlp ≤ 0, (II.4.11)
∂E[Πp]
∂mlp
mlp = 0, and mlp ≥ 0 ∀ lp,
∂E[Πp]
∂f lp
= α− λlp ≤ 0, (II.4.12)
∂E[Πp]
∂f lp
f lp = 0, and f lp ≥ 0 ∀ lp,
∂E[Πp]
∂a˜lp
=
s
T
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)]+ s
T
∂
∑
h6=l
a˜hp
∂a˜lp
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)]− ωlp ≤ 0, (II.4.13)
∂E[Πp]
∂a˜lp
a˜lp = 0, and a˜lp, and
∂E[Πp]
∂rlp
= −ωlp ≤ 0, (II.4.14)
∂E[Πp]
∂rlp
rlp = 0, and rlp ≥ 0 ∀ lp.
Lemma 3. Each policymaker with α 6= 0 extracts all potential resources up to the point
that each lobbyist with whom he has contact is indifferent between staying in and leaving
the industry.
Proof. See the Appendix.
23Citizens and lobbyists realize the same expected share of spillovers independent of their choices, and
therefore take only private benefits into account.
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A lobbyist can provide valuable information improvement and financial contributions
to a policymaker who has the means to extract resources. This result is standard in
the classical principal-agent literature, the only twist being that the policymakers do not
compensate their agents directly but rather transfer to them an asset, access, which they
sell to their clients, citizens.24
Proposition 5. If there is a corner solution to (II.4.8) with respect to verified proposals,
then all approved policy proposals received a positive verification signal. Policymakers
extract all remaining rents from lobbyists via financial contributions.
If there is a corner solution to (II.4.8) with respect to verified and unverified proposals,
then then the solution to the policymaker’s problem involves lobbyists verifying mco
proposals to exhaust a lobbyist’s financial resources, and presenting those proposals which
received a positive verification signal together with sufficient unverified proposals to exhaust
access. No rents are extracted via financial contributions because of a sufficiently small α.
The amount of verification at the firm-level is determined by
F
mco +∑
h6=p
mlh
 = nlk −∑
h6=p
f lh −G
(
nl
)
− E[Πc|private ben.]. (II.4.15)
If there is an interior solution to (II.4.8) with respect to verified and unverified
proposals as well as financial contributions, then the solution to the policymaker’s problem
involves lobbyists verifying m# proposals, and presenting those proposals which received a
positive verification signal together with sufficient unverified proposals to exhaust access.
All remaining rents are again extracted by policymakers via financial contributions. The
amount of verification at the firm-level is determined by
∂F
(
ml
)
∂mlp
= ρ(x+)
s
αT
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)] . (II.4.16)
24The principal-agent problem with moral hazard has its origins in the work by Mirrlees (1974, 1976),
Holmstrom (1979), and Grossman and Hart (1983). For an extensive review of the principal-agent literature
see Laffont and Martimort (2002) and Bolton and Dewatriport (2005).
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If there is a corner solution with respect to (II.4.8) and all approved proposals are
unverified. All rents from lobbying firms are extracted via financial contributions.
Proof. See the Appendix.
When each of the potential solutions to the policymaker’s problem arises depends
primarily on the degree of the dishonesty α. If a policymaker has a higher degree
of dishonesty and therefore values financial contributions more, then he requests less
verification efforts but higher financial contributions. Less verification efforts imply a
substitution of unverified proposals for proposals with positive verification signals since
the number of approved proposals does not change. As a consequence, the quality of
political decisions, as measured by spillover effects, decreases.
A policymaker’s incentive to improve political decisions depends also on his share
of expected spillovers. The share depends on the population size and is decreasing in
the number of people. An increasing population moves a policymaker’s trade-off towards
financial contributions. On the other hand, if the magnitude of spillovers increases or
the verification technology improves, then policy choices become more valuable to the
policymaker and move his trade-off towards verification efforts.
How the optimal level of verification responds to changes in the exogenous parameters
of the model depends on the nature of the solution to the policymaker’s problem.
Providing that the market for lobbying services between citizens and lobbyists clears
and the solution to the policymaker’s problem is interior, then the optimal level of
verification is independent of this market outcome. The comparative statics for an interior
solution can be summarized as
m# = m
 α︸︷︷︸
(−)
, T︸︷︷︸
(−)
, s︸︷︷︸
(+)
, ρ(x+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
, ρ(e+|x+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
, ρ(e−|x+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
, ρ(e+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
, ρ(e−)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
 . (II.4.17)
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When there is a corner solution with respect to verified (and unverified proposals),
then the policymaker’s optimal verification requests depend on the market outcome for
lobbying services (first and second statement of proposition 5). The greater the rents
lobbyists earn from this market the greater will be the level of verification policymakers
can request.
Finally, when there is a corner solution with respect to financial contributions, then
the policymaker requests zero verification and this is locally invariant with respect to
endogenous parameters of the model.
II.4.4. Comparison of Socially Optimal and Market Levels of Verification and Financial Contributions
Comparing the requests for verification and financial contributions made by a
policymaker in a market environment with the socially optimal level of these variables
allows us to identify the distortions caused by self-interested policymakers. A social planner
takes all costs and benefits of commercial lobbying into account, but each policymaker in
a market environment neglects the value of spillovers to others, and all costs that do
not impose direct constraints on their choices. Further, the value placed on financial
contributions by a policymaker provides him with an incentive to substitute financial
contributions for information quality. The verification efforts at the firm level for an interior
solution are characterized by
∂F (ml)
∂mlp
= ρ(x+)
s
αT
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)] . (II.4.18)
Using (II.3.6) and (II.4.18), the verification effort levels determined by the social planner
and the verification efforts requested by policymakers relate such that
∂F (ml)
∂ml
=
1
αT
(
∂F (ml)
∂ml
∣∣∣∣
ml=m∗
+
∂G(nl)
∂nl
∣∣∣∣
nl=m∗
)
. (II.4.19)
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As a result, the following can be stated.
Proposition 6. Comparing the verification effort levels for the full information social
welfare optimum and the requests by policymakers under the full information market
outcome, we have
– If ∂F (m
l)
∂ml
∣∣∣
ml=m∗
> 1αT−1
∂G(nl)
∂nl
∣∣∣
nl=m∗
, then m# < m∗. Policymakers request less
verification per firm than socially optimal.
– If ∂F (m
l)
∂ml
∣∣∣
ml=m∗
= 1αT−1
∂G(nl)
∂nl
∣∣∣
nl=m∗
, then m# = m∗. Policymakers request socially
optimal verification per firm.
– If ∂F (m
l)
∂ml
∣∣∣
ml=m∗
< 1αT−1
∂G(nl)
∂nl
∣∣∣
nl=m∗
, then m# > m∗. Policymakers request more
verification per firm than socially optimal.
Proof. See the Appendix.
There are several distortions in operation. First, each policymaker receives only a
share of aggregate spillovers and therefore does not fully internalize all benefits from
improved political decisions. The larger the policymaker’s share of expected aggregate
spillovers, through a smaller population T , the more likely is oververification at the firm
level. Second, a policymaker recognizes and responds to a trade-off between verification
efforts and financial contributions constrained by lobbying firms’ participation constraints.
In contrast, a social planner does not respect this trade-off, and indeed when α < 1
financial contributions are banned. The higher the degree of dishonesty the more likely is
underverification at the firm-level. Finally, a policymaker ignores processing costs which
are taken into account by a social planner. As a consequence, higher marginal processing
costs increase the likelihood of oververification at the firm level.
Using lemma 3 and proposition 5, the following can be stated.
Lemma 4. If α < 1, then policymakers may request financial contributions that are socially
inefficient.
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Even if the various distortions are offsetting such that the levels of verification are as
at the social optimum, it is still the case that financial contributions are socially wasteful,
simply because a policymaker does not value a dollar as highly as a lobbying firm. In the
extreme case there are corner solutions, where policymakers’ dishonesty is sufficiently high
such that they request zero verification so as to maximize to financial contributions.25
II.4.5. Equilibrium
The market equilibrium is characterized by supply equals demand in the lobbying
service market, a Nash equilibrium between policymakers in selecting agency contracts to
offer lobbyists, and perfect arbitrage in the market for allocating labor between lobbyists
and citizens. This equilibrium is attained under the assumption of a given constitution
which specifies the number of policymakers, P¯ .
II.4.5.1. The Commercial Lobbying and Labor Markets
The citizens’ demands for commercial lobbying with political capture by lobbyists
follows from (II.4.4). Assuming symmetric lobbying firms, the market demand can be
written as a function of nl such that
k(nl) =
P¯Ap
Lnl
pic for every l. (II.4.20)
Each lobbying firm takes the lobbying service fee, k, and requests by policymakers
as given and determines its profit-maximizing size with respect to clients. The supply of
commercial lobbying services is
k(nl) =
∂G(nl)
∂nl
for every l. (II.4.21)
25This holds if the fourth statement of proposition 5 holds.
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Using the demand (II.4.20) and supply of commercial lobbying (II.4.21) with perfect
competition, the symmetric equilibrium number of clients per firm can be described such
that
P¯Ap
Lnl
pic = k(nl) =
∂G(nl)
∂nl
for every l. (II.4.22)
The market clearing lobbying service fee depends on the number of clients, lobbyists,
political resources, private benefits from an approved proposal, and technology for
processing proposals.
Lemma 5. In an equilibrium with a perfectly competitive lobbying market and nonsatiated
policymakers, all citizens are clients of commercial lobbying firms – i.e., C = nlL.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This is an immediate implication from the assumption that the market for lobbying
services is perfectly contestable. If a citizen exists who is not a client of a lobbying firm,
then he realizes no expected private benefits. Given that the costs of lobbying activities
are increasing and convex that citizen can always enter the lobbying industry at a lower
cost per client than pre-existing firms, hence all citizens must either be clients of lobbying
firms or become lobbyists themselves.
II.4.5.2. The Market for Political Access
It has been shown that with political capture all political access goes to lobbyists, in
the symmetric case this can be written as
a˜l =
P¯Ap
L
for every l (II.4.23)
and a˜c = 0 for all c.
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The number of clients per lobbying firm is given by
nl = ml + ul + rl for every l. (II.4.24)
However, not all clients’ proposals may be presented to policymakers, the number presented
is given by
a˜l = al = ρ(x+)ml + ul for every l. (II.4.25)
The requested verification efforts at the firm-level for an interior solution follow from
(II.4.18). The total financial contributions paid by a single lobbying firm to its political
contacts follows from lemma 3 such that
f¯ l = nlkl − F (m¯l)−G(nl) ≥ 0 for all l. (II.4.26)
II.4.5.3. Full Equilibrium
The full market equilibrium is characterized by the market equilibrium conditions
discussed above and the population constraint
T = C + L+ P¯ (II.4.27)
where P¯ is the constitutionally determined number of policymakers.
First, using the full political participation result of lemma 5 and (II.4.27), the
equilibrium number of lobbyists depending on the number of clients per firm can be derived.
The equilibrium number of lobbyists is
L =
T − P¯
1 + nl
. (II.4.28)
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In the symmetric lobbying market equilibrium characterized by (II.4.22) with the
equilibrium number of lobbyists from (II.4.28), the equilibrium number of clients per firm
is such that
n#
1 + n#
∂G(nl)
∂nl
∣∣∣∣
nl=n#
=
P¯Appic
T − P¯ . (II.4.29)
The equilibrium number of clients per firm is positive and unique.26
Using (II.4.28) and (II.4.24), the symmetric equilibrium number of lobbyists can be
obtained such that
L# =
T − P¯
1 + n#
. (II.4.30)
The equilibrium number of citizens follows from full political participation and (II.4.30)
such that
C# = n#L#. (II.4.31)
The equilibrium lobbying service fee is
k# =
∂G(nl)
∂nl
∣∣∣∣
nl=n#
(II.4.32)
and each lobbying firm receives political access of
a˜# =
P¯Ap
L#
. (II.4.33)
Political access is granted by policymakers in exchange for the presentation of
portfolios of proposals with the requisite expected social value and financial contributions.
For the interior solution, the presented proposals consist of verified proposals with a positive
verification signal, ρ(x+)m#, such that
∂F (ml)
∂ml
∣∣∣∣
ml=m#
= ρ(x+)
s
αT
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)] (II.4.34)
26See the Appendix A.2.9.
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and unverified proposals described by
u# = a˜# − ρ(x+)m# ≥ 0.27 (II.4.35)
The equilibrium number of unverified and unpresented proposals, proposals that disappear,
is given by
r# = n# −m# − u# ≥ 0. (II.4.36)
The equilibrium amount of financial contributions per firm is
f# = n#k# − F (m#)−G(n#) ≥ 0. (II.4.37)
II.4.6. Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium
In the following the analysis focuses on the comparative statics of the market
equilibrium to identify how exogenous parameter changes affect the market equilibrium.
The full equilibrium is described by a list of endogenous variables (L, C, nl, k, ml,
ul, rl, f l) and determined by eight equilibrium conditions as supplied above. Using these
equilibrium conditions, the Jacobian28 is derived and thereafter the determinant of the
Jacobian, which is negative.29
Given that all equilibrium equations are differentiable with respect to all endogenous
and exogenous variables and the determinant of the Jacobian is nonzero, the derivation
applies the Implicit Function Theorem and calculates the comparative statics for the system
27If there is a corner solution to the policymaker’s problem with respect to verified proposals, then
the equilibrium verification at the firm-level is m# = a˜
#
ρ(x+)
and u# = 0. Alternatively, if there is is
a corner solution to the policymaker’s problem with respect to verified and unverified proposals, then
u# = a˜#−ρ(x+)P¯mco with F (P¯mco) = n#k#−G (n#). Finally, if there is a corner solution with respect
to financial contributions, then m# = 0 and u# = a˜#.
28See the Appendix A.3.1.
29See the Appendix A.3.2.
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of equilibrium equations by Cramer’s rule.30 The comparative statics for the system
of equilibrium equations with an interior solution for verification efforts and financial
contributions are summarized in table II.1. In the following, the analysis discusses some
comparative statics of greatest interest.
∂y
∂x m
# L# C# n# k# u# f#
P¯ 0 (–) (?) (+) (+) (+) (+)
α (–) 0 0 0 0 (+) (+)
s (+) 0 0 0 0 (–) (–)
pic 0 (–) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
T (–) (+) (+) (–) (–) (?) (?)
Ap 0 (–) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
TABLE II.1. Summary of Comparative Statics for Market Equilibrium
II.4.6.1. The Number of Policymakers
Increasing the number of policymakers affects the commercial lobbying service market
as well as the market for political access between lobbyists and policymakers. In the
lobbying service market, citizens form expectations about the likelihood that proposals are
presented by lobbyists to one their political contacts. The citizens’ expectations depend on
each firm’s political access and number of clients. Increasing the number of policymakers
increases available political access lobbying firms compete for, and increases the probability
that any given citizen’s proposal will be presented to a policymaker, hence this increases
citizens’ willingness to pay for lobbying services. This increased willingness to pay for
30See the Appendix A.3.3.
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lobbying services causes higher lobbying expenditures and higher resources for lobbying
firms. Lobbying firms with political access become larger, and this increases concentration
in the lobbying industry.
The interactions between lobbyists and policymakers are affected in the following
ways: The lobbying industry becomes more concentrated with fewer lobbying firms each of
whom presents an unchanged number of verified proposals, hence the number of unverified
proposals increases both on the firm level and in aggregate. As lobbying firms have
unchanged verification costs and higher revenues, policymakers can extract more rents via
increased financial contributions. The additional unverified proposals decrease the average
quality of political decisions, furthermore aggregate financial contributions increase.
II.4.6.2. The Degree of Dishonesty
Increasing the degree of policymakers’ dishonesty does not affect the lobbying
service market. The lobbying service market outcome depends on the distribution
of political access, competition for access, and the benefits and costs of commercial
lobbying. None of which change. However, increasing the degree of dishonesty changes the
policymaker’s relative weights attached to information quality and financial contributions.
A policymaker substitutes unverified proposals for verified proposals and requests higher
financial contributions.
II.4.6.3. The Magnitude of Spillovers
Since spillovers are external to the citizens’ and lobbyists’ decisions on the lobbying
service market, there is no direct effect on this market from a change of the magnitude
of spillovers. As noted above, each policymaker’s optimal verification requests depend
on the share of expected spillovers from policy proposals. If the magnitude of spillovers
increases, then the expected gain from verifying policy proposals increases. Each
policymaker substitutes verified proposals for unverified proposals and requests less
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financial contributions. This spillover magnitude effect has the opposite effect to a marginal
change in the degree of dishonesty.
II.4.6.4. Private Benefits
Increasing the private benefit from an approved policy proposal, all else equal,
increases the citizens’ willingness to pay for lobbying services. This in turn causes a
reallocation of labor away from the lobbying services industry into private citizenry. The
higher willingness to pay and more and more lobbyists becoming citizens it follows that the
lobbying industry becomes more concentrated. Overall, lobbying expenditures increase.
A policymaker’s optimal verification requests at the firm level are unaffected by an
increase of private benefits. However, fewer lobbyists mean that each receives more political
access, presents more unverified proposals, and makes larger financial contributions. The
overall amount of financial contributions depends on the opposite effects of fewer lobbyists
and higher payments per firm. Further, the overall quality of political decisions decreases
since fewer lobbyists provide the same amount of verification per firm.
II.4.6.5. Population
Given that the number of policymakers is determined by the constitution, an increase
in the population must increase the number of citizens and lobbyists. It immediately
follows that then the number of proposals enacted cannot change and the likelihood of
realizing private benefits from policy proposals must decline. As a consequence, the citizens’
willingness to pay for lobbying services decreases. The decreased willingness to pay and
more competing firms decrease the number of clients per firm and the lobbying service fee.
Each policymaker receives a smaller share of expected spillovers and benefits less from
improved policy information. This changes this relative weights attached to information
quality and financial contributions towards higher financial contributions. This change
causes a substitution of unverified proposals for verified proposals. As a consequence, the
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average quality of political decisions declines. Further, there are two opposite effects for
the equilibrium number of unverified proposals and financial contributions per firm; on the
one hand all policymakers approve more unverified proposals and request higher aggregate
financial contributions. On the other hand there more lobbyists providing lobbying services.
As a result, the comparative statics for the equilibrium number of unverified proposals per
firm and equilibrium amount of financial contributions depend on parameter values.
An increasing population decreases the share of expected spillovers for citizens,
lobbyists, and policymakers. It also increases the number of citizens and lobbyists. Citizens
and lobbyists do not take the share of expected spillovers into account but there are more
citizens and lobbyists competing for political access.
II.4.6.6. Political Resources
Increasing the number of policy proposals that each policymaker can potentially enact
increases the likelihood that a citizen’s proposal is enacted. This increased likelihood raises
the citizens’ willingness to pay for lobbying services and raises the opportunity costs of being
a lobbyist. Hence the number of lobbyists declines and each remaining lobbyist has more
access and lobbying rents. A policymaker’s optimal verification requests are unaffected,
hence policymakers use their additional resources to approve more unverified proposals, and
extract the additional lobbying rents from lobbyists via higher financial contributions. The
additional unverified proposals and fewer lobbyists verifying the same number of proposals
per firm decrease the average quality of political decisions. The overall amount of financial
contributions increases.
II.4.7. Normative Analysis and Potential Regulation
In this section the analysis first compares the market equilibrium to the social
optimum. Then potential efficiency enhancing regulatory actions are analyzed. To facilitate
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this analysis it is first assumes that the constitution fixes the number of policymakers at
their first-best optimal level.
Our regulatory analysis is confined to examining the comparative statics of the effects
of changes in the number of policymakers and the policymakers’ degree of dishonesty,
which may be interpreted as the standard of policymakers, on social welfare evaluated at
the market allocation. The analysis provides predictions as to whether these changes are
welfare improving, not whether or not the allocation is welfare optimal.
II.4.7.1. Market Equilibrium and Social Welfare Optima
Population and Commercial Lobbying Industry In a first step, the analysis
evaluates the distribution of citizens and lobbyists and the concentration of the commercial
lobbying industry. Following proposition 6 and lemma 4, self-interested policymakers cause
a socially inefficient over- or underverification and may request socially inefficient financial
contributions. Analyzing the case of oververification first, the following can be stated.
Lemma 6. If there is oververification on the firm level, then the lobbying industry is larger
and more concentrated than is socially efficient.
Proof. See the Appendix.
If policymakers request more verification per firm than is socially optimal, then each
lobbyist receives more political access than is socially optimal. More political access per
firm increases the willingness to pay for a firm’s lobbying services and increases the firm’s
number of clients. More clients per firm and verification efforts increase processing and
verification costs. A lobbyist with more political access crowds out other lobbyists, and
therefore the industry is more concentrated than at the socially efficient level.
Proceeding with the case of underverification at the firm level, the following can be
stated.
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Lemma 7. If there is underverification at the firm level, then relative to the social welfare
optimum this leads to
– a smaller and less concentrated lobbying industry if ρ(x+)m∗ > ρ(x+)m# + u#,
– or a larger and more concentrated lobbying industry if ρ(x+)m∗ < ρ(x+)m# + u#.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The first case occurs when the policymakers’ requests for verification efforts cause
lower firm verification efforts and each lobbyist receives less political access than is socially
efficient, then citizens are willing to pay less for a firm’s lobbying services and the number
of clients per firm decreases. Fewer clients per firm decrease verification and processing
costs. As a consequence, the lobbying service fee is lower and there are more lobbyists
and fewer citizens than is socially efficient. The other case involves an underverification at
the firm level, but each lobbyist receives more political access. This circumstance leads to
fewer lobbyists but larger firms than is socially efficient.
Social Welfare at the Market Equilibrium Expected social welfare evaluated
at the market equilibrium with self-interested policymakers and a perfectly competitive
commercial lobbying market is
E[Πs#] = P¯
(
θ + αfp#
)
+ P¯E[ec|α], (II.4.38)
where the quality of expected spillovers, E[ec|α], depends on the policymakers’ degree of
dishonesty, α.
The social welfare optimum, when commercial lobbying is socially desirable, is
E[Πs∗∗] = P ∗∗ (θ +Appic)− L∗∗ (F (m∗) +G(m∗)) + P ∗∗E[ec|x+], (II.4.39)
where all proposals are verified and only those with positive verification signals are enacted,
E[ec|x+].
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Suppose P¯ = P ∗∗. This implies that the number of policymakers follows from
the socially optimal structure discussed in II.3.3.2 when commercial lobbying is welfare
enhancing. The comparison of E[Πs∗∗] ≥ E[Πs#] can be summarized by
P¯Appic − L∗∗ (F (m∗) +G(m∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(?)
−αP¯fp#︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+ P¯
(
E[ec|x+]− E[ec|α])︸ ︷︷ ︸
(≥0)
≥ 0, (II.4.40)
which can be broken down into the three terms indicated. The first term is the potential
pure private gains for citizens and lobbyists in the social welfare optimum with commercial
lobbying. The second term gives the private benefits for self-interested policymakers from
financial contributions in a market environment. Such financial contributions are socially
wasteful when α 6= 1. The third term identifies the quality difference of political decisions
with respect to expected spillovers. Self-interested policymakers may substitute unverified
proposals with verified proposals to realize higher financial contributions. This substitution
decreases the expected quality of spillover effects. If self-interested policymakers are
sufficiently dishonest, then they approve unverified proposals and distort the political
decision-making process.
II.4.7.2. Market Equilibrium and Political Structure
The final part of the analysis focuses on how the political structure, in terms of the
number of policymakers and their degree of dishonesty, can be adjusted to achieve welfare
improvements when the actions of self-interested policymakers cause welfare distortions.
Social welfare evaluated at the full market equilibrium given P¯ policymakers can be written
as
E[Πs#] = P¯
(
θ +Aps
(
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)))+ αL#f#
+ρ(x+)L#m#s
(
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)) , (II.4.41)
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where policymakers realize private benefits from ego rents and financial contributions. The
remaining social benefits are aggregate expected spillovers from approved policy proposals.
The Number of Policymakers First, the analysis determines the effect on social
welfare when there is a marginal increase for the number of policymakers. It has been shown
that verification efforts at the firm level are independent to the number of policymakers,
but there are more unverified proposals approved because of more political access for fewer
lobbyists. The comparative statics for social welfare for an increase of the number of
policymakers at the full market equilibrium is given by
∂E[Πs#]
∂P¯
= θ +Aps
(
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+αL#
∂f#
∂P¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+
∂L#
∂P¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
(
αf# + ρ(x+)m#sψ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
, (II.4.42)
where ψ = ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−) and sψ measures the additional expected
benefit from verifying an additional policy proposal.
If the number of policymakers increases, then there are also additional ego rents and
more approved proposals. However, a larger number of policymakers would decrease the
social benefits from commercial lobbying because of fewer lobbyists verifying the same
number of proposals per firm. From a citizen’s perspective, an increased number of
policymakers and fewer lobbyists increases the chances for political access and willingness to
pay for lobbying services. However, in equilibrium all citizens’ private rents are dissipated
and they don’t benefit directly from the increase in political access. There are opposing
effects with respect to financial contributions. On the one hand, financial contributions
per firm are increasing; on the other hand, there are fewer lobbyists.
Policymaker Standards Finally, the analysis asks how a change of the policymakers’
quality, measured by the degree of dishonesty α, would affect social welfare at the full
market equilibrium. The quality of policymakers, α, may be thought of as associated with
the ability of voters to monitor their actions, or with social norms. The parameter α shall
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be made endogenous at a later juncture. Differentiating of (II.4.41) with respect to α, gives
∂E[Πs#]
∂α
= L#
f# + α ∂f#∂α︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+ρ(x+)sψ
∂m#
∂α︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
 , (II.4.43)
which can be re-written as
∂E[Πs#]
∂α
= L#
f# − (T − 1)ρ(x+) sψ
αT
∂F (m#)
∂mlp
∂2F (m#)
∂mlp2
 . (II.4.44)
As described above, a policymaker’s degree of dishonesty does not affect the commercial
lobbying service market, but affects the trade-off between verification efforts and financial
contributions. Greater dishonesty leads to more financial contributions and the substitution
of unverified proposals for verified policy proposals. This substitution effect has negative
welfare consequences.31 However, policymakers gain because financial contributions are
substituted for verification efforts. The overall effect on social welfare is ambiguous; if α is
very low, then there may be oververification and increase in α would increase social welfare,
if α is high, then there is underverification and would lower social welfare. This suggests
that there is a socially optimal level of α which is nonzero, some dishonesty may be a good
thing.
II.5. Conclusion
This chapter has introduced a novel model of commercial lobbying. It both explains
the existence of the commercial lobbying industry and the impact commercial lobbying
has on welfare via its influence on policy-making. Policymakers request information
transmission and financial contributions from lobbyists in exchange for political access.
31See the Appendix for calculations for the two effects. The result of the comparison is α ∂f
#
∂α
<
ρ(x+)sψ ∂m
#
∂α
.
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The political access enables lobbyists to sell their lobbying services to their clients for
profit.
The introduction of commercial lobbyists as intermediaries between citizens and
policymakers provides several new insights into lobbying and political influence. First,
it has been shown that commercial lobbying is welfare enhancing if the benefits from
implied improvements in policy information outweigh the foregone private benefits from
direct political access for citizens plus the costs of commercial lobbying. Thus, the analysis
has identified the political structure that would facilitate socially efficient outcomes.
Second, it has been demonstrated how commercial lobbying arises endogenously in a
perfectly competitive market, and identified the potential sources for inefficiencies. Self-
interested policymakers’ preferences for financial contributions and positive externalities
from policy choices can distort market outcomes even with potentially welfare enhancing
lobbying. Finally, our analysis highlights the interactions of political institutions and
policymakers’ characteristics.
Many aspects of commercial lobbying remain unexplained and left for future research.
The analysis has assumed that policymakers are informed about lobbying activities and
can observe the verification efforts of lobbyists. It is important to understand how policy
choices would change if lobbyists were able to hide information. It was assumed that the
number of policymakers is given by a constitution and that the degree of dishonesty is
exogenous. An extension with political competition among heterogeneous policymakers
could provide some further interesting results.
This chapter has focused on questions of efficiency given commercial lobbying firms
exist. In the next chapter the analysis shall take a closer look at distributional issues and
their political economic consequences.
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CHAPTER III
COMMERCIAL LOBBYING, OPTIMAL INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL
REFORMS
III.1. Introduction
The conventional wisdom of lobbying is that citizens or special interest groups may
have policy relevant information that an imperfectly informed policymaker wishes to learn
to the benefit of society. However, lobbying and other activities may influence policymakers
in socially undesirable ways. Exemplary lobbying and influential activities include the
strategic provision of information and policy contingent, or candidate specific, campaign
contributions.1 Such activities are usually undertaken or organized by representatives
of traditional special interest groups or employees of commercial lobbying firms. The
difference between the two types of professional lobbyist being that special interest
groups are directly affected by the policy outcomes they lobby for whereas lobbying
firms provide intermediation services for profit to various clients.2 The analysis of special
interest group activities and the regulation of their activities has been a primary focus of
economic analysis.3 However, as argued in the previous chapter, commercial lobbyists are
increasingly predominant. This chapter intends to explain the implications of commercial
lobbying for the optimal regulation of lobbying activities and to provide empirically relevant
1Further activities include the formation of coalitions, candidate endorsements, media campaigns, and
corruption.
2The wide engagement in lobbying activities and the presence of commercial lobbying firms can be
confirmed by the disclosures by professional lobbyists under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (1995) which are
electronically available on through the Senate’s Office of Public Records. The data reveal that commercial
lobbyists represent the interests of a variety of companies, unions, trade groups, counties, cities, universities,
and individual citizens.
3See Olson’s (1965) seminal work for the formation of special interest groups. Persson and Tabellini
(2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) provide a detailed review for special interest groups’ political
influence activities. See Dahm and Porteiro (2008b) for an overview of the campaign finance reform
literature.
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arguments for why some societies choose to regulate professional lobbying activities and
others do not.
The influence of special interests on the political process has produced plenty of public
scandals and started many public discussions about the benefits and risks of professional
lobbying activities. A few of these scandals and discussions lead to gradual reforms in the
regulation of professional lobbying activities. The history of lobbying regulation in the
United States goes back to the 1930s when the influence of specific industries or foreign
governments on domestic policies became of public concern.4 But the first comprehensive
regulation of lobbying activities at the federal level did not come into place until the
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. Additional public scandals revealed loopholes and public
pressure resulted in the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, enacted as
amendments to the existing rules.5 The current regulations require lobbyists to disclose
their lobbying activities, limit policymakers’ “revolving door” career ambitions,6 and
increase the transparency of policymakers’ discretionary spending. Nonetheless, the current
regulations do not provide transparency about lobbyist-policymaker interactions,7 strategic
4The Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935 required representatives of holding companies to
report their activities to the Securities and Exchange Commission before lobbying Congress, the Securities
and Exchange Commission or the Federal Power Commission. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 required
representatives of ship owning companies or shipyards that received government subsidies to disclose their
income, expenses and interests. The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 required individuals who
represented foreign entities to register. The first general law to regulate lobbying activities at the federal
level was enacted in 1938 and applied only to the legislative branch, namely Congress. See Chari, Hogan,
Murphy (2010) for a more detailed discussion of the history of lobbying regulation in the United States.
5Jack Abramoff was one of the more enigmatic professional lobbyists, working for several lobbying
firms over time, and also well known for lucrative lobbying contracts. He was the center of a public
corruption scandal and pleaded guilty to charges of fraud, tax evasion, and bribery of Congress members.
The investigations led to several investigations and convictions against policymakers, staffers, and lobbyists.
See Schmidt and Grimaldi (2005, 2006).
6The revolving door is the phenomenon of former public officials who become lobbyists and provide their
political networks and expertise to potential clients. For an empirical analysis of this phenomenon and the
networks of lobbyists and policymakers see Blanes i Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen (2011) as well as Eggers
(2010).
7The Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) requires lobbyists to disclose their lobbying revenues, names of
clients, and institutions of their administrative contacts but not the names of the policymakers they interact
with. Current empirical analysis uses various proxies for lobbyist-policymaker networks. Blanes i Vidal,
Draca and Fonsen (2011) use past work experience of lobbyists and policymakers, Eggers (2010) uses party
affiliation of lobbyists, and Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi (2011) employ campaign contributions to
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information transfers from lobbyists to policymakers,8 or the potential substitution of
financial transfers for desirable policy information to influence self-interested policymakers.
In addition to the observed gradual reforms, a comparison reveals that the institutions
that regulate lobbying activities differ widely both across countries and within countries
at the state level. Countries with a higher degree of formal lobbying regulation, such
as public registers, code of conducts, and activity reports, are, for example, the United
States, Canada, and recently Australia. Most Western democracies have only limited
forms of regulation or no regulation at all.9 Even in the absence of regulations, public
dissatisfaction with professional lobbying activities is present in most countries. This can
be seen in the case of the European Union: The European Parliament has a mandatory
register for lobbyists; the European Commission changed in 2008 from self-regulation to a
voluntary register for lobbyists;10 but the European Council has no rules in place.
The current analysis addresses two questions: What are the political institutions that
can achieve first-best lobbying outcomes in a market environment, and why do we observe
unregulated lobbying activities as well as gradual reforms? To answer both questions the
analysis uses the model of commercial lobbying presented in section II.2. of the previous
chapter and defines a set of institutional elements that provides a more complete picture
for an effective regulation of lobbying with respect to the distribution of political access,
the provision of policy relevant information, as well as financial contributions. In the
commercial lobbying model, lobbyists provide lobbying services for profit to many clients
and possess an expertise that allows them to make predictions about the social desirability
politicians by lobbyists as measure. The current analysis may shed some light why policymakers may
hesitate to disclose their interactions with lobbyists.
8The New York Times obtained emails in 2009 that showed how lobbyists employed by the same law
firm and lobbying on behalf of a biotechnology company provided House members from both parties ghost-
written statements and printed in the Congressional Records.
9See Chari, Hogan and Murphy (2010) for a detailed comparison of lobbying regulation across countries.
10The Interinstitutional Agreement on the Establishment of a Transparency Register (2011) combines
both the Parliament and the Commission registers for enhanced transparency.
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of policy proposals, which they can share with policymakers. The policymakers’ powerful
position to allocate political access between competing citizens and lobbyists allows them to
request their preferred combination of information acquisition and financial contributions,
which in turn may not be socially efficient.
For the first question of the current analysis, it is shown that if commercial lobbying is
socially desirable, then institutional rules and transparency about both financial transfers
and informational transfers from lobbyists to policymakers can limit potential welfare
distortions in a market environment.11 These distortions may arise if lobbyists and
policymakers substitute financial contributions for socially beneficial information. The
exclusive focus of current regulations on campaign contributions and other financial
benefits, which ignores informational transfers, may fail to limit these distortionary
substitutions.
The current analysis highlights that private rent dissipation and the quality of
political decisions in a market equilibrium may cause political conflict between citizens
and policymakers. This political conflict addresses the second question and determines the
conditions under which a first-best institution is or is not self-stable – i.e., under which
conditions a first-best institution can be or cannot be implemented via democratic reforms.
The current analysis also shows that the observed political stability of unregulated lobbying
activities can be explained by self-interested policymakers who do not distort the positive
welfare effects from commercial lobbying too much, or by citizens who do not have sufficient
political power to initiate political reforms.
11In this chapter, the analysis focuses on all policymakers with some discretionary power such
as politicians, staff members, or public servants and proposes optimal institutional constraints for
accountability. The specific case of politicians and political competitions as means for accountability is
discussed in chapter 5.
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III.1.1. Related Literature
The current study is related to the lobbying literature that focuses on a special interest
group’s strategic choice of providing information and making campaign contributions as a
means to influence policymakers.12 Early models examined campaign contributions as a
means to gain political access to policymakers and the gained political access as a channel
for the transmission of the interest group’s private information.13 More recent models
focus on a special interest group’s strategic choice of information acquisition and financial
contributions.14 A more detailed review of the rent-seeking and lobbying literature can be
found in section II.1.1 of the previous chapter.
The implications of lobbying activities and the specific regulation of campaign finances
have been studied by Dahm and Porteiro (2008b). They focus on the implications of legal
campaign contribution limits on the provision of information by a special interest group.
In their lobbying model, a special interest group that is directly affected by the policy can
provide both policy relevant information and campaign contributions to induce a favorable
political outcome. However, the gathered and observable information may counteract the
interest group’s ambition. The authors show that limits on campaign contributions make
12There is an extensive literature that examines the influence of campaign contributions on policy
outcomes. In particular, see Bernheim and Whinston (1986), Grossman and Helpman (1994), and Besley
and Coate (2001). Common for these models is that special interest groups provide financial resources to
policymakers in exchange for preferred policies. Another strand of literature assesses the role of lobbying
as information revelation. See Crawford and Sobel (1982), Potters and van Winden (1992), Austen-Smith
(1994), and Krishna and Morgan (2001) for exemplary studies. Issues in these models are the special
interest group’s ability to reveal credibly their private information to the policymaker, and the special
interest group’s incentive to misrepresent private information to induce desired policy choices.
13Austen-Smith (1995) argues that a special interest group acquires political access to a legislator that
enables the group to transmit policy relevant information. The legislator can use the interest group’s
willingness to buy access as a signal to form a belief about the group’s credibility. Lohmann (1995) shows
that competing special interest groups provide policy relevant information to a policymaker and only those
with interests that conflict with the policymaker’s interests pay a positive amount to gain access and enhance
their credibility.
14Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006) argue that an information externality arises when competing special
interest groups attempt to influence a policymaker with policy relevant information about a single policy.
This information externality reduces an interest group’s incentive to provide information and results in
a specialization of interest groups in providing information or financial contributions depending on the
interest group’s information technology. Dahm and Porteiro (2008a) focus on the observed simultaneity of
information acquisition and financial contributions.
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contributions as “damage control” less effective and decrease an interest group’s incentive
to gather risky information. In this analysis, commercial lobbyists compete for political
access and are less concerned about the information related to the policies they lobby for.
Finally, the current study also relates to the recent literature that models political
institutions as endogenous choices by rational agents. One strand of the literature focuses
on the endogeneity of the political enfranchisement of agents.15 Another strand focuses on
the endogeneity of electoral rules, social choice functions, and the delegation of power.16
Barbera and Jackson (2001), for example, focus on self-stable constitutions consisting of a
voting rule for ordinary affairs and one for constitutional changes, and Aghion, Alesina and
Trebbi (2004) analyze the delegation of power and its optimal checks and balances.17 In
contrast, Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-Martin (2004) argue that the political decision-making
process might be more affected by interest groups’ influence activities than by electoral
rules. The current analysis focuses on the conditions under which a first-best institution
that regulates commercial lobbying activities is or is not self-stable, and it shows how
unregulated commercial lobbying activities may cause endogenous political reforms.
III.1.2. Outline of the Chapter
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section III.2. summarizes the economic
model. Section III.3. discusses two characteristics of the unregulated market equilibrium.
Section III.4. derives the first-best institution that regulates commercial lobbying activities
in a market environment. Section III.5. derives the conditions under which a first-best
15In particular, see Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006) who argue that political elites transferred
political power to disenfranchised citizens to prevent social unrest. Other models provide explanations for
a voluntary extension of the franchise such as Lizzeri and Persico (2004) and Jack and Lagunoff (2006).
16See Koray (2000) for the endogeneity of social choice functions.
17More recent work by Messner and Polborn (2004) studies self-stable voting rules in an overlapping
generations framework in which young and old vote on policies that realize delayed costs and benefits.
Maggi and Morelli (2006) analyze countries’ voluntary entry decision into international organizations and
the stability of such agreements with respect to voting rules. Trebbi, Aghion and Alesina (2008) focus on
the choice of voting rules when some electorates are part of minorities.
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institution is self-stable, and provides arguments for the empirically relevant case of
unregulated lobbying activities despite a public dissatisfaction. Section III.6. concludes.
III.2. The Economic Model
The economic model follows the commercial lobbying model presented in section
II.2. of the previous chapter. Here a brief summary is provided. A society consists of
a population T with citizens, c, lobbyists, l, and policymakers, p, such that T = C+L+P .
Each citizen has a single policy proposal that if enacted will yield a private benefit of
pic > 0 and create a social spillover of ec, ec ∈ {s,−s} with s > 0. A policy proposal
with a positive spillover would be socially desirable whereas one with a negative spillover
would be socially undesirable – i.e., pic − s < 0. A policy proposal’s social desirability
is unknown to society ex ante but each society member knows the exogenous probability
of a positive spillover, ρ(e+), and the complimentary probability of a negative spillover,
ρ(e−) = 1−ρ(e+). Overall, the expected social value of any policy proposal is positive and
each society member receives an identical share of all realized spillovers.18 A policy proposal
can be presented to a policymaker either directly by a citizen or indirectly for a fee of k
by a lobbying firm, which operates for profit and is represented by one lobbyist. Lobbyists
have a verification technology that allows them to investigate the social desirability of
policy proposals, mlp, the ability to provide financial contributions, f lp, and the ability
depending on access to present verified and unverified proposals, ulp, to the pl policymakers
they interact with. Each lobbyist bears costs for processing nl clients’ proposals, G(nl),
and costs for verifying proposals, F (ml).19 Policymakers announce political access rules to
citizens and lobbyists and enact all presented proposals, A. Each policymaker has a time
constraint for enacting policy proposals, Ap, receives an ego rent for holding office, θ, and
18These spillovers can be interpreted as externalities or impure public goods. Examples for such policies
are projects that require a legislative change of current laws or an administrative support such as special
permissions or exemptions, which are common in tax, antitrust, and immigration issues.
19It still holds that G(.) and F (.) are increasing convex and G′(0) = F ′(0) = 0.
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discounts financial contributions by α with α ∈ (0, 1].20 The appointment and number of
policymakers follows from a constitution with P = P¯ and is common knowledge.
The actions by lobbyists and the interactions between policymakers and lobbyists are
unobservable to citizens. Nevertheless, citizens can observe the amount of political access,
a˜l, and the number of clients, nl, for each lobbyist. A policymaker is able to observe
both the lobbyists’ verification efforts for him, mlp, and returned verification signals,
x ∈ {x+, x−}. All individuals know how the probability that a particular proposal will
be socially desirable is updated after the receipt of a given verification signal with ρ(x),
ρ(e+|x+), ρ(e−|x+), ρ(e+|x−), and ρ(e−|x−).21
There are three markets. The lobbying labor market has no barriers to entry
and exit. Citizens may hire a lobbyist in a perfectly competitive lobbying market
at a market equilibrium fee of k. Lobbyists offer verification efforts and financial
contributions to policymakers in exchange for political access. These exchanges have
agency characteristics. This framework accounts for commercial lobbying activities with
both information acquisition and financial contributions, and it provides a simple general-
equilibrium structure. Further details about the economic model are presented in section
II.2. of the previous chapter.
The payoff for citizen c is
Πc =

pic + 1T
A∑
c=1
ec if c gains access directly,
1
T
A∑
c=1
ec if c gains no access,
pic − k + 1T
A∑
c=1
ec if lobbyist l presents c’s proposal, or
−k + 1T
A∑
c=1
ec if lobbyist l does not present c’s proposal.
(III.2.1)
20This refers to a policymaker’s degree of dishonesty or the effectiveness of in-kind transfers.
21It holds that ρ(e+|x+) (pic + s) + ρ(e−|x+) (pic − s) > ρ(e+) (pic + s) + ρ(e−) (pic − s) > 0 >
ρ(e+|x−) (pic + s) + ρ(e−|x−) (pic − s).
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as described in (II.2.1) in the previous chapter. The payoff for lobbyist l is
Πl = knl −G(nl)− F (ml)−
pl∑
p=1
f lp +
1
T
A∑
c=1
ec (III.2.2)
as described in (II.2.3). Finally, the payoff for policymaker p follows from (II.2.4) with
Πp = θ + α
lp∑
l=1
f lp +
1
T
A∑
c=1
ec. (III.2.3)
III.3. Unregulated Market Equilibrium
The unregulated market equilibrium is characterized by demand equals supply in
the market for commercial lobbying services, perfect arbitrage in the lobbying labor
market, and a Nash equilibrium between policymakers in choosing agency contracts for
lobbyists. The derivation and complete characterization of the unregulated market outcome
can be found in section II.4. of the previous chapter. Here two characteristics of the
unregulated market equilibrium are highlighted: The potential market failure and private
rent dissipation. These two characteristics motivate the current analysis of the effective
regulation of commercial lobbying activities and the endogenous choice of institutions that
regulate such activities.
III.3.1. Potential Market Failure and Quality of Political Decisions
The analysis of the previous chapter highlights that the sources for potential market
failure can be manifold. The two sources that motivate the current analysis are: Externality
problems because policymakers do not internalize all benefits and costs of lobbying
activities when they request verification efforts, and distortions because of policymakers’
preferences over spillover shares and financial contributions.22 The first externality problem
22The detailed normative analysis of the market equilibrium can be found in section II.4.4 and section
II.4.7 of the previous chapter. It also characterizes additional sources for market failure and discusses each
potential market failure in more detail.
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arises when policymakers take only their individual spillover shares into account but ignore
aggregate spillover effects. Another externality arises when policymakers respect the
lobbyists’ participation constraints but ignore the costs of processing policy proposals.23
The former may cause verification efforts at the firm-level that are inefficiently low; the
latter may cause verification efforts that are inefficiently high. These effects are shown in
proposition 6 of the previous chapter.
The second source for market failure relates to the policymakers’ ability to control
the allocation of political access. A policymaker’s preferences over improved spillover
shares and financial contributions determine the quality of political decisions and may
distort the social benefits from commercial lobbying activities. The distortion arises when
policymakers trade socially beneficial verification efforts for privately beneficial financial
contributions. The policymaker’s trade-off between verification efforts and financial
contributions is characterized in proposition 5 of the previous chapter. A policymaker’s
request for financial contributions substitutes unverified policy proposals for verified policy
proposals with positive signals because of the lobbyist’s resource constraint. Since the
policymaker’s verification effort requests are affected by the degree of dishonesty (or
effectiveness of in-kind transfers), α, and the expected quality of spillovers from verified
and unverified enacted policy proposals is affected by the extent of verification efforts, the
expected quality of spillovers depends on α and can be summarized by E[ec|α]. Following
(II.4.17) in the previous chapter, a higher value of α decreases the expected quality of a
spillover, and vice versa.
III.3.2. Private Rent Dissipation and Equilibrium Payoffs
In equilibrium, all political access is allocated to lobbyists because of their resource
advantages and all citizens become clients of commercial lobbying firms (lemma 5). The
23The costs of verifying proposals affect the market for commercial lobbying services and lobbyists’
participation condition for the political access market. The policymaker’s marginal decision how to extract
available lobbying rents is unaffected by the commercial lobbying market outcome.
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citizen’s willingness to pay for commercial lobbying services is equal to the expected benefit
of an enacted policy proposal and equals the marginal cost of processing proposals at the
firm-level – i.e., P¯A
p
Lnl
pic = k = ∂G(n
l)
∂nl
for every l.
In equilibrium, free exit and entry into the lobbying industry imply perfect arbitrage
with E[Πc] = E[Πl]. Using the perfect arbitrage equilibrium condition and lemma 3, we
can predict the following.
Proposition 7. All expected private rents from approved policy proposals are dissipated.
However, not all expected rents are dissipated.
The competition for political access and the resource requests by policymakers extract
all expected private rents from the rest of the economy. This result is similar to the rent-
seeking literature, in which a Tullock (1980) contest function induces individuals competing
for a prize to expend resources such that with an increasing number of competitors
these political investments equal the prize. It also adds to the discussion of Tullock
(1972) and Ansolabehere, de Figeueiro, and Snyder Jr (2003), who observe that campaign
contributions fall well short of the public budgets for which they are competing. In this
sense they observe incomplete rent dissipation. Generally, the presence of spillovers and
competition for private rents, as defined by a government budget, may lead to incomplete
social rent dissipation.
The market equilibrium payoff for a citizen and a lobbyist is
E[Πc#] =
P¯Ap
T
E[ec|α] = E[Πl#] (III.3.1)
and for a policymaker
E[Πp#] = θ + αfp
#
+
P¯Ap
T
E[ec|α] (III.3.2)
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with P¯Ap = A. These equilibrium payoffs emphasize that the benefits from commercial
lobbying activities for citizens and lobbyists depend entirely on the expected quality of
spillovers from policy proposals enacted by self-interested policymakers, E[ec|α].
III.4. First-Best Institution
This section takes up the point of a potential market failure and proposes the
institutional elements that may achieve efficient market outcomes. The analysis starts
by defining the institutional elements of interest and then derives the elements of a first-
best institution in a market environment in two steps: First, the results of the social welfare
optimum characterize the institutional elements for the socially desirable distribution of
political access and level of commercial lobbying; second, the analysis derives additional
institutional conditions under which the first-best outcome can be attained as a market
equilibrium.
The social optimum depends on the social desirability of commercial lobbying. There
are two possibilities. The analysis derives two institutions with either a larger number of
policymakers and zero level of commercial lobbying or a smaller number of policymakers
and a positive level of commercial lobbying. The current analysis the need for transparency
rules that focus on both financial transfers and information transfers from lobbyists to
policymakers in order to ensure the potential social benefits from commercial lobbying.
III.4.1. Institution
The institutional elements of interest are the number of policymakers, the availability
of political access to citizens and lobbyists, and the legal constraints on lobbying activities
within a constitutional framework.24 The constitutional framework could be, but is not
24The current analysis abstracts from a detailed discussion of voting rules and the delegation of power
for collective decision-making. The reader is referred to Buchanan and Tullock’s (1962) seminal work and
Congleton and Swedenborg’s (2006) review of democratic constitutional design. In the next section, some
more general voting rules are considered.
67
limited to, a democratic constitution with presidential, parliamentary, or direct democratic
voting features, or a bureaucracy with government agencies.
The institution, I, determines the number of policymakers, P¯ ; defines potential
constraints for each policymaker to allocate political access between citizens and lobbyists,
a¯c and a¯l; describes potential responsibilities for each policymaker to request a certain
expected quality of policy information from commercial lobbyists, q¯; and may regulate the
ability of policymakers to receive financial contributions from lobbyists, f¯ . The expected
quality of policy information, which is provided by a lobbyist to a policymaker, q, depends
on the share of verified policy proposals with positive signals amongst all presented policy
proposals – i.e., q = ρ(x
+)mlp
a˜lp
. Here, f¯ can be interpreted as a financial contribution limit on
what a policymaker can receive from a lobbyist. This can be summarized as the following:
Definition 1. An institution I is a set of elements
(
P¯ , a¯c, a¯l, q¯, f¯
)
with P¯ ∈ [0, T ], a¯c ∈
[0, Ap], a¯l ∈ [0, Ap], q¯ ∈ [0, 1], and f¯ ∈ [0,∞).
III.4.2. The First-Best Institution
It is shown in section II.3. of the previous chapter that the form of the social optimum
depends on the social desirability of commercial lobbying. If commercial lobbying is
not welfare enhancing, then the social optimum is described by no commercial lobbying
activities and there are only citizens and policymakers; if commercial lobbying is welfare
enhancing, then the social optimum is described by a positive level of commercial lobbying
and there are citizens, lobbyists, and policymakers. In the first step the characteristics of
the social optimum describe the elements of a first-best institution.
III.4.2.1. Commercial Lobbying is Socially Undesirable
If commercial lobbying is socially undesirable, then the socially optimal number of
policymakers follows from the notion that all unverified policy proposals are in expected
terms welfare increasing and lobbyists contribute more to social welfare as citizens providing
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policy proposals. Therefore, sufficient policymakers shall be appointed to office and approve
a maximum of policy proposals. Using proposition 2 of the previous chapter and definition
1, the implications for a potential first-best institution when commercial lobbying is socially
undesirable can be summarized as to the following:
Proposition 8. If commercial lobbying is socially undesirable, then institution I∗ with
P¯ = P ∗, a¯c = Ap, a¯l = 0, q¯ = 0, and f¯ = 0 is a first-best institution.
Policymakers are required to allocate all their time to citizens and enact any policy
proposal independent of their private incentives. If all political access is allocated to
citizens, then there is no reason for citizens to hire lobbyists, and the institutional elements
that regulate the quality of information and amount of financial contributions, q¯ and f¯ ,
are not binding. The socially optimal expected payoff for a citizen is
E[Πc∗] = pic +
P ∗Ap
T
E[ec] (III.4.1)
and for a policymaker
E[Πp∗] = θ +
P ∗Ap
T
E[ec]. (III.4.2)
The expected quality of political decisions is E[ec] = s [ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)] per enacted policy
proposal.
III.4.2.2. Commercial Lobbying is Socially Desirable
If commercial lobbying is socially desirable, then the net benefits from commercial
lobbying should be maximized. Therefore, policymakers shall allocate their time to
lobbyists and ask only for verified proposals with positive signals. Citizens do not receive
direct political access and shall pass their proposals to lobbyists, who verify all of them.
This can be summarized to PAp = ρ(x+)Lm, C = nL, and n = m. The existence
of financial transfers depends on the degree of dishonesty or effectiveness. If financial
contributions are socially wasteful, α < 1, then they should be banned; if financial
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contributions are just pure transfers, α = 1, then the social optimum would be unaffected
and would not require a contribution limit. Using proposition 3 of the previous chapter
and definition 1, the implications for a potential first-best institution of socially desirable
commercial lobbying can be summarized as to the following:
Proposition 9. If commercial lobbying is socially desirable, then institution I∗∗ with P¯ =
P ∗∗, a¯c = 0, a¯l = Ap, q¯ = 1, and f¯

= 0 if α < 1
≥ 0 if α = 1
is a first-best institution.
The institution I∗∗ would maximize the net benefits of socially desirable commercial
lobbying and result in the best expected quality of enacted policy proposals since all of them
were verified and received a positive verification signal, x+. The implications for financial
contribution limits are two-fold: The limit shall ensure that financial transfers neither
affect the distribution of political access nor substitute for policy relevant information,
and if they are allowed, then they should be pure transfers rather than socially inefficient
in-kind transfers. The socially optimal expected payoff for a citizen is
E[Πc∗∗] = ρ(x+)pic − k + P
∗∗Ap
T
E[ec|x+], (III.4.3)
for a lobbyist
E[Πl∗∗] = m∗k − F (m∗)−G(m∗)− f l∗ + P
∗∗Ap
T
E[ec|x+], (III.4.4)
and for a policymaker
E[Πp∗∗] = θ + αfp∗ +
P ∗∗Ap
T
E[ec|x+]. (III.4.5)
The expected quality of political decisions is E[ec|x+] = s [ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)] per
enacted policy proposal.
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III.4.2.3. Choice of a First-Best Institution and the Veil of Ignorance
The selection of a first-best institution by founding fathers could be characterized
by the social planner’s planner and would depend on the social desirability of commercial
lobbying, which follows immediately from the welfare outcomes of E[Πs∗] and E[Πs∗∗] from
(II.3.16) and (II.3.20) described in the previous chapter. If the informational gains from
commercial lobbying do outweigh the larger private rents from a larger government and the
costs of commercial lobbying, then the institution I∗∗ is chosen. If not, then I∗ is chosen.
An institution can also be proposed by founding fathers to society members who
contemplate the proposed institutions “behind a veil of ignorance.”25 It is assumed that
all individuals are risk-neutral.
If individuals do not know their identities ex ante but know that commercial lobbying
is socially undesirable, then they all evaluate their individual expected payoffs from behind
a veil of ignorance and expect an individual payoff of
E[Πv∗] =
C∗
T
E[Πc∗] +
P ∗
T
E[Πp∗] =
1
T
E[Πs∗], (III.4.6)
which is the expected payoff from being either a citizen or a policymaker and is equal to
an identical share of the optimal social welfare.
If individuals do not know their roles but know that commercial lobbying is socially
desirable, then each individual expects a payoff of
E[Πv∗∗] =
C∗∗
T
E[Πc∗∗] +
L∗∗
T
E[Πl∗∗] +
P ∗∗
T
E[Πp∗∗] =
1
T
E[Πs∗∗], (III.4.7)
25This criterion for collective decision-making goes back to Harsanyi (1953) and was named and extended
by Rawls (1971). Buchanan and Tullock (1962) discuss the costs of collective decision-making and external
costs (costs that an individual bears because of a personal disagreement with a collective decision). The
collective decision-making behind a veil of ignorance reduces external costs ex ante and can implement a
social choice with unanimity.
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which is the expected payoff from being either a citizen, lobbyist or policymaker and equals
an identical share of social welfare.
Both can be summarized as to the following:
Lemma 8. Behind a veil of ignorance no individual has an incentive to oppose a first-best
lobbying institution I∗ or I∗∗.
Proof. See the Appendix B.1.1.
Each individual expects an equal share of social welfare from behind a veil of ignorance.
So whenever social welfare is maximized the expected individual payoff is also maximized
and no individual has an incentive to oppose a first-best institution.
III.4.3. Individual Compliance with a First-Best Institution
The second step of the current analysis focuses on the individual incentives to deviate
from their socially desirable behavior. These incentives help to identify the potential need
for additional rules or transparency to achieve a first-best outcome in a market environment.
Suppose that founding fathers (or society members who vote behind a veil of ignorance)
have implemented an institution I∗ or I∗∗ but that individuals behave according to their
self-interests.
III.4.3.1. Institutional Ban on Commercial Lobbying
Suppose commercial lobbying is not welfare enhancing and the institution I∗ with
a larger government, P ∗, and a ban on commercial lobbying, a¯l = 0, would have been
implemented. Further, citizens and policymakers observe their roles and expected payoffs,
as described in (III.4.1) and (III.4.2).
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A citizen could deviate from this behavior in a market environment in two ways:26
A citizen could attempt to hire another citizen to act as a lobbyist who provides a
verified policy proposal to a policymaker,27 or could act as a lobbyist for another citizen.
Both potential deviations require that a policymaker has a mutual interest in reallocating
political access and grant it to a designated lobbyist.
A policymaker could also deviate from the socially desirable behavior in two ways:
A policymaker could require verification efforts in exchange for political access, or could
require financial contributions in exchange for political access.28 Both actions imply that
a policymaker would reallocate political access from a citizen to a designated lobbyist
and violate Ap = a¯c. A citizen would then have the choice between complying with the
policymaker’s request or being politically inactive.
Proposition 10. A citizen has no incentive to deviate from the institutional rules of I∗.
A policymaker has an incentive to deviate from the institutional rules of I∗ if
ρ(x+)E[ec|x+] > 2E[ec] and ρ(x+)pic ≥ F (1) +G(1) (III.4.8)
and would require verification efforts in exchange for political access or if
α >
(
T
(
pic −G(1)
E[ec]
)
+ 2
)−1
(III.4.9)
and would require financial contributions in exchange for political access.
Proof. See the Appendix B.1.2.
26Every citizen has an incentive to use available political access because of pic > 0. This is independent
of I∗ that specifies whether a citizen is required to present a policy proposal or a policymaker is required
to accept all policy proposals presented by citizens.
27Every citizen receives political access and has no incentive to hire a lobbyist just for political
representation.
28Every policymaker has a private incentive to employ all political resources because of a share of positive
expected spillovers.
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If commercial lobbying is socially undesirable, then no citizen has an incentive to
privately provide the public good of policy information. Unlike citizens, policymakers
do not bear the costs of commercial lobbying directly and possess a powerful position
that allows them to offer their scarce time in exchange for resources. If a policymaker
sufficiently values the improvements in spillover shares through verification efforts, shown
in (III.4.8), or values financial contributions higher than a spillover share from an unverified
proposal, shown in (III.4.9), then a policymaker has an incentive to deviate from I∗ and to
offer political access to citizens via a commercial lobbyist. The policymaker’s requests
for verification efforts are more likely for larger information improvements and larger
private benefits from proposals, pic. Financial requests are more likely for higher degrees of
dishonesty (or the effectiveness of in-kind transfers), α, a larger population, T , and larger
private benefits from proposals, pic.
Proposition 10 implies that potential violations of I∗ would be undertaken by
policymakers and not by citizens. This may require penalties and additional transparency
rules to monitor and constrain policymakers’ actions.
III.4.3.2. Institutional Facilitation of Commercial Lobbying
Now suppose commercial lobbying is welfare enhancing and the institution I∗∗ with
a smaller government and a positive level of commercial lobbying activities, a¯l = Ap,
has been implemented. All individuals observe their identities and payoffs, as described
in (III.4.3), (III.4.4), and (III.4.5). Citizens shall not receive direct political access to
policymakers but shall pass their policy proposals to lobbyists, who receive all available
political access, verify all policy proposals from their clients, and present only those with
positive verification signals to policymakers.
A citizen could deviate from the socially desired behavior with an attempt to bypass
the lobbyists’ verification efforts and to approach a policymaker directly.29 This would
29Assume that ρ(x+)pic − k ≥ 0 and that a citizen has an incentive to pass the proposal to a lobbyist.
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require that a policymaker would have to have an incentive to reallocate political access
from a lobbyist to a citizen.
A lobbyist could deviate from the institutional rules of I∗∗ in two ways: A lobbyist
could offer to make a financial contribution when f¯ = 0 (because of α < 1), or could offer
financial contributions to substitute for verification efforts. However, a lobbyist has no
incentive to offer financial contributions if it does not affect the amount of political access
or terms for political access. Alternatively, a policymaker could violate the institution I∗∗
in three ways: A policymaker could reallocate political access to citizens, could demand
financial contributions when f¯ = 0, or could substitute financial contribution requests for
verification request, i.e., q < 1.30
Proposition 11. A citizen has no individual incentive to deviate from the institutional
rules of I∗∗.
A lobbyist and a policymaker have a mutual incentive to substitute financial
contributions for verification efforts if
F ′(m∗ − 1) > 1 + α
α
E[ec|x+]− E[ec]
T
. (III.4.10)
A policymaker has an incentive to extract further financial contributions from lobbyists
if
k +
E[ec|x+]− E[ec]
T
> F ′(m∗ − 1) +G′(m∗ − 1). (III.4.11)
Proof. See the Appendix B.1.3.
A citizen may want to bypass the verification efforts of lobbyists to avoid the private
costs of commercial lobbying, ρ(x−)pic+k, but cannot persuade a policymaker to reallocate
political access because of a potential reduction in the policymaker’s share of spillovers,
E[ec|x+]−E[ec]
T > 0.
30Similarly, every policymaker has a private incentive to employ all political resources because of a share
of positive expected spillovers.
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If (III.4.10) holds, then lobbyists have an incentive to substitute financial contributions
for verification efforts because of cost savings, and policymakers have an incentive to
realize higher private gains from financial contributions than from better spillover shares.
These incentives can lead to a collusive behavior between lobbyists and policymakers.
The substitution of financial contributions for verification efforts is more likely for higher
marginal costs of verification, F ′(.), higher degrees of dishonesty, α, larger populations,
T , and lower spillover improvements through commercial lobbying – i.e., the difference
between an enacted policy proposal with a positive verification signal and an unverified
proposal with E[ec|x+]− E[ec].
The incentive for collusion is related to Tirole (1986) and Laffont and Tirole (1991).
In their agent-supervisor-principal model an agent undertakes an unobservable productive
effort and a supervisor is hired by a principal to monitor the agent. The supervisor can share
the monitoring findings with the principal or can collude for a side payment with the agent
and suppress the information. A collusion reduces the principal’s wealth and would require
the principal to pay the supervisor a reward for sharing the information. Kessler (2000)
shows that if the supervisor’s monitoring information can be concealed but not forged,
then a principal can prevent collusion at no cost. In the analysis here, the policymaker
receives “hard” information about the lobbyist’s signals and verification effort if he requests
the information. Collusion, in the form of the substitution of financial contributions for
verification efforts, could therefore be prevented if additional institutional rules ensure
transparency about lobbyists’ and policymakers’ financial and information transfers. That
is, policymakers would have to disclose the amount of policy information they received.
Policymakers have an incentive to use their powerful position and extract economic
rents from lobbyists via financial contributions. The threat of losing political access and the
lobbyist’s value of political access is described in (III.4.11). This mechanism is similar to
the unregulated market outcome in which policymakers announce take-it-or-leave-it access
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rules to lobbyists. The welfare implications depend on whether such financial contributions
are socially wasteful in-kind transfers, α < 1, or pure transfers, α = 1.
Despite the risk of political influence, a common argument in support of lobbying
activities is the provision of socially desirable information to policymakers. This emphasizes
the importance of evaluating the effectiveness of such information provision. Here,
proposition 11 highlights a potential collusive incentive for lobbyists and policymakers that
may require monitoring informational transfers as well as the financial transfers between
them. Further, current transparency rules that focus exclusively on financial transfers
may fall short in distinguishing between additional financial contributions that do not
affect information acquisitions (as pure transfers or additional transfers) and financial
contributions that substitute for information acquisitions (as distortions).
III.5. Political Conflict and Institutional Reforms
This section relaxes the assumption of exogenously given institutions and focuses on
the distributional consequences arising from commercial lobbying activities. The focus is on
a potential political conflict between citizens, lobbyists, and policymakers that may result
in endogenous reforms departing from or preventing a first-best institution. The analysis
focuses on two questions: Under which conditions is a first-best lobbying institution self-
stable and how can the empirically relevant case of unregulated lobbying market outcomes
be explained? Rather than using a specific voting rule to initiate institutional reforms, the
focus is more general and considers the cases when unanimous support is required, when
citizens are decisive, or when policymakers are decisive for institutional reforms.31
31The current analysis includes all policymakers with discretionary power such as politicians, staff
members, or public servants. One may argue that political competition amongst politicians may keep
politicians sufficiently accountable and political reforms may not be necessary. However, this special case
is left for chapter 5.
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III.5.1. Self-Stable First-Best Institutions
Previously we explored when founding fathers implemented or proposed the first-best
lobbying institution depending on the social desirability of commercial lobbying activities.
In this section individuals observe their individual payoffs in the first-best and articulate
their collective demands. These political incentives and some varying pivotal rules for
reforms help to explain the stability of first-best institutions in various scenarios. It is
assumed that there are no compensating transfers between individuals and their political
preferences are entirely determined by their individual payoffs.32 The rationale for an
inefficient institutional reform is characterized by the distributional consequences of the
first-best outcome and the distribution of political power but not by any kind of market
failure. The political implications of market failure are analyzed in section III.5.2.
An institutional reform may lead to a different number of policymakers, P¯ , and result
in a different distribution of citizens and lobbyists. If individuals would expect a completely
new draw of social roles and payoffs, then they would act behind a veil of ignorance and
the first-best institution would be always self-stable as shown in section III.4.2.3. To add
some insights, it is assumed that individuals’ expectations are more detailed.
For example, the analysis does not model how policymakers are appointed to office but
derives the optimal number of policymakers for I∗ and I∗∗ – i.e., P ∗ > P ∗∗. Abstracting
from appointment rules, the analysis focuses on heterogeneous expectations amongst
policymakers. Suppose some policymakers would be more likely than other policymakers
to stay in office if there is reduction in the number of policymakers. A reason for such
heterogeneity could be influence, seniority, or party affiliation. So the analysis defines
“stronger policymakers” who expect to stay in office and “weaker policymakers” who expect
to lose office because of a reduction in the number of policymakers.
32A first-best outcome can be always achieved with compensatory transfers. However, a compensation
for individuals who suffer from a single policy is rarely observed and it is not uncommon that individuals
are asked to vote on a single policy topic and ignore potentially offsetting policies.
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III.5.1.1. First-Best Institution I*
Suppose commercial lobbying is socially undesirable and the institution I∗ has been
implemented at the constitutional stage. The question then is whether or not the first-best
institution I∗ is self-stable or if there is a collective demand for the institution I∗∗ (for
example, via a referendum) with P ∗ > P ∗∗.
If citizens do not expect to be appointed to a political office because of a smaller
government or political barriers to entry, then they would find it optimal to be a client or
a lobbyist after a reform. A representative citizen compares the expected payoffs of E[Πc∗]
with E[Πc∗∗] and E[Πl∗∗] as described in (III.4.1), (III.4.3), and (III.4.4).
Proposition 12. Citizens oppose the first-best institution I∗ if the expected improvements
in spillover shares outweigh citizens’ private benefits from direct political access.
Proof. See the Appendix B.1.4.
Citizens desire to deviate from the first-best institution I∗ and privately provide
the public good of lobbyists’ verification efforts if their expected shares of spillover
improvements outweigh their foregone private benefits from direct political access, which
yields the entire proposal’s private benefit.
If some policymakers expect that they would lose political office, then these weaker
policymakers would expect to be a client or a lobbyist after an institutional reform. A
representative weaker policymaker compares the expected payoffs of E[Πp∗] as described in
(III.4.2) with E[Πc∗∗] and E[Πl∗∗]. The trade-off for a representative stronger policymaker
follows from the expected payoffs of E[Πp∗] and E[Πp∗∗] as described in (III.4.5).
Proposition 13. Weaker policymakers oppose the first-best institution I∗ if the expected
improvements in spillover shares outweigh their private benefits from holding a political
office.
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Stronger policymakers oppose the first-best institution I∗ if their expected benefits from
commercial lobbying activities are positive – i.e.,
αfp∗ +
Ap
T
(
P ∗∗E[ec|x+]− P ∗E[ec]) > 0 (III.5.1)
with fp∗ ≥ 0.
Proof. See the Appendix B.1.5.
Weaker policymakers face a similar trade-off to citizens. A citizen loses the private
benefits from direct political access, whereas a weaker policymaker loses the private
benefits, such as ego rents and potential financial contributions for α = 1, associated with
political office. Stronger policymakers expect to keep their private benefits from office and
demand institutional reform of commercial lobbying if their spillover shares from fewer but
verified proposals outweigh the spillover shares from more but unverified policy proposals,
or if the financial contributions of fp∗ are sufficiently large. An institutional reform could
improve the quality of enacted policy proposals, if P ∗∗E[ec|x+] > P ∗E[ec], but this is just
a necessary but not sufficient condition for welfare enhancing commercial lobbying.
Using proposition 12, proposition 13, ρ(x−)pic +k > 0, and fp∗ ≥ 0, the following can
be concluded:
Corollary 1. Policymakers are more likely than citizens to oppose the first-best lobbying
institution I∗.
This follows immediately from the distribution of benefits and costs of commercial
lobbying. Policymakers do not bear the costs of commercial lobbying and can improve
their spillover shares and earn financial contributions, whereas citizens have to bear the
costs of commercial lobbying.
80
III.5.1.2. First-Best Institution I**
Now suppose commercial lobbying is socially desirable and the institution I∗∗ has been
implemented at the constitutional stage. The question reverses to: Under which conditions
is the first-best institution I∗∗ with P ∗∗ < P ∗ self-stable?
If citizens and lobbyists do not expect to be appointed to political office because
they are relatively numerous and there is a potentially relatively small increase in the
number of policymakers, then citizens and lobbyists would expect to be a citizen after an
institutional reform. A representative citizen or lobbyist would compare the individual
expected payoffs of E[Πc∗∗] and E[Πl∗∗] with E[Πc∗]. If policymakers expect to stay in
office after an institutional reform, then the trade-off is between E[Πp∗∗] and E[Πp∗].
Proposition 14. Citizens and lobbyists oppose the first-best institution I∗∗ if their private
lobbying costs outweigh their shares of spillover improvements through commercial lobbying.
Policymakers do not oppose the first-best institution I∗∗.
Proof. See the Appendix B.1.6.
Citizens bear the costs of commercial lobbying and the foregone private benefits
from direct political access. If citizens’ shares in spillovers do not improve sufficiently,
then they are not willing to bear these costs and abandon direct political access. Unlike
citizens, policymakers do not bear the costs of commercial lobbying and focus entirely on
potential spillover improvements. If commercial lobbying is socially desirable, then the
spillover improvements through commercial lobbying are positive and policymakers have
an incentive to pursue such benefits.
III.5.1.3. Political Power and Reforms
Given the previously described political incentives the analysis proceeds with different
voting rules. First, suppose an institutional reform requires unanimity amongst society’s
members. Corollary 1 predicts that the support by citizens would determine the likelihood
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of an institutional reform from institution I∗ to institution I∗∗. If policymakers would
support a reform because of expected gains, then citizens cannot also expect gains since
all potential Pareto-improvements are exhausted whenever I∗ would be optimal. This
implies that the first-best institution I∗ would be self-stable because of a veto by citizens.
Proposition 14 implies that the first-best institution I∗∗ would be self-stable because of a
veto by policymakers to block an institutional reform from I∗∗ to I∗.
However, unanimous voting as a collective decision rule for institutional reforms may
not be appropriate for all constitutional settings. Now suppose that citizens are decisive
for an institutional reform. Examples would be a simple majority or super majority for
collective decisions, which are indeed mostly affected by citizens’ preferences. Proposition
12 and proposition 14 imply that the citizens’ support for a potential reform is entirely
determined by the comparison of commercial lobbying fees and benefits from direct political
access with the potential improvements in individual spillover shares.
Finally, suppose policymakers are pivotal for institutional reforms. Examples would
be a parliament approval that can be delayed, a bureaucratic government agency, or
policymakers with limited re-electoral concerns. The support for an institutional reform
by policymakers follows from proposition 13. It implies that policymakers favor an
institution with commercial lobbying activities as their expected benefits from the provision
of information or financial contributions are positive. This is independent of the lobbying
costs, which are borne by citizens.
The choice of the lobbying institution via potential reforms can be summarized by
the following:
Proposition 15. The distributional consequences of commercial lobbying activities and
the collective decision rule for institutional reforms may lead to an inefficient lobbying
institution.
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The analysis assumed that all individuals behave according to their “socially efficient”
roles but allowed for endogenous institutional reforms. The rationale for an inefficient
institutional reform has been characterized by the distributional consequences in the
absence of market failures and political power. In the following, the analysis focuses on
the political implications of a market failure.
III.5.2. Stability of the Unregulated Market Outcome
To address the question of the empirically relevant case of unregulated lobbying
activities the analysis focuses on the predicted private rent dissipation for citizens in
an unregulated market equilibrium. The private rent dissipation for citizens and the
political market failure raises the question why unregulated lobbying activities are relatively
common despite these predictions. It can be shown that the unregulated market outcome
can be explained by self-interested policymakers who do not distort the benefits from
commercial lobbying activities too much, or by citizens who are not powerful enough to
constrain policymakers via institutional reforms.
Citizens support commercial lobbying in the first-best if their shares of expected
spillover improvements outweigh their private lobbying costs – i.e.,
Ap
T
(
P ∗∗E[ec|x+]− P ∗E[ec]) ≥ ρ(x−)pic + k. (III.5.2)
Suppose this holds but the institution I∗∗ may not be feasible. Citizens who observe the
unregulated market outcome with a given number of policymakers P¯ support a complete
ban on commercial lobbying if
P¯Ap
T
(E[ec|α]− E[ec]) < P¯A
p
T − P¯ pi
c, (III.5.3)
which is the difference between the shares of expected spillover improvements from
commercial lobbying and the expected private benefits from direct political access. The
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share of expected spillovers depends on the quality of political decisions made by self-
interested policymakers - i.e., E[ec|α]. For the citizens’ political incentives for the
unregulated market setting, the following can be stated:
Lemma 9. If citizens have a political incentive to oppose commercial lobbying activities in
a market environment, then they demand a constitutional change with a ban on commercial
lobbying and an increase in the number of policymakers.
Proof. See the Appendix B.1.7.
If citizens demand a ban on commercial lobbying because of relatively low spillover
improvements compared to the expected gains from direct political access, then citizens
also demand a ban on commercial lobbying in order to receive direct political access. If the
number of policymakers would not change, then direct political access would be uncertain
and citizens would be better off reducing the competition for political access. Therefore the
citizens’ decision to accept or oppose the current unregulated commercial lobbying market
depends on
Ap
T
(
P¯E[ec|α]− P ∗E[ec]) R pic. (III.5.4)
Consequentially, the following can be stated:
Proposition 16. If the policymakers’ degree of dishonesty, α, is too large, then citizens
have an incentive to demand a second-best institution that bans commercial lobbying. Even
when citizens support commercial lobbying in the first-best.
Proof. See the Appendix B.1.8.
Despite the fact that citizens would be willing to forfeit political access for improved
political decisions through commercial lobbying activities at the constitutional stage,
(III.5.2) holds, citizens may have an incentive to implement an inefficient institution that
bans commercial lobbying activities and constrains self-interested policymakers. As the
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policymakers’ degree of dishonesty, α, increases policymakers request less verification efforts
for higher financial contributions and distort social benefits. The citizens’ collective demand
is independent of the actual commercial lobbying costs. Their collective demand is entirely
characterized by the improvements in political decisions and the citizen’s private benefit
from direct political access.
Proposition 16 implies that unregulated commercial lobbying activities can be
explained by self-interested policymakers who do not distort the social benefits from
commercial lobbying too much, or by citizens who do not have sufficient political power to
constrain policymakers. Which of these two hypotheses is correct is an empirical question.
III.6. Conclusion
This chapter provides an analysis of the effective regulation of commercial lobbying
activities, and it analyzes the endogeneity of institutions that regulate such activities.
The current analysis emphasizes the need of transparency rules about both financial
transfers and information transfers from lobbyists to policymakers. It also argues that the
observed institutional differences can be explained by a political conflict between citizens
and policymakers that is rooted in the distribution of costs and benefits from commercial
lobbying.
The current analysis uses a model of commercial lobbying that explains the observed
simultaneity of information acquisition and financial contributions in a simple general-
equilibrium framework. Imperfectly informed policymakers can announce take-it-or-leave-
it political access rules to citizens and lobbyists who compete for political access by
providing resources to policymakers. The analysis provides several new insights that are not
present in the analysis of lobbying activities and regulatory institutions. First, the effective
regulation of commercial lobbying activities may require additional transparency rules that
limit lobbyists’ and policymakers’ collusive incentives to substitute financial contributions
for information provisions. Current transparency rules that focus exclusively on financial
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benefits may fail to prevent this. Second, the analysis shows how the distribution of costs
and benefits from commercial lobbying activities may cause a political conflict between
citizens and policymakers. This potential conflict provides the conditions under which
a first-best institution is or is not self-stable. It also argues that the observed political
stability of unregulated lobbying activities can be explained by self-interested policymakers
who do not distort political decisions too much or by citizens who do not have sufficient
political power to initiate reforms.
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CHAPTER IV
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND REPEATED COMMERCIAL LOBBYING
This chapter is co-authored with Christopher J. Ellis, who contributed through
analytical insights. I was the primary contributor to the development and analysis of
the theoretical model.
IV.1. Introduction
In recent policy debates much attention has been devoted to the activities, personal
relationships and influence of lobbyists on the political process.1 It is argued in the
previous chapters that most of these lobbying activities are undertaken by individual
lobbyists and lobbying firms that are, in contrast to special interest groups, not directly
affected by policy outcomes. Commercial lobbyists have usually some form of expertise
in legal, public, or political affairs and provide financial resources to policymakers in form
of campaign contributions, networking events, gifts, and potential future employment.
This type of lobbyist works on behalf of clients for economic profit rather than ideological
motives, and the commercial lobbyist’s proprietary asset is political access to policymakers.
Chapter II provides a rationale for commercial lobbying activities and analyze the welfare
implications in a static environment. This chapter intends to focus on repeated commercial
lobbying activities in the presence of private policy information and in the absence of legally
binding contracts. It is shown that repeated lobbying relationships simplify a policymaker’s
1For example, The New York Times reported in 2009 how the same lobbyists, employed by the same
law firm and lobbying on behalf of a biotechnology company, provided House members from both parties
with statements about the health care reform. Some of these statements were printed in the Congressional
Records (Pear 2009). The extensive Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act and the process of its drafting
caused a windfall of lobbying revenues, especially for lobbyists with expertise in financial products and
regulation (Becker 2010). The New York Times’s online service “Topics” has a special archive for articles
related to lobbying and lobbyists. The Washingtonian magazine listed in 2007 the top 50 “hired guns” -
a list of professional lobbyists working for law or government affairs firms (Eisler 2007). Jack Abramoff
was one of the more enigmatic lobbyists, working for several lobbying firms over time, and well known for
lucrative lobbying deals (Schmidt and Grimaldi 2005). He pleaded guilty to charges of fraud, tax evasion,
and bribery of Congress members (Schmidt and Grimaldi 2006).
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information and contracting problem. To the best of my knowledge the repeated personal
interactions between lobbyists and policymakers have not been analyzed in the theoretical
economics literature, and it is the intent of this chapter to provide a dynamic model of
commercial lobbying that explains how these interactions arise endogenously and analyzes
their welfare implications.
The empirical lobbying literature provides evidence for repeated personal relationships
between lobbyists and policymakers. For example, Krozner and Stratmann (1998) argue
that the committee system of Congress provides an environment that facilitates repeated
interactions and reputation building between special interest groups and politicians. The
committee structure and the repeated interactions ease agreements of legislative support
for campaign contributions in the absence of legal contracts. Recent empirical work by
Blanes i Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen (2011) and Eggers (2010) focuses on the importance
of personal relationships between lobbyists and politicians. The former concentrates on
the “revolving door” phenomenon in which political staff members become lobbyists and
attempt to earn lobbying rents by offering their previous political contacts to special interest
groups. They find empirical support for the revolving door hypothesis and show that those
lobbyists with previous staff experience realize immediate, discontinuous, and permanent
losses in lobbying revenues after their previous employer leaves office. Eggers (2010) focuses
on lobbyists’ and politicians’ party affiliation and the revolving door phenomenon. His
results show that the revenues of those lobbyists with staff experience are more affected
by their party membership and the party in power; whereas former politicians generate
lobbying income by offering personal contacts rather than ideological proximity to political
incumbents. Other recent empirical work by Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011) tries
to disentangle whether lobbyists provide issue expertise to policymakers or offer political
access to potential clients. Amongst their results, they show that lobbyists, measured by
campaign donations and reported policy issues, follow their political contacts and change
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their political issues when those politicians change offices or committee assignments and
political issues.
The basic model of commercial lobbying, which is presented in Chapter II, focuses
on the existence and welfare implications of commercial lobbying activities in a market
environment. The basic model assumes that policymakers can observe both the lobbyists’
information acquisition and information. This allows policymakers to request their
desired levels of verification efforts and financial contributions directly, which results in
private rent dissipation for lobbyists and citizens. However, the assumption of observable
verification efforts might be too restrictive for all commercial lobbying games. If policy
information is private knowledge to lobbyists, then they may not be able to credibly
transmit information to policymakers or may have an incentive to misrepresent information.
Imperfect information about a lobbyist’s verification efforts causes a moral hazard problem:
A lobbyist may misrepresent the information about costly verification. The policymakers’
information problem decreases their ability to request verification efforts directly and may
require them to share rents.
This chapter introduces a dynamic version of the commercial lobbying model that
builds on unobservable lobbying efforts and promised, rather than contractible, financial
contributions. Commercial lobbying firms have the capability to investigate the social
desirability of citizens’ policy proposals and can transfer financial benefits to policymakers.
It is argued that if policymakers cannot observe lobbyists’ investigation efforts and
financial contributions cannot be contracted, then repeated personal relationships between
a policymaker and a lobbyist facilitate a solution to a policymaker’s information and
contracting problem. Policymakers have an incentive to announce political access rules that
induce current information acquisition and financial contributions in exchange for political
access. The intertemporal interactions enable policymakers to escape a static “cheap talk”
game with no lobbying efforts that actually allows them to monitor the quality of exchanges
with lobbyists. The motivation for lobbyists to engage in such repeated interactions arises
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when policymakers create political barriers to entry and promise lobbyists, as “political
insiders”, positive profits. These information rents reduce the verification efforts by
each lobbyist, and the welfare implications of repeated personal interactions depend on
whether the policymakers’ information or contracting problem predominates. However,
the policymaker’s information problem may actually improve welfare outcomes. Similar to
the results in Chapter II, financial contributions may also improve welfare outcomes.
The commercial lobbying model characterizes the actions of commercial lobbyists
with expertise who act as intermediaries between citizens and policymakers. Commercial
lobbyist differ from “experts” and “advocates” who have been discussed in the economic
literature.2 Their characteristics share specific features of each of these types. Experts
are characterized as agents who possess some form of expertise and private information
that is valued by a decision-maker. In contrast to a commercial lobbyist who competes for
political access, which is offered to clients, an expert is directly affected and compensated
by the decision-maker’s choice. An advocate is expected to achieve the best outcome
for another agent. Dewatriport and Tirole (1999) study the behavior of advocates and
show that informational benefits are maximized when each advocate argues for a specific
cause. They point out that we observe two compensation schemes for advocates: Decision-
based rewards and information-based rewards. Decision-based rewards are based on
the advocates’ achievements for their clients; information-based rewards are based on
how advocates achieves outcomes. Dewatriport and Tirole (1999) focus their analysis
on decision-based rewards and ignore information-based rewards. Commercial lobbyists
represent many clients and are dependent on political access to policymakers. Commercial
lobbyists have to balance policymakers’ demands with clients’ objectives in order to be
successful. The former is closer to information-based rewards, whereas the latter is closer
2For example, Crawford and Sobel (1982), Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989), Austen-Smith (1994), and
Krishna and Morgan (2001) study the behavior of a single or multiple experts with private information who
advise an imperfectly decision-maker. A biased expert has an incentive to misrepresent information, and a
decision-maker may want to consult competing experts to improve decision-making. Krishna and Morgan
(2001) provides a review of this literature.
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to decision-based rewards. It is argued that the competition for scarce political access
allows relatively powerful policymakers to shift the lobbyists’ compensation scheme more
towards indirect information-based rewards.
IV.1.1. Other Related Literature
The current study is related to the rent-seeking and lobbying literature that focuses on
campaign contributions, information acquisition, or both simultaneously.3 The closest two
literature strands are lobbying models with unobservable information and the simultaneity
of information acquisition and financial contributions. Crawford and Sobel (1982) and
Krishna and Morgan (2001) focus on static lobbying games with imperfect information.
An imperfectly informed decision-maker anticipates a sender’s incentive to misrepresent
information and, as a result, one or multiple senders may be unable to communicate their
private information credibly.4 Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006) and Dahm and Porteiro
(2008a) focus on the interdependency and the trade-off between information acquisition
and financial contributions. However, similar to the basic model presented in Chapter II,
both assume that a lobby’s information is verifiable for a policymaker. To the best of my
knowledge no economic analysis has focused on repeated lobbying.
The current study is also related to the extensive literature that focuses on incomplete
information, repeated interactions, and barriers to entry. The notion that current actions
can generate future information is introduced by Kreps and Wilson (1982), as well as
Milgrom and Roberts (1982). Both address Selten’s (1978) Chain Store Paradox and
analyze incumbents’ and entrants’ actions in a repeated game with asymmetric information.
Market incumbents undertake current investments to create a reputation that deters future
3A detailed review of the two literature strands is provided in section 1.1 of Chapter II.
4Section 1.1 of Chapter II provides a survey for costly lobbying activities. In such models lobbying
expenditures serve the decision-maker as a signal for an interest group’s credibility. Here, costly lobbying
activities improve the information about policies or serve as a private benefit for a policymaker.
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entry.5 Diamond (1991) focuses on the reputation of borrowers and monitoring by lenders.
The borrower’s current repayments improve the borrower’s credit rating and allow the
borrower to borrow at lower interest rates in the future. Here, commercial lobbyists
undertake current verification efforts, which are positively correlated with quality signals
policymakers receive, to establish a reputation that is rewarded with political access. These
reputations and the policymakers’ rewards create barriers to entry in the political access
market and deter entry into the market for commercial lobbying services.
The interactions between commercial lobbyists and policymakers who grant political
access in exchange for unobservable efforts is also related to the principal-agent literature.
However, as Holmstrom (1981) points out, principal-agent models with asymmetric
information may require complex sharing rules that may entail serious limitations with
respect to legal enforcement. Simple fixed-wage contracts may perform better whenever the
complex contracts cannot be enforced.6 Such contracts with prohibitively costly bonding
have been addressed in the economic literature of efficiency wages with shirking. This
literature addresses the relationship between a worker’s productivity and compensation.
For example, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) show that employers have an incentive to offer
higher wages that increase a worker’s opportunity cost of shirking and being fired. The
resulting higher equilibrium wages imply a higher level of unemployment that serves as a
discipline device. The authors assume that the likelihood of detecting shirking is exogenous
and that a worker’s effort choice is dichotomous. Sparks (1986) allows for continuous effort
and employer’s can observe with some positive probability an employee’s effort level. As a
result, an employer announces a minimum effort level and dismisses shirking workers. In
equilibrium, workers undertake the required minium effort and receive efficiency wages. In
5Kreps and Wilson (1982) assume that entrants do not know the incumbent’s predatory payoff and that
there is positive chance that predatory actions yield better payoffs for an incumbent in any stage. Milgrom
and Roberts (1982) assume that predation is costly for the incumbent and that there is some uncertainty
for entrants’ about their alternatives. The qualitative implications are similar for both though the latter
has a strong uniqueness result.
6For an extensive survey of the economic literature of moral hazard and dynamic moral hazard problems
see Bolton and Dewatriport (2005).
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Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani (1989) as well as Black and Garen (1991), an employer receives
a signal about a worker’s performance that is positively correlated with the worker’s effort.
The worker’s choice of effort is continuous, and the employer announces a performance
standard for a continued work relationship.7 In both models, some unlucky non-shirking
workers are in equilibrium dismissed, creating vacancies for entry.
The current analysis models the principal’s problem similarly to Esfahani and Salehi-
Isfahani (1989) as well as Black and Garen (1991). However, it provides some additional
insights. First, a policymaker, as the principal, does not bear any explicit cost when
rewarding a lobbyist’s performance. A policymaker allocates scarce time that is valued by
citizens and lobbyists and this causes an implicit cost for the policymaker. The political
access, as indirect compensation for a lobbyist in this market, can be sold to potential
clients in the market for lobbying services and creates an incentive to undertake effort.
Second, both a lobbyist’s verification effort and financial contribution is continuous but the
degree of monitoring differs. Verification effort can only be imperfectly monitored whereas
financial contributions can be perfectly monitored. The former reflects the policymaker’s
information problem and the latter the policymaker’s contracting problem in the presence
of asymmetric information and in the absence of binding contracts.
IV.1.2. Outline
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section IV.2. presents the dynamic model
and characterizes a simple political access rule. Section IV.3. characterizes the steady state
with a simultaneous equilibrium in the lobbying labor market, the market for commercial
lobbying services, and the market for political access. Section IV.4. concludes and discusses
the findings.
7Esfhani and Salehi-Isfahani (1989) focus on the observed dualism, the coexistence of formal and informal
sectors, and the wage gaps and unemployment rates across both sectors. They argue that workers’ effort is
less observable in the formal sector because of complexity. Black and Garen (1991) focus on industry wage
differentials and argue that observed wage gaps result from differences in labor performance standards or
observability of workers’ efforts.
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IV.2. The Dynamic Model
The economic model is a dynamic version of the commercial lobbying model presented
in section 2 of Chapter II. The lobbying model is in discrete time and characterized by
unobservable information acquisitions and promised financial contributions. A society
consists of citizens, c, lobbyists, l, and policymakers, p. All agents are risk-neutral and
infinitely lived. Each citizen has a single policy proposal in any period t that if enacted
will yield a private benefit of pic > 0 and create a social spillover of ect with e
c
t ∈ {s,−s}
and s > 0. A policy proposal with a positive spillover would be socially desirable whereas
one with a negative spillover would be socially undesirable – i.e., pic − s < 0. The social
value of any policy proposal is unknown to society in t and each society member will only
know in t+ 1 whether the proposal has been or has not been socially desirable. However,
each society member knows the exogenous probability for a positive spillover, ρ(e+), and
the complimentary probability for a negative spillover, ρ(e−) = 1 − ρ(e+). Overall, the
expected social value of any policy proposal is positive, and each individual receives an
identical share from all realized spillovers.
A policy proposal can be presented to a policymaker either directly by the citizen
or indirectly by a lobbyist, who operates for profit. Lobbyists have two capabilities: 1)
they have a verification technology that allows them to investigate the welfare effects of
policy proposals, and 2) they can make financial contributions to policymakers. Each
policymaker has a time constraint for enacting policy proposals but no independent
verification technology. Every policymaker announces political access rules to citizens
and lobbyists, a˜cp(.) and a˜lp(.), that allocate time between citizens and lobbyists for the
presentation of policy proposals. The total number of enacted policy proposals is At.
The timing of the model for each time period t is the following: First, all policymakers
simultaneously announce individual access rules to citizens and lobbyists. Second, citizens
choose to become a lobbyist or continue as citizen with a policy proposal. Third, lobbyists
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accept a certain number of proposals from clients and may investigate some of them.
Finally, lobbyists promise financial contributions and present a portfolio of policy proposals
to policymakers, which are immediately enacted.
The actions by lobbyists and the interactions between lobbyists and policymakers are
unobservable to citizens. However, citizens can observe the amount of political access, a˜lpt ,
and the number of clients, nlt, for each lobbyist. Policymakers know the characteristics of
the lobbyists’ verification technology but the lobbyists’ verification efforts, their received
verification signals, and financial contributions are unobservable in t. Notwithstanding,
each policymaker observes in t+ 1 the financial contributions made by lobbyists and their
delivered quality of policy proposals in period t. All individuals know the distribution of
society’s members in the population, T , in t – i.e., T = Pt + Ct + Lt. The appointment
and number of policymakers follows from some commonly known constitutional rule with
Pt = P¯ .
There are three markets in the economy. Citizens have free access to the verification
technology and may enter the lobbying labor market. The remaining citizens may hire a
lobbyist in a competitive lobbying market at a market fee of kt or attempt to approach
a policymaker directly. Policymakers announce political access rules to lobbyists that
demand verification efforts and financial contributions in exchange for future political
access. These exchanges have agency characteristics but are not contractible. Further
details about the dynamic model are presented in the following.
IV.2.1. Citizens
There are Ct citizens and each has a policy proposal. If a policy proposal will not be
enacted by the end of t, then the proposal expires and each citizen will have a new policy
proposal in t+ 1. A citizen realizes the private benefit of the enacted policy proposal, pic,
and additionally a share of aggregate spillovers from all enacted policy proposals, At, at
the end of t. Citizens may present their proposals directly to a policymaker at no cost or
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hire a commercial lobbyist to present the proposal on their behalf for a fee of kt. A citizen
can hire only one lobbyist in t.
The payoff for citizen c in t is:
Πct =

pic + 1T
At∑
c=1
ect if c gains access directly in t,
1
T
At∑
c=1
ect if c gains no access in t,
pic − kt + 1T
At∑
c=1
ect if lobbyist l presents c’s proposal in t, or
−kt + 1T
At∑
c=1
ect if lobbyist l does not present c’s proposal in t.
(IV.2.1)
If all policymakers exhaust their time constraints and citizens are not strategic about
spillover effects and the contribution of each citizen to total spillovers is sufficiently small,
then citizens do not take spillover shares into account since they realize ex ante the same
shares of expected spillovers.
IV.2.1.1. Citizens’ Lobbying Labor Supply
Each citizen takes the political access rules by policymakers as given. Given the free
access to the verification technology, the citizen’s entry decision depends on the payoffs
for citizens, Πct , and lobbyists, Π
l
t, in t, as well as the expected lifetime payoffs for citizens
and lobbyists. More important for the entry decision for citizens is whether or not there is
political access available to entrants, which they could then offer to potential clients – i.e.,
P¯∑
p=1
a˜lpt ≥ 0, where a˜lpt is lobbyist l’s political access.
IV.2.1.2. Citizens’ Demand for Commercial Lobbying Services
A citizen can try to approach a policymaker directly at no cost. If direct access is
granted, then the proposal is presented and enacted. However, political access is uncertain
and citizens have to form an expectation about the likelihood for direct political access.
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The citizens’ expected trade-off for direct political access may be characterized by
∑P¯
p=1 a˜
cp
t
Ct −Nt pi
c ≥ 0 for all t, (IV.2.2)
where a˜cpt ∈ {0, 1}, Nt is the number of all lobbying industry clients, and Ct − Nt is the
number of citizens competing for direct political access. Another alternative is to hire
a lobbyist to present the policy proposal. A potential client cannot observe lobbyists’
actions behind closed doors and therefore has to form expectations about the likelihood
for a presentation by a lobbyist. A citizen uses the lobbyist’s political access, a˜lpt , and the
number of its clients, nlt, to form an expectation about a successful mandate by l. The
expected payoff from hiring a lobbyist depends on the likelihood of a successful mandate,
the private benefit of the policy proposal, and the lobbying service fee. Finally, a citizen
has the alternative of being politically inactive, which yields a certain private benefit of
zero.
If citizens expect no direct political access to policymakers – i.e.,
∑P¯
p=1 a˜
cp
t = 0 – then
the alternatives are reduced to hiring a lobbyist or being politically inactive. As a result,
the individual demand for commercial lobbying can be reduced to
a˜lpt
nlt
pic − kt ≥ 0 for all l and t. (IV.2.3)
IV.2.2. Lobbying Firms
There are Lt lobbyists and each represents one lobbying firm. A lobbyist accepts
proposals from nlt clients for a lobbying service fee of kt per proposal. Lobbyists have some
sort of expertise that allows them to investigate the potential spillovers of policy proposals.
This verification technology returns a private signal x, x ∈ {x+, x−}, and improves the
lobbyist’s information about a proposal’s expected spillover. If the signal is positive, x+,
then the exogenous probability for a positive spillover is higher than without investigation,
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ρ(e+|x+) > ρ(e+); a negative signal, x−, increases the likelihood for a negative spillover,
ρ(e−|x−) > ρ(e−). Investigated proposals with a positive signal have a greater expected
social value than unverified proposals; verified proposals with a negative signal have a
negative expected social value. The expected social value of a policy proposal can be
summarized as to the following:
ρ(e+|x+) (pic + s) + ρ(e−|x+) (pic − s) > ρ(e+) (pic + s) + ρ(e−) (pic − s)
> 0 > ρ(e+|x−) (pic + s) + ρ(e−|x−) (pic − s) . (IV.2.4)
The verification of proposals causes costs that are expressed by F
(
mlpt
)
, where mlpt is
the number of proposals that are investigated for the lobbyist’s only political contact, plpt .
Another source of lobbying costs arises with each client and proposal. Each proposal causes
processing costs for a lobbyist, and these processing costs are expressed by G
(
nlt
)
. It is
assumed that both F (.) and G(.) are increasing and convex.8 Depending on the political
access rule, a˜lp(.), a lobbyist may present verified proposals as well as some unverified
proposals to the policymaker, ulpt . The potential remaining proposals disappear in the
firm, rlt – i.e., n
l
t = m
lp
t + u
lp
t + r
l
t. Finally, depending on the policymaker’s political access
rule a lobbyist may also make a financial contribution to the policymaker, f lpt . Both the
verification effort and the financial contribution are private information in t.
The payoff for lobbyist l in t is
Πlt = ktn
l
t −G
(
nlt
)
− F
(
mlpt
)
− f lpt +
1
T
At∑
c=1
ect . (IV.2.5)
IV.2.3. Policymakers
Each of the P¯ policymakers can approve a maximum of Ap proposals in t, and all
policymakers together enact At proposals with At = P¯A
p
t ≤ P¯Ap. In each period, a
8It is also assumed that F ′(0) = G′(0) = 0 and F ′′′(.) ≥ 0.
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policymaker receives an ego rent for holding office, θ, may receive financial contributions,
f lpt , from l
p
t lobbying contacts, and enjoys a share of spillovers from all enacted policy
proposals.9 A policymaker may discount financial contributions by α with α ∈ [0, 1]. This
can be interpreted as the policymaker’s degree of dishonesty or the effectiveness of in-kind
transfers.
Policymakers do not have an independent verification technology for policy proposals
and enact all presented proposals. However, each policymaker p can announce access
rules to citizens and lobbyists, a˜cp(.) and a˜lp(.), that allocate the policymaker’s time and
specify implicit conditions. These access rules may be influenced by lobbyists’ verification
efforts and financial contributions. Naturally, the allocation of access is restricted by the
policymaker’s time constraint – i.e., Apt ≥
cpt∑
c=1
a˜cpt +
lpt∑
l=1
a˜lpt . Note that there is no explicit
cost for the policymaker to enact policy proposals or to compensate citizens or lobbyists for
the presentation of policy proposals. However, there is an implicit cost for the policymaker
because of his finite time endowment.
The payoff for policymaker p in t is
Πpt = θ + α
lpt∑
l=1
f lpt +
1
T
At∑
c=1
ect , (IV.2.6)
where the aggregate spillovers depends on presented policy proposals. The expected quality
of spillovers from enacted policy proposals, E
[
At∑
c=1
ect
]
, depends on the number of unverified
proposals presented by citizens or lobbyists and verified policy proposals with their received
verification signals presented by lobbyists.
9The only purpose of the ego rent is to provide some form of benefit to the policymaker that is
independent of his actions and provides some compensation for foregoing private benefits he may would
enjoy as if he were a citizen. Whether θ > 0 or θ = 0 has no effect on the qualitative results of this analysis.
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IV.2.4. Political Access Rules
Each policymaker faces a trade-off in the allocation of political access: Citizens can
provide policy proposals but lobbyists can provide multiple policy proposals and verification
efforts. Further, a political access rule for a citizen, a˜cp(.), can only specify whether a citizen
can or cannot present a policy proposal. Whereas a policymaker’s access rule for a lobbyist,
a˜lp(.), can specify the desired quality of presented policy proposals, financial contributions,
and the number of policy proposals in exchange for political access. In order to grant
political access to lobbyists conditionally on their unobservable efforts, policymakers have
to take legal constraints as well as the monitoring of lobbyists into account.
It is assumed that policymakers and lobbyists cannot write legally binding contracts
about the quality of presented portfolios and financial contributions.10 However, it is
reasonable to assume that there are some “insider rules” or lose agreements that serve as
implicit contracts and common sense amongst “political insiders.” These insider rules imply
the conditions under which policymakers grant political access to lobbyists in exchange for
their provided efforts. For the design of such insider rules, a policymaker realizes that
lobbyists are not directly affected by policy proposals but care about political access for
economic profit, which creates a means to induce costly lobbying efforts. A relatively
simple and legally unobjectionable incentive device for a policymaker is the implicit threat
of terminating a personal relationship.11 With the end of a personal relationship, and the
implied loss of political access, a lobbyist can no longer offer this access to clients. So a
lobbyist would have to approach another policymaker to replace the lost access or go out
of business. The policymaker’s advantage is that the policymaker can replace a lobbyist
by offering a citizen the opportunity to become a lobbyist.
10This follows from the observation that such contracts are usually not legally enforceable or that the
enforcement and disclosure of such contracts may have adverse effects for policymakers and lobbyists.
Adverse effects could be a loss of credibility or just public envy.
11This is captured by Holmstrom’s (1981) analysis that simple fixed-wage contracts may not be generally
optimal but might perform better in circumstances when the optimal contract itself would be complex but
difficult to enforce because of legal constraints.
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The presented political access rule and the issue of monitoring lobbyists’ efforts is
closely related to the issue of monitoring workers’ efforts and rewarding them with fixed
wages as studied in Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani (1989) and Black and Garen (1991). The
two key differences are 1) lobbyists’ efforts are indirectly compensated (with political access
that is valued in the market for lobbying services) and 2) lobbyists’ undertake two efforts
with different monitoring characteristics: Verification efforts and financial contributions.
IV.2.4.1. Unobservable Effort, Monitoring, and Termination
A lobbyists’ current verification effort and financial contributions are private
information in t, and this creates an incentive for a lobbyist to promise effort but to
actually not undertake effort.12 A lobbyist only undertakes such costly effort if there is
a positive relationship between costly effort and potential rewards. A policymaker can
identify perfectly in t + 1 a lobbyist’s financial contribution that was made in t. So if a
policymaker received at least the announced minimum financial contribution of f¯ lpt , then
the policymaker does not terminate the relationship and rewards the lobbyist with political
access in t+1. Therefore, the likelihood for a lobbyist of being dropped given the announced
f¯ lpt is therefore either 0 or 1 and depends entirely on the lobbyist’s choice of f
lp
t . However, a
policymaker observes a lobbyist’s verification effort neither in t nor in t+1. The policymaker
only observes the quality of spillovers from policy proposals enacted in t, qlpt , and has to
form an expectation about the lobbyist’s verification efforts.13 The observed quality can
be used by the policymaker as a performance measure that is positively related to the
lobbyist’s verification effort. This performance measure and conditional future political
access can help the policymaker to create a relationship between efforts and rewards.
12It is never optimal for a lobbyist with political access to become a citizen in t if ktn
l
t−G
(
nlt
) ≥ Πct ≥ 0.
If this condition would not hold in equilibrium, then nobody would want to be a lobbyist and there would
be no commercial lobbying in equilibrium.
13A policymaker knows in t + 1 the number of presented proposals, a˜lpt , and the number of enacted
policy proposals with positive and negative spillovers. This allows the policymaker to observe the quality
of presented policy proposals, qlpt .
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The expected quality of presented proposals with positive spillovers can be written,
from the lobbyist’s perspective in t, as
Et
[
qlpt
]
=
ρ(x+)ρ(e+|x+)mlpt + ρ(e+)ulpt
a˜lpt
= ρ(e+) +
ρ(x+) [ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e+)]mlpt
a˜lpt
, (IV.2.7)
where a˜lpt = ρ(x
+)mlpt + u
lp
t and a˜
lp
t is parametric for the lobbyist but m
lp
t and u
lp
t are
choices.14 The expected quality of presented proposals depends on the lobbyist’s political
access and the expected information improvement through the verification of proposals.
A policymaker can form an expectation in t+1 about the lobbyist’s verification effort
in t with
Et+1
[
mlpt
]
=
qlpt − ρ(e+)
ρ(x+) [ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e+)] a˜
lp
t , (IV.2.8)
where a˜lpt and q
lp
t are known to the policymaker in t+ 1.
Each policymaker can announce a quality threshold for policy proposals’ spillovers,
q¯lpt , that serves as a minimum performance standard and determines whether a policymaker
terminates or does not terminate a relationship with a lobbyist in t+ 1. If a policymaker
observes qlpt ≥ q¯lpt in t+1, then the relationship continues and the lobbyist receives political
access in t+ 1; if a policymaker observes qlpt < q¯
lp
t , then the relationship is terminated and
the policymakers allocates the lobbyist’s political access to another agent.
In Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani (1989), the principal observes a signal that is equal to
the agent’s effort plus an unobservable error term, which is characterized with a continuous
bell-shaped density function. Since a bell-shaped density function does not guarantee
a unique solution to the agent’s optimization problem and a continuous best-response
14The notion that a lobbyist would not present policy proposals with negative verification signals is made
precise shorty.
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function in a principal-agent framework, they make additional assumptions about the
agent’s cost of efforts to ensure a solution.15
The current problem differs because of the information structure of the model.
Each policy proposal has either a positive or negative spillover. Further, the lobbyist’s
verification technology returns either a positive or a negative signal. Given the
binary outcomes and exogenous probabilities, the probability of achieving an announced
quality threshold follows a hypergeometric probability distribution. The hypergeometric
probability distribution is discrete but can be, for specific parameter values, approximated
to either a Poisson or a normal probability distribution.16 Following Jewitt (1988),
the Poisson probability distribution fulfills the desired characteristics for the first-order
approach of solving principal-agent problems. Unfortunately, the approximation of the
hypergeometric probability distribution to a Poisson probability distribution requires that
the number of presented proposals with a positive verification signal is relatively small
in comparison to the lobbyist’s portfolio. So the statistically appropriate approximation
would be the normal distribution.
Using (IV.2.7), the observed quality of enacted policy proposals can be approximated
by
qlpt =
ρ(x+) [ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e+)]mlpt
a˜lpt
+ lpt , (IV.2.9)
where t has a mean of ρ(e
+) and is normally distributed. The likelihood for a lobbyist of
being terminated can be written as
Pr
(
qlpt ≤ q¯lpt
)
= Pr
(
lpt ≤ q¯lpt −
ρ(x+) [ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e+)]mlpt
a˜lpt
)
= δ
(
q¯lpt ,m
lp
t
)
(IV.2.10)
15Similarly, in Black and Garen (1991), the principal observes a similar performance signal but the error
term is normally distributed.
16See Fahrmeir et al. (1997).
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with
∂δ
(
q¯lpt ,m
lp
t
)
∂q¯lpt
> 0 and
∂δ
(
q¯lpt ,m
lp
t
)
∂mlpt
< 0.17 A lobbyist’s verification effort reduces the
likelihood of termination and may provide an incentive to undertake unobservable effort
to maintain the relationship.18
IV.2.4.2. The Political Access Rule for Lobbyists
To summarize, the political access rule for a lobbyist, a˜lp(.), specifies the policymaker’s
performance expectation, the minimum financial contribution, and the promised future
political access – i.e., the access rule is a triple of
{
q¯lpt , f¯
lp
t , a˜
lp
t
}
. The lobbyist takes
this access rule as given and forms a best-response of m∗t = m(.) and f∗t = f(.) that
maximizes the lobbyist’s expected lifetime payoff. Further, each lobbyist takes kt as given
and chooses the number of clients, n∗t = n(.). The policymaker takes m∗t , f∗t , n∗t , and
kt as given and chooses q¯
∗
t as well as f¯
∗
t to maximize the policymaker’s expected lifetime
payoff. If a relationship with a lobbyist is terminated by a policymaker, then the lobbyist’s
political access is allocated to an entering lobbyist who is becoming part of the political
establishment.
IV.2.5. The Lobbyist’s Optimization Problem
Each lobbyist takes the lobbying service fee, kt, the citizen’s current payoff, Π
c
t , and
the political access rules by policymakers, a˜lp(.), with a˜lpt , q¯
lp
t , and f¯
lp
t as given. In each
period, a lobbyist determines the number of clients, nlt, the number of verified proposals,
mlpt , and the financial contribution, f
lp
t , taking into account the impact of these choices on
the likelihood of maintaining the relationship with a policymaker.19 A lobbyist anticipates
17In the following, δ
(
q¯lpt ,m
lp
t
)
is written as δ
(
q¯lp
)
for notational reasons.
18It is possible for the policymaker to increase the number of observations by to incorporating a lobbyist’s
performance history. The analysis abstracts from the optimal political access rules and focuses on how
repeated personal interactions can solve a policymaker’s information and contracting problem.
19The number of presented but unverified proposals, ulpt , follows from (IV.2.12) and the choice of m
lp
t ;
the number of disappearing policy proposals, rlt, follows from (IV.2.13), (IV.2.12), and m
lp
t .
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that the presentation of a proposal with a negative verification signal has a negative
effect on the expected quality of the presented portfolio. Because of verification costs
the lobbyist’s optimal portfolio of policy proposals includes only proposals with positive
verification signals and unverified proposals – i.e., a˜lpt = ρ(x
+)mlpt + u
lp
t .
20 The expected
lifetime payoff at the beginning of t + 1 of a lobbyist is V l and of a citizen V c. Both are
parametrically given in the lobbyist’s optimization problem. The lobbyists’ discount rate
is r with r ∈ [0, 1]. The lobbyist’s optimization problem in t is
max
nlt,m
lp
t ,f
lp
t
E[Πl] = ktn
l
t −G
(
nlt
)
− F
(
mlpt
)
− f lpt +
δ
(
q¯lp
)
1 + r
V c +
(
1− δ (q¯lp))
1 + r
V l (IV.2.11)
s.t. a current political access constraint of
a˜lpt = ρ(x
+)mlpt + u
lp
t for all t (IV.2.12)
with Lagrange parameter λlpt and the lobbyist’s portfolio of clients’ proposals
nlt = m
lp
t + u
lp
t + r
l
t for all t (IV.2.13)
with Lagrange parameter µlpt . It is not optimal for a lobbyist with political access to
become a citizen in t if ktn
l
t − G
(
nlt
) ≥ Πct . If this would not be true, then the solution
is trivial because no society member would want to be a lobbyist and there would be no
equilibrium with commercial lobbying.
A lobbyist chooses 1) the number of verified proposals, mlpt , simultaneously and 2)
makes a financial contribution, f lpt , with the knowledge that the likelihood of dismissal is
either 0 or 1.21 The first-order condition for the optimal number of clients can be written
20The number of presented proposals is equal to the granted political access. The presentation of policy
proposals itself does not cause any costs for lobbyists. So lobbyists with a sufficient number of clients have
no incentive to dispose political access.
21One may argue that the choice of verification is sequential. That is, a lobbyist observes the verification
signal for a proposal and decides whether another proposal should be or should not be verified in order
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as
∂E[Πl]
∂nlt
= kt −
∂G
(
nlt
)
∂nlt
≤ 0 (IV.2.14)
and for verification effort
∂E[Πl]
∂mlpt
= −
∂F
(
mlpt
)
∂mlpt
− ∂δ(q¯
lp)
∂mlpt
(
V l − V c)
1 + r
− ρ(x+)λlpt − µlpt ≤ 0. (IV.2.15)
Note that (IV.2.15) depends on whether nlt ≥ mlpt . If ulpt > 0, then λlpt = 0 and µlpt = 0.
Otherwise there would be a corner solution with a˜lpt = ρ(x
+)mlpt .
The second-order conditions are
∂2E[Πl]
∂nlt
2 = −
∂2G
(
nlt
)
∂nlt
2 < 0 (IV.2.16)
and
∂2E[Πl]
∂mlpt
2 = −
∂2F
(
mlpt
)
∂mlpt
2 −
∂2δ(q¯lp)
∂mlpt
2
(
V l − V c)
1 + r
≤ 0.22 (IV.2.17)
IV.2.5.1. The Supply of Commercial Lobbying Services
The first-order condition (IV.2.14) describes the optimal number of clients with respect
to the costs of processing clients’ proposals and the current market lobbying service fee.
This can be summarized as to the following:
Lemma 10. The optimal size of the lobbying firm in t, nlt, depends on the market lobbying
service fee in t with kt > 0 such that
kt = G
′
(
nlt
)
. (IV.2.18)
to balance the lobbyist’s chances costs. However, one can imagine that a sequential process is much more
time-consuming and costly. So in reality, one may observe a mixture of both.
22In the following the partial derivatives for δ(q¯lp) with respect to mlpt are written as δm(q¯
lp) and δmm(q¯
lp).
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A lobbyist chooses the number of clients based on the current rewards received in the
market of commercial lobbying services. The decision does not depend on the relationship
with a policymaker and a potential reward received in the market for political access. The
lobbyist’s best-response can be described by n∗t = n(kt).
IV.2.5.2. The Lobbyist’s Financial Contribution
Part of each policymaker’s political access rule is the minimum financial contribution
of f¯ lp. Each lobbyist knows that the policymaker can identify perfectly in t + 1 whether
or not the lobbyist made the minimum financial contribution in t. If the lobbyist makes a
financial contribution less than the minimum, f lpt < f¯
lp, then the policymaker terminates
the relationship. If a lobbyist made a financial contribution in excess of the the minimum,
f lpt > f¯
lp, then the policymaker expects, because of the lobbyist’s resource constraint, that
the lobbyist may not have allocated sufficient resources to the verification of proposals.
This would have either an adverse effect on the duration of the relationship or would not
maximize a lobbyist’s profit. This can be summarized as the following:
f∗t =

0 if V l < V c for a given q¯lpt or
f¯ lpt if V
l ≥ V c for a given q¯lpt .
(IV.2.19)
The lobbyist’s stationary participation constraint, V l ≥ V c, follows from (IV.2.11)
with Πl = V l as well as the expected lifetime payoff for a citizen such that:
Πl = knl −G
(
nl
)
− F
(
mlp
)
− f lp + δ
(
q¯lp
)
1 + r
V c +
(
1− δ (q¯lp))
1 + r
V l ≥ V c
V l =
(1 + r)
(
knl −G (nl)− F (mlp)− f lp)
r + δ (q¯lp)
+
δ
(
q¯lp
)
r + δ (q¯lp)
V c ≥ V c
(1 + r)
(
knl −G
(
nl
)
− F
(
mlp
)
− f lp
)
≥ rV c.(IV.2.20)
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IV.2.5.3. The Lobbyist’s Verification Effort
The first-order condition (IV.2.15) describes the optimal amount of verification efforts
given the policymaker’s announced quality threshold, q¯lpt . As long as there is a promised
future benefit to being a lobbyist, V l−V c > 0, and the lobbyist’s verification effort decreases
the likelihood of being dropped in the future, δm
(
q¯lpt
)
< 0, the lobbyist undertakes
a positive level of unobservable verification effort to maintain the relationship with the
policymaker.23 So if a policymaker wants to induce a lobbyist to undertake effort, then
the policymaker has to ensure positive future profits and monitor the lobbyist’s presented
portfolio. This can be summarized as the following:
Proposition 17. Lobbyists provide positive levels of unobservable verification efforts in
t whenever policymakers can promise future benefits and lobbyists’ verification efforts
decrease the likelihood of being dropped by a policymaker.
Note that the solution to (IV.2.15) and (IV.2.17) might not be unique with multiple
optimal levels of verification efforts.24 This would imply that the lobbyist’s best-response,
m∗t , is not a continuous function. However, the important result is that a policymaker can
escape a “cheap talk” lobbying game if the policymaker interacts repeatedly with the same
commercial lobbyist.25 Each lobbyist has an incentive ex ante to promise verification efforts
in exchange for political access but has no incentive ex post to undertake these efforts in
an one-shot lobbying game. So if a policymaker is able to promise future rents and can at
23This follows from F ′(0) = 0 and that F (.) is increasing convex. Therefore E
[
Πl(0)
]
> 0 and
E
[
Πl(∞)] < 0 such that m∗t > 0 would be a unique solution to ∂E[Πl]
∂m
lp
t
= 0.
24See Rogerson (1985) for a general discussion of the multiplicity problem in principal-agent frameworks.
25For example, Crawford and Sobel (1982) show how a better-informed sender partitions strategically
the information about the state to influence a decision maker’s choice. Krishna and Morgan (2001) focus
on circumstances with one lobby or two lobbies, which have similar or opposite bias, have also partitioning
equilibria. Austen-Smith (1995) focuses on campaign contributions that increase the likelihood of receiving
political access in a first-stage lobbying game and that have reveal some information about the interest
group’s preference. However, a policymaker has no means to evaluate the credibility of a lobby’s speech in
the second stage. Here, a commercial lobbyist is not strategic about the information itself but about the
verification costs.
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least imperfectly monitor verification efforts, then lobbyists have an incentive to provide
unobservable verification efforts to gain future profits.26 It is therefore not optimal for a
policymaker to meet every period with different lobbyists or to allow free entry into the
political establishment, which would diminish a lobbying contacts’ profits and verification
efforts. Further, a commercial lobbyist represents a variety of clients and is motivated by
economic profits. Whereas a citizen or special interest group provides only a few policy
proposals and is motivated by a proposal’s private benefit. So a policymaker gains a better
statistical inference from repeated interactions with commercial lobbyists, and the threat
of terminating a relationship is more severe for commercial lobbyists with many clients
than for a citizen or special interest group motivated by a single proposal.
Using (IV.2.15) and (IV.2.17), the sufficient condition for a globally optimal level
of verification effort, and a continuous best-response function, can be summarized by the
following:
Assumption 1. It holds that
F ′′
(
mlpt
)
F ′
(
mlpt
) > δmm (q¯lp)
δm (q¯lp)
. (IV.2.21)
The assumption ensures a unique optimal verification effort if nlt > m
lp
t . It is assumed
for the remaining analysis.27
The best-response function for the lobbyist’s verification effort can be described by
the exogenous variables of the model, as well as by the lobbyist’s parametric values. This
26This result is standard in the efficiency wage literature. In order to induce unobservable costly efforts,
employers offer higher wages to employees that increase the employees’ opportunity costs of shirking and
dismissal.
27As noted earlier, the normal probability distribution does not fulfill Jewitt’s (1988) general sufficient
conditions for the first-order approach. Since an approximation to a Poisson probability distribution is
desirable but not feasible, the analysis faces a trade-off between a problematic statistical approximation
and additional assumptions about the lobbyist’s cost structure to justify the first-order approach, which
keeps the analysis tractable. It seems more reasonable to proceed with an additional assumption. The
assumption follows Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani (1989).
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can be summarized, using the parametric values of interest, by the following:
m∗t = m
(
q¯lpt , f¯
lp
t , a˜
lp
t , kt
)
. (IV.2.22)
The steady state verification effort follows from the notion that the political access
rule with its elements does not change from period to period and that mlpt = m
lp
t+1 for all
t. Using Πl = V l, the lobbyist’s expected lifetime payoff in the steady state can be written
as
V l =
(1 + r)
(
knl −G(nl)− F (mlp)− f lp)
r + δ(q¯lp)
+
δ(q¯lp)V c
r + δ(q¯lp)
(IV.2.23)
and reduced to
V l − V c = (1 + r)
(
knl −G(nl)− F (mlp)− f lp)− rV c
r + δ(q¯lp)
. (IV.2.24)
The first-order condition (IV.2.15) for an interior solution with nlt > m
lp can be written as
(1 + r)F ′
(
mlp
)
= −δm
(
q¯lp
) (1 + r) (knl −G(nl)− F (mlp)− f lp)− rV c
r + δ(q¯lp)
(IV.2.25)
and reduced to
−F ′
(
mlp
) r + δ (q¯lp)
δm (q¯lp)
= knl −G(nl)− F
(
mlp
)
− f lp − rV
c
1 + r
. (IV.2.26)
The first term on the left-hand side is the marginal cost of verification. The numerator of
the second factor expresses the effective discount rate for being a lobbyist in the future;
the denominator expresses the marginal change in the likelihood of not being dropped by
the policymaker. On the right-hand side of (IV.2.26) is the net benefit of being a lobbyist.
Note that in steady state, knl is affected by the clients’ willingness to pay for lobbying
services, which depends on the lobbyist’s steady state political access to a policymaker.
The interpretation is straightforward: The policymaker has to grant less political access
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to the lobbyist in order to induce verification efforts if either the effective discount rate or
the effect of verification efforts on the likelihood of not being dropped is relatively small.
Using (IV.2.26), the steady verification effort can be written as a function of a˜lp, q¯lp, f¯ lp,
and k – i.e., m∗ = m(a˜lp, q¯lp, f¯ lp, k). The steady financial contribution is either f∗ = 0 or
f∗ = f¯ lp, and the number of clients follows from n∗ = n(k).
IV.2.6. The Policymaker’s Optimization Problem
Each policymaker knows the lobbyists’ best-responses to a˜lp(.) and takes the outcomes
of the lobbying service market, kt and n
l
t, as given. A policymaker is also not strategic about
the behavior of other policymakers and takes their actions, A−pt , as given. The policymaker
maximizes his expected lifetime payoff by choosing a˜lpt , q¯
lp
t , and f¯
lp
t and taking their effects
on the lobbyists’ best-responses into account.
Each policymaker has no incentive to allocate time to citizens as long as lobbyists
provide sufficient resources in exchange for political access – i.e., Apt =
lpt∑
l=1
a˜lpt . However,
a policymaker does not want to enact all policy proposals from lobbyists because some of
their proposals may have received negative verification signals and are in expected terms
undesirable. A policymaker would like to ignore these proposals and takes this into account
by announcing q¯lp. Further, a policymaker does not bear any explicit cost for the allocation
of time. The explicit cost of lobbying activities are borne by citizens and lobbyists. The
policymaker bears an implicit cost and it is in the policymaker’s best interest to maximize
lobbyists’ efforts in exchange for a minimum of political access.
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In steady state, the policymaker’s optimization problem can be written as maximizing
per period payoffs with
max
q¯lp,f¯ lp,a˜lp,lp
E[Πp] = θ + α
lp∑
l=1
f lp +
1
T
E
 ∑
c∈A−p
ec

+
s
T
(
ρ(x+)
lp∑
l=1
mlp
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)])
+
s
T
(
lp∑
l=1
(
a˜lp − ρ(x+)mlp
) [
ρ(e+)− ρ(e+)]) (IV.2.27)
s.t. the policymaker’s time constraint of
Ap =
lp∑
l=1
a˜lp, (IV.2.28)
which makes the policymaker’s choice of lp redundant because of the symmetry of firms,
the lobbyist’s participation condition with V l ≥ V c from (IV.2.20) of
(1 + r)
[
knl −G(nl)− F
(
mlp
)
− f lp
]
≥ rV c for all lp, (IV.2.29)
which holds with inequality whenever m∗ > 0 because of the lobbyist’s first-order condition
described in (IV.2.15), and the lobbyist’s incentive compatibility constraint to provide
verification efforts from (IV.2.26) for nl > mlp of
−F ′
(
mlp
) r + δ (q¯lp)
δm (q¯lp)
= knl −G(nl)− F
(
mlp
)
− f lp − rV
c
1 + r
, (IV.2.30)
which is binding.
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Using (IV.2.30) and substituting for f lp, the policymaker’s problem with a non-binding
participation constraint and ignoring other policymakers’ actions can be reduced to
max
q¯lp,f¯ lp,a˜lp
E[Πp] = θ + α
lp∑
l=1
(
knl −G(nl)− F
(
mlp
)
− rV
c
1 + r
+ F ′
(
mlp
) r + δ (q¯lp)
δm (q¯lp)
)
+
s
T
(
ρ(x+)
lp∑
l=1
mlp
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)])
+
s
T
(
lp∑
l=1
(
a˜lp − ρ(x+)mlp
) [
ρ(e+)− ρ(e+)]) (IV.2.31)
The first-order condition with respect to the minimum quality threshold is
∂E[Πp]
∂q¯lp
= α
[
−F ′
(
mlp
) ∂m∗
∂q¯lp
+ F ′′(mlp)
∂m∗
∂q¯lp
r + δ
(
q¯lp
)
δm (q¯lp)
+F ′
(
mlp
) δm (q¯lp)2 − δmm (q¯lp) (r + δ (q¯lp))
δm (q¯lp)
2
]
+
ρ(x+)s
T
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)] ∂m∗
∂q¯lp
(IV.2.32)
and for the minimum desired financial contribution
∂E[Πp]
∂f¯ lp
= α
[
−F ′
(
mlp
) ∂m∗
∂f¯ lp
+ F ′′(mlp)
∂m∗
∂f¯ lp
r + δ
(
q¯lp
)
δm (q¯lp)
]
+
ρ(x+)s
T
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)] ∂m∗
∂f¯ lp
. (IV.2.33)
The granted access follows from the notion that lobbyists represent a certain number of
clients and that the policymaker takes the outcomes of the lobbying service market as given.
The political access for a lobbyist, a˜lp, follows from the notion that a policymaker wants to
induce verification effort and financial contributions in exchange for lowest possible political
access given a lobbyist’s resources and clients. Further, the dismissal of shirking or unlucky
lobbyists creates vacancies for new lobbyists who are recruited by a policymaker to exhaust
the policymaker’s time endowment.
113
IV.2.6.1. The Interior Solution: Verification Effort and Financial Contribution
As a first step, suppose the policymaker’s problem has an interior solution with q¯lp > 0
and f¯ lp > 0. It follows from (IV.2.33) with ∂E[Π
p]
∂f¯ lp
= 0 and ∂m
∗
∂f¯ lp
< 0 from (IV.2.26) that
F ′
(
mlp
)
− F ′′(mlp)r + δ
(
q¯lp
)
δm (q¯lp)
=
ρ(x+)s
αT
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)] .
(IV.2.34)
Note that the left-hand side of (IV.2.34) is increasing in mlp and equals for a given q¯lp the
right-hand side only once.28 Further, (IV.2.34) is identical to (II.4.16) in Chapter II except
for the second the left-hand side that expresses the imperfect monitoring of verification
effort This can be summarized as to the following:
Proposition 18. The desired unobservable verification effort depend on the policymaker’s
trade-off between improved spillover shares and financial contributions as well as the
imperfect monitoring of verification efforts. The desired level of verification efforts per
firm is less than in the full information scenario.
The comparison to the full information scenario follows from proposition 5 of
Chapter II. The policymaker’s trade-off between a share of increased social spillovers
through verification efforts and private benefits from financial contributions is similar in
both scenarios. However, because of the imperfect monitoring of verification efforts a
policymaker receives less verification efforts from each lobbyist.
Proceeding with (IV.2.32) with ∂E[Π
p]
∂f¯ lp
= 0 and using (IV.2.34), the optimal quality
threshold, q¯∗, follows from
F ′
(
mlp
) δm (q¯lp)2 − δmm (q¯lp) (r + δ (q¯lp))
δm (q¯lp)
2 = 0 (IV.2.35)
28This follows from F ′′(.) > 0 and F ′′′(.) ≥ 0.
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such that
δm
(
q¯lp
)2
= δmm
(
q¯lp
)(
r + δ
(
q¯lp
))
. (IV.2.36)
Using (IV.2.34) and (IV.2.36), it can be solved for the optimal verification effort of m∗
given q¯∗. Given the outcomes for the commercial lobbying service market, the optimal
minimum financial contribution of f¯∗ follows from the lobbyist’s incentive compatibility
condition, described in (IV.2.30), and the pair {q¯∗,m∗}.
IV.2.6.2. Corner Solution: Verification Effort
Now suppose α = 0 implying that a policymaker does not value financial contributions.
Therefore, each policymaker sets f¯ lpm = 0 to maximize lobbyists’ available resources for
verification efforts and a lobbyist who would make a financial contribution would be
dropped. So a lobbyist’s best-response is f∗m = 0. The first-order condition for the quality
threshold with α = 0 is
∂E[Πp]
∂q¯lp
=
ρ(x+)s
T
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)] ∂m∗
∂q¯lp
. (IV.2.37)
It follows that for ∂E[Π
p]
∂q¯lp
= 0 it has to hold that ∂m
∗
∂q¯lp
= 0. This is similar to Esfahani and
Salehi-Isfahani (1989) with a general bell-shaped distribution, and the derivation is the
following: Using the lobbyist’s best-response, (IV.2.26), and differentiating with respect to
q¯lp, it has to hold for ∂m
∗
∂q¯lp
= 0 that
r + δ′
(
q¯lp
)
δ′m (q¯lp)
= 0. (IV.2.38)
It follows that a policymaker chooses a q¯lp that solves (IV.2.38). A policymaker balances
two effects: 1) if the quality threshold is low, then a lobbyist expects that not many
proposals have to be verified to reach the announced quality for presented policy proposals,
and 2) if the quality threshold is high, then a lobbyist expects that many proposals
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have to be verified to reach the threshold but is likely to be dropped. The global
maximum for (IV.2.38) depends on the distribution function δ(.), which is characterized in
section IV.2.4.1 as an approximated normal distribution. Given the shape of the normal
density function, the maximum is global and unique. Using the unique value of q¯∗m that
solves (IV.2.37) and the lobbyist’s stationary first-order condition from (IV.2.26), the
corresponding m∗ solves
F
(
ml
)
+ F ′
(
ml
) r + δ(q¯lp)
δm(q¯lp)
∣∣∣∣
q¯lp=q¯∗m
= knl −G
(
nl
)
− rV
c
1 + r
(IV.2.39)
and the optimal m∗ is unique because of the convexity of F (.) and F ′(.).
IV.2.6.3. Corner Solution: Financial Contribution
Finally, suppose policymakers do not value verification efforts sufficiently and desire
only financial contributions. A policymaker avoids providing any incentives for costly
verification effort as it reduces a lobbyist’s resources and they hence choose a quality
threshold of q¯∗f = 0. Since a policymaker can monitor perfectly a lobbyist’s current financial
contribution in t+ 1, the policymaker takes only the participation constraint into account
and tries to extract all available rents. It follows that the participation constraint is binding.
The optimal financial contribution minimum follows from (IV.2.29) with
V l − V c
1 + r
= f lpt . (IV.2.40)
Using the stationary expected payoff described in (IV.2.24) with V l − V c, it follows that
V l − V c = (1 + r)
(
knl −G(nl)− f lp)
r
− V c (IV.2.41)
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and with (IV.2.40) that
(
knl −G(nl)− f lp)
r
− V
c
1 + r
= f lp. (IV.2.42)
This can be reduced to
knl −G(nl)− rV
c
1 + r
= (1 + r)f¯∗f (IV.2.43)
with f∗f = f¯
∗
f .
IV.3. Equilibrium
The equilibrium is characterized by a steady state in the markets for lobbying labor,
commercial lobbying services, and political access. The lobbying labor market is in
equilibrium if the inflow of citizens into the lobbying industry is equal to the outflow
of lobbyists who have lost political access to policymakers. The market for commercial
lobbying services is in equilibrium if the demand equals the supply of intermediation
services. Finally, the political access market is in equilibrium if there is a Nash equilibrium
between policymakers in choosing political access rules, as well as citizens lobbyists respond
optimally to these announced rules. In the following, the equilibrium with an interior
solution to the policymaker’s problem is derived. The equilibrium for each corner solution
can be found in the Appendix C.1. and C.2. The presented steady state consists of
homogeneous citizens, lobbyists, and policymakers and is solved with symmetry for each
group.
IV.3.1. Lobbying Labor Market
The citizen’s entry into the lobbying industry depends on the expected payoffs for
citizens and lobbyists as well as the availability of political access. The availability of
political access is determined by the number of lobbyists who lose political access to
policymakers, which can be written as δtLt. The probability of entering the market for
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political access and becoming a lobbyist for a citizen, ht, is
ht =
δtLt
Ct + δtLt
(IV.3.1)
and depends on the number of lobbyists losing political access and the number of citizens
competing for entry. The value asset equation for a citizen can be written as
V c = htΠ
l + (1− ht)
(
Πct +
V c
1 + r
)
= htΠ
l + (1− ht)Πct +
(1− ht)V c
1 + r
(IV.3.2)
with
V c =
(1 + r)
(
htΠ
l + (1− ht)Πct
)
r + ht
. (IV.3.3)
The value asset equation for a lobbyist follows from the lobbyist’s expected lifetime
payoff in the steady state as described in (IV.2.23). Given the opportunity for access, the
citizen’s entry decision depends on whether V l ≥ V c.
IV.3.2. Market for Lobbying Services
The citizens’ demand for commercial lobbying with political capture by lobbyists in t
follows from (IV.2.3). Since lobbying firms are identical, the market demand for commercial
lobbying services can be written as
kt = k
(
nlt
)
=
a˜lpt
nlt
pic for every l and t. (IV.3.4)
Each lobbying firms takes the market fee, kt, as given and determines its optimal size.
Using lemma 10, the supply of commercial lobbying services solves
kt = k
(
nlt
)
= G′
(
nlt
)
for every l and t. (IV.3.5)
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Using the market demand (IV.3.4) and the market supply (IV.3.5), the equilibrium
condition for the lobbying service market can be written as
P¯Ap
nlt
pic = G′
(
nlt
)
for every l and t. (IV.3.6)
The market clearing lobbying service fee depends on the number of clients, lobbyists’
political access, the private benefit of an enacted policy proposal, and the cost of processing
proposals. Suppose lobbying firms increase the number of clients sequentially and therefore
each citizen is a client of a lobbying firm – i.e., Ct = ntLt.
IV.3.3. Market for Political Access
As shown in the policymaker’s problem, policymakers want to employ all political
resources and have no incentive to allocate political access to citizens – i.e., At = P¯A
p and
a˜ct = 0. The symmetric political access for each lobbyist can be written as
a˜lpt =
P¯Ap
Lt
for every t. (IV.3.7)
The number of presented unverified proposals and the number of proposals
disappearing in the lobbying firm follow from
nlt = m
lp
t + u
lp
t + r
l
t for every l and t (IV.3.8)
and the lobbyist’s portfolio of presented proposals from
a˜lpt = ρ(x
+)mlpt + u
lp
t for every l and t. (IV.3.9)
The announced quality threshold, q¯lpt , follows from (IV.2.36); the number of verified
proposals for nlt > m
lp
t follows from (IV.2.34). Finally, the required minimum financial
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contribution, f¯ lpt , follows from q¯
∗, m∗, and the lobbyist’s incentive compatibility constraint
(IV.2.30). The lobbyist’s best-response to f¯∗ is f∗ ≥ f¯∗ depending on V l ≥ V c.
IV.3.4. Solution
The full steady state equilibrium with symmetry is characterized by the previously
described equilibrium conditions and the population constraint
T = Ct + Lt + P¯ , (IV.3.10)
where P¯ follows from the constitution. The number of lobbyists can be written as
Lt =
T − P¯
1 + nlt
, (IV.3.11)
because of Ct = Ltn
l
t and (IV.3.10).
In the steady state all endogenous variables, X, of the system do not vary over time
– i.e., Xt = Xt+1. First, using (IV.3.6), (IV.3.7), and (IV.3.11), the equilibrium number of
clients per firm is
n∗
1 + n∗
∂G(nl)
∂nl
∣∣∣∣
nl=n∗
=
P¯Appic
T − P¯ . (IV.3.12)
The equilibrium number of clients is positive and unique.29 The equilibrium lobbying
service fee follows immediately such that
k∗ =
∂G(nl)
∂nl
∣∣∣∣
nl=n∗
. (IV.3.13)
Using (IV.3.11) and (IV.3.12), the equilibrium number of lobbyists and citizens is
L∗ =
T − P¯
1 + n∗
and C∗ = L∗n∗. (IV.3.14)
29See the Appendix of Chapter II.
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Each lobbying firm receives political access of
a˜∗ =
P¯Ap
L∗
(IV.3.15)
in exchange for lobbying efforts. The lobbying efforts are best-responses to the announced
political access rule of {a˜∗, q¯∗, f¯∗}, where the equilibrium minimum quality threshold
follows from (IV.2.36) such that
δm
(
q¯lp
)2∣∣∣∣
q¯lp=q¯∗
= δmm
(
q¯lp
)(
r + δ
(
q¯lp
))∣∣∣
q¯lp=q¯∗
. (IV.3.16)
The corresponding equilibrium best-response for the verification effort follows from
(IV.2.34) such that
F ′ (mlp)− F ′′(mlp)r + δ (q¯lp)
δm (q¯lp)
∣∣∣∣∣
q¯lp=q¯∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣
mlp=m∗
=
ρ(x+)s
αT
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)] . (IV.3.17)
Using (IV.3.9) and the equilibrium values from (IV.3.15) and (IV.3.17), the
equilibrium of unverified presented proposals per firm follows from (IV.3.9) such that
u∗ = a˜∗ − ρ(x+)m∗. (IV.3.18)
The equilibrium number of proposals that disappear in each lobbying firm follows from
(IV.3.8) with (IV.3.12), (IV.3.17), and (IV.3.18) such that
r∗ = n∗ −m∗ − u∗. (IV.3.19)
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The equilibrium inflow of citizens into the lobbying industry follows from (IV.3.1),
(IV.3.14), and (IV.3.16) such that
h∗ =
δ∗
n∗ + δ∗
. (IV.3.20)
The equilibrium value for the citizen’s expected lifetime payoff follows from the notion
that there is private rent-dissipation for citizens in equilibrium – i.e., Πct = 0 – and that
a positive expected lifetime payoff is entirely determined by potential entry and positive
rents for lobbyists.30 It follows from (IV.3.3) that
V c =
(1 + r)h∗Πl
r + h∗
. (IV.3.21)
The steady state values for Πl, V l, V c, f¯ lp, and f lp can be solved with Πl = V l, (IV.2.19),
(IV.2.23), (IV.2.26), and (IV.3.21). Using (IV.2.23) and (IV.3.21), the following can be
obtained
V l =
(1 + r)
(
knl −G (nl)− F (mlp)− f lp) (r + h)
r (r + h+ δ (q¯lp) (1− h)) . (IV.3.22)
Using (IV.2.26) and (IV.3.21), it follows that
f lp = knl −G(nl)− F
(
mlp
)
+ F ′
(
mlp
) r + δ (q¯lp)
δm (q¯lp)
− rh
r + h
V l. (IV.3.23)
The equilibrium minimum financial contribution can be derived with (IV.3.22) and
(IV.3.23) such that
f¯∗ = k∗n∗ −G
(
nl
)
− F ′
(
mlp
) r + δ (q¯lp)
δm (q¯lp)
r + h∗ + δ
(
q¯lp
)
r(1− h∗)
r + δ (q¯lp) (1− h∗)− rh∗
∣∣∣∣∣
nl=n∗,mlp=m∗,q¯lp=q¯∗
(IV.3.24)
30This follows from the citizen’s willingness to pay and the equilibrium service fee described in (IV.3.6).
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with the lobbyist’s equilibrium best-response of f∗ = f¯∗. The expected lifetime payoff for
a lobbyist in the steady state is
V l∗ =
(
k∗n∗ −G
(
nl
)
− F ′
(
mlp
) r + δ (q¯lp)
δm (q¯lp)
− f∗
)
r + h∗
rh∗
∣∣∣∣∣
nl=n∗,mlp=m∗,q¯lp=q¯∗
.
(IV.3.25)
Finally, the expected lifetime payoff for a citizen in the steady state is
V c∗ =
(1 + r)h∗
r + h∗
V l∗. (IV.3.26)
If there is a steady state with both a positive level of verification efforts and financial
contributions, then it follows from proposition 17 and (IV.3.26) that V l∗ > V c∗ > 0.
Comparing this result to the previous result discussed in proposition 7 of chapter III, it
can be stated that both lobbyists and citizens realize expected private benefits and are both
better off with respect to private benefits than in the scenario with perfect observability
of lobbying efforts. Here, lobbyists realize information rents, which are protected by
policymakers’ access rules, and citizens realize private rents from limited entry into the
political establishment. The dismissal of “unlucky” lobbyists gives policymakers credibility,
induces lobbyists to undertake unobservable efforts, and spreads private benefits. However,
the quality of political decisions and the implications for social welfare depend on the
policymakers’ preferences and choice of political access rules. This can be summarized as
to the following:
Proposition 19. The repeated personal interactions between lobbyists and policymakers
as well as the resulting barriers to political entry create private benefits for both citizens
and lobbyists. The social welfare effects are ambiguous.
So if commercial lobbying is socially desirable and verification efforts are unobservable,
then it would be desirable to have both a political capture by lobbyists and repeated
personal interactions between lobbyists and policymakers with barriers to political entry
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(proposition 17). However, if verification efforts are unobservable, then verification efforts
at the firm-level are less (proposition 18) but the equilibrium number of lobbyists is
unaffected. This implies that the social welfare implications can be obtained from
proposition 18 and proposition 6 of chapter II. If there is an oververification at the firm-
level, then a policymaker’s imperfect monitoring may improve social outcomes; if there is
an underverification at the firm-level, then imperfect monitoring may worsen social welfare.
To summarize, the general welfare implications of repeated personal interactions depend on
whether these interactions solve a policymaker’s information problem (verification efforts)
or a policymaker’s contracting problem (financial contributions).
IV.4. Conclusion
This chapter provides an explanation for observed repeated personal interactions
between lobbyists and policymakers. In the presence of asymmetric information about
lobbyists’ information improvements or the absence of binding contracts, policymakers
have an incentive to initiate repeated personal interactions with lobbyists to solve their
information and contracting problem. Lobbyists undertake current verification efforts and
make promised financial contributions if repeated personal relationships promise them
positive future profits. These rents arise when policymakers create barriers to entry
and restrict the political establishment. If policymakers would not be able to promise
future rents and to at least imperfectly monitor verification efforts, then lobbyists have no
incentive to provide costly effort and policymakers would be trapped in a repeated “cheap
talk” lobbying game. If commercial lobbying is socially desirable, then repeated personal
interactions between lobbyists and policymakers improve social welfare outcomes. It has
been shown that the welfare implications depend on the policymakers’ preferences and the
monitoring of verification efforts. Further, the verification efforts are less than in the full
information scenario. However, imperfect information may improve welfare outcomes if
policymakers cause an oververification at the firm-level otherwise.
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The current analysis has focused on policymakers and abstracted from elected
representatives. Nevertheless, the analysis can provide some insights for unobservable
lobbying efforts and term limits for elected officials. Using the current analysis, a term
limit would imply that a lobbyist has no incentive to provide any efforts to a policymaker
who is in his last period of office. If politicians use repeated interactions to coordinate
campaign contributions, then term limits would improve welfare. However, if repeated
interactions solve a policymaker’s information problem, then term limits would be socially
undesirable.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The defining feature of this dissertation is its focus on commercial lobbying activities.
The analysis presented in Chapter II introduces a novel model of lobbying that examines
the behavior commercial lobbying firms as well as the welfare implications of commercial
lobbying activities in a general equilibrium framework with simultaneity of information
acquisition and financial contributions. In Chapter III the analysis focuses on the
optimal regulation of commercial lobbying activities and the endogenous choice of political
institutions regulating such activities. In Chapter IV policymakers cannot observe
lobbyists’ verification efforts and contract with lobbyists about financial contributions.
It is shown that repeated personal interactions between a lobbyist and a policymaker solve
the policymaker’s information and contracting problem.
The economic literature has focused on the political influence activities of classical
special interest groups that compete for political ends and are directly affected by the
political outcomes they lobby for. However, direct observation reveals that lobbyists are
usually either representatives of classical special interest groups or employees of commercial
lobbying firms. Empirical evidence suggests that commercial lobbyists are more and more
prevalent with respect to their numbers and lobbying revenues (Bertrand, Bombardini,
and Trebbi 2011). In contrast to special contrast groups, commercial lobbying firms are
not directly affected by policy outcomes and they represent a variety of clients. Further,
commercial lobbying firms act as intermediaries between their clients and policymakers
who grant them political access. Therefore, they have to balance their clients’ interests
and policymakers’ demands to avoid adverse effects to other clients. In short, commercial
lobbying firms compete for political access that they can sell to a variety of clients for
economic profit; special interest groups compete for political access that allows them to
shape political ends for private benefits.
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Lobbying activities are widely observed in democracies today, and understanding their
mechanisms and consequences is essential in formulating policies and regulation. This
dissertation makes some progress towards this goal by examining the underlying structure
and mechanisms of commercial lobbying activities that seem to be more and more prevalent.
Most Western democracies have only limited forms of regulation or no regulation at all.
This makes it difficult to provide more than just anecdotal evidence for most countries.
However, public concern about lobbying and commercial lobbying activities is present in
most Western democracies. The dissertation provides some theoretical insights that may
help the public and policymakers in addressing these discussions.
The distinct characteristics of commercial lobbying activities in this dissertation
have been: The existence of firms that act as intermediaries between many clients and
policymakers, an observed expertise by commercial lobbyists, the observed simultaneous
provision of information acquisition and financial contributions, as well as observed
personal repeated interactions between lobbyists and policymakers. The analysis in
Chapter II addressed all but the last characteristic. It has been argued that commercial
lobbyists possess an expertise that allows them to make predictions about the social
desirability of policy proposals. This expertise gives policymakers an incentive to allocate
political access to lobbyists. It is an exchange of political access for the lobbyists’
provision of socially desirable information and privately beneficial financial contributions.
Citizens with policy proposals, which yield private benefits if enacted, hire commercial
lobbyists to increase the likelihood of having a policy proposal enacted. In Chapter
IV the analysis extended the baseline model of commercial lobbying and examined the
observed personal repeated interactions. It was shown that repeated interactions with
lobbyists solve a policymaker’s information and contracting problem in the presence
of unobservable information acquisition and in the absence of legally binding contracts
between policymakers and lobbyists.
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The public concern about commercial lobbying activities and the role of transparency
about these activities were addressed in Chapter III. The analysis derived the conditions
for a socially desirable optimal regulation of commercial lobbying activities and highlighted
the importance of transparency about financial transfers as well as information transfers
from lobbyists to policymakers. It was shown that policymakers may request a socially
undesirable mix of verification efforts and financial contributions and that lobbyists and
policymakers may have an incentive to substitute financial contributions for socially
desirable information improvements.
It was argued that a cross-national comparison of lobbying activities and commercial
lobbying activities is difficult because of the currently limited availability of data. A cross-
national comparison of lobbying and its relevance rest on anecdotal evidence for most
Western democracies. The analysis in Chapter II and IV abstracted to a large degree from
institutional differences and focused on the characteristics of commercial lobbying activities
that seem to be common in most Western democracies. The analysis in Chapter III
addressed the cross-national differences in the regulation of commercial lobbying activities.
It was shown that institutional differences can be explained by efficiency or equity. The
observed lack of institutions that regulate lobbying and commercial lobbying activities can
be explained by either self-interested policymakers who do not distort the social benefits
of commercial lobbying too much or by citizens who do not have sufficient political power
to initiate political reforms.
There remain unanswered questions and much research is left for future work. The
analysis in this dissertation focused on policymakers in a general sense. It abstracted
from political competition amongst politicians who enact policies and compete for offices
as well as political campaign resources. Future research could address how policymakers
with different degrees of dishonesty compete for political offices and how citizens could
keep politicians and their use of commercial lobbying accountable. Further, the models of
commercial lobbying presented in this dissertation assumed that spillovers are shared by
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all agents in the society and that these spillovers are symmetric. Including distributional
differences for spillover shares and heterogeneous spillover magnitudes, the analysis
of commercial lobbying could be extended and examine observed issues of partisan
polarization or different political agendas of policymakers. Some policy proposals may
have spillovers that either affect many people or only a few people severely. These
different spillover effects may explain a partisan polarization or the formation of coalition
amongst different citizens lobbying for or against policies. Further, different spillovers may
also explain personal relationships between lobbyists with a specific issue expertise and
policymakers with specific assignments or agendas. A policymaker with a specific political
office or political agenda may use commercial lobbyists to provide exactly these proposals
that fit the policymaker’s office or agenda.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER II APPENDIX
A.1. Perfectly Honest Policymakers
For the special case of perfectly honest policymakers, α = 0, who do not value financial
contributions, the following can be stated.
Proposition 20. If lobbying contacts have sufficient lobbying resources, then each perfectly
honest policymaker approves only proposals with positive verification signals.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Each perfectly honest policymaker maximizes expected spillovers given firms’
resources. But it is not necessarily the case that this is socially efficient. A perfectly honest,
but self-interested, policymaker does not internalize the costs of lobbying. Furthermore
because other agents in the economy do not fully internalize spillovers, the policymaker
may face a resource constraint in terms of resources to finance verification. Notice that
these two distortions with respect to verification work in opposite directions creating the
possibility that verification will be at the socially optimal level.
Lemma 11. If there are sufficient financial resources in each lobbying firm to verify
all presented proposals, then a perfectly honest policymaker does not dissipate all private
economic rents. However, if there are insufficient financial resources to verify all presented
proposals, then perfectly honest policymakers’ demands for verification exhaust all private
rents.
If revenues earned from lobbying equal or exceed the processing and requested
verification costs, λlp = 0, and enough citizens hire lobbyists, ωlp = 0, then lobbyists realize
a positive economic profit. In comparison to the case of a dishonest policymaker, a perfectly
honest policymaker requests exclusively proposals with positive verification signals and does
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not request financial contributions to extract remaining economic lobbying rents. However,
a perfectly honest policymaker’s verification demands may exhaust all lobbying rents and
cause that lobbying firms break even.
A.2. Proofs
A.2.1. Proof of Proposition 2
For the first statement, suppose PAp > A. In case of an excess of political resources,
decreasing political resources by civilizing a policymaker would increase the number of
available proposals, which are in expected terms welfare increasing. This holds iff pic +
E[ec] > θ. If this condition would not hold, then it would be optimal to have a population
only consisting of policymakers. Now suppose PAp < A. It is not feasible that the number
of approved proposals exceeds the available political resources.
For the second statement, suppose PAp > C. In case of an excess of political resources,
decreasing political resources by civilizing a policymaker would increase the number of
available proposals, which are accepted because of PAp = A. This holds iff pic +E[ec] > θ.
Now suppose PAp < C. Assigning a disenfranchised citizen, who receives only a common
share of aggregate spillovers, to a political office would increase the expected social welfare
by Ap (pic + E[ec]) + θ.
Therefore, PAp = A and PAp = C.
A.2.2. Proof of Proposition 3
For the first statement, PAp = P , see proof A.2.1.
For the third statement, suppose ρ(x+)m∗L < PAp. This would describe an excess
of political resources and approving proposals with negative verification signal would
decrease expected social welfare. Social welfare could be increased by decreasing political
resources and increasing the number of verified proposals supplied through more lobbyists.
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Now suppose ρ(x+)m∗L > PAp. This excess of verification is socially wasteful and less
verification efforts would increase welfare.
For the second statement, suppose m∗L < C. Increasing the number of lobbyists would
increase the number of verified policy proposals. By assumption, commercial lobbying is
socially efficient and outweighs the costs of citizens now being a lobbyist. Now suppose
m∗L > C. It is not feasible that there are more clients than citizens.
To summarize, it follows that PAp = A, m∗L = C, and ρ(x+)m∗L = PAp.
A.2.3. Proof of Proposition 4
The first statement relates to the comparison of P ∗ and P ∗∗. It follows that
P ∗ R P ∗∗
T
Ap + 1
R ρ(x
+)m∗T
ρ(x+)m∗ +Ap +Apm∗
ρ(x+)m∗ +Ap +Apm∗ R Apρ(x+)m∗ + ρ(x+)m∗
1 +m∗ R ρ(x+)m∗
1 R
(
ρ(x+)− 1)m∗ (A.2.1)
where ρ(x+) ≤ 1 and m∗ > 0.
A.2.4. Proof of Lemma 2
The second statement relates to the comparison of P ∗ and P ∗∗ + L∗∗. It follows that
P ∗ R P ∗∗ + L∗∗
T
Ap + 1
R ρ(x
+)m∗T
ρ(x+)m∗ +Ap +Apm∗
+
TAp
ρ(x+)m∗ +Ap +Apm∗
ρ(x+)m∗ +Ap +Apm∗ R Apρ(x+)m∗ +Ap2 + ρ(x+)m∗ +Ap(
1− ρ(x+))m∗ R Ap. (A.2.2)
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Therefore, P ∗ > P ∗∗ and P ∗ < P ∗∗ + L∗∗ if ρ(x−)m∗ < Ap.
A.2.5. Proof of Lemma 3
If α ∈ (0, 1], then the first term in (II.4.12) is positive. Suppose λlp = 0, then (II.4.12)
is positive and a policymaker can increase his payoff by increasing f lp because of the
lobbyist’s financial resources. This contradicts λlp = 0.
Therefore, the lobbyists’ participation constraint has to bind for α 6= 0.
A.2.6. Proof of Proposition 5
An auxiliary result used for the subsequent statements. Suppose a policymaker’s time
resource is exhausted - Ap =
∑lp
l=1 a˜
lp. It follows that
s
T
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)]+ s
T
∂
∑
h6=l
a˜hp
∂a˜lp
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)] = 0, (A.2.3)
since one proposal crowds out another. Using (II.4.13) and (A.2.3), this can be written as
∂E[Πp]
∂a˜lp
= −ωlp ≤ 0 for every lp. (A.2.4)
If ωlp > 0, then a˜lp = 0. Because of symmetry across lobbyists and exhausted political
resources it has to be true that ωlp = 0. Now suppose a policymaker’s resources are not
exhausted - Ap >
∑lp
l=1 a˜
lp. It follows that
∂E[Πp]
∂a˜lp
=
s
T
[
ρ(e+)− ρ(e−)]− ωlp ≤ 0 for every lp. (A.2.5)
If ωlp = 0, then a policymaker would allocate more political access to lobbyists until
Ap =
∑lp
l=1 a˜
lp. On the other hand, if ωlp > 0 and Ap is not exhausted, then a policymaker
would grant further access to firm j with ωjp = 0.
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For the first statement with ωlp = 0. If ∂E[Π
p]
∂mlp
> 0 and no unverified proposal is
approved because of an exhausted policymaker’s time constraint, then there is a corner
solution with respect to verified proposals. Using lemma 3, remaining resources are
extracted via financial contributions.
For the second statement with ωlp = 0. If ∂E[Π
p]
∂mlp
= 0 and α is sufficiently small such that
λlp =
ρ(x+) sT [ρ(e
+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)]
∂F (.)
∂mlp
> α, (A.2.6)
then there is a corner solution with respect to verified and unverified proposals with f lp = 0.
The number of verified proposals follows from
nlk −
∑
h6=p
f lh − F
mco +∑
h6=p
mlh
−G(nl) = E[Πc|private ben.] (A.2.7)
with ulp > 0.
For the third statement with ωlp = 0. If ∂E[Π
p]
∂mlp
= ∂E[Π
p]
∂f lp
= 0, then there is an interior
solution with respect to verified and unverified proposals as well as financial contributions
such that
∂F (.)
∂mlp
= ρ(x+)
s
αT
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)] (A.2.8)
with ulp > 0 and f lp > 0.
For the fourth statement. Suppose α > ρ(x+) sT [ρ(e
+|x+) − ρ(e−|x+) − ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)].
In this case, the marginal benefit from a financial contribution outweighs the marginal
benefit from a verified proposal independent of the amount of verification. The policymaker
extracts all resources via financial contributions and approves only unverified proposals.
134
A.2.7. Proof of Proposition 6
Take (II.4.19) and define the threshold value mt for equal verification on the firm level
such that
∂F (.)
∂mlp
∣∣∣∣∑
mlp=mt
=
1
αT
(
∂F (ml)
∂ml
∣∣∣∣
ml=mt
+
∂G(nl)
∂nl
∣∣∣∣
nl=mt
)
. (A.2.9)
Solving for the condition, we get
∂F (.)
∂ml
∣∣∣∣
ml=mt
=
1
αT − 1
∂G(nl)
∂nl
∣∣∣∣
nl=mt
. (A.2.10)
Whenever the left-hand side is larger than the righ-hand side of (A.2.10), policymakers’
request lead to underverificiation on the firm level. Vice versa, whenever the left-hand side
is less than the right-hand side of (A.2.10), policymakers’ request lead to oververification.
A.2.8. Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose C > nlL for a symmetric market equilibrium. A discouraged realizes a
private payoff of zero. Entering the lobbying industry given k, he could represent another
discouraged citizen and contest the lobbying market equilibrium. Operating at lower
marginal processing costs, G′(.), the entrant has more resources to provide in exchange
to political access.
Now suppose C < nlL for a symmetric market equilibrium. It is not feasible that there
are more clients than citizens.
Therefore, C = nlL.
A.2.9. Uniqueness of Equilibrium Number of Clients per Firm
Define
H(n) =
n
1 + n
∂G(n)
∂n
. (A.2.11)
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If H(n) is monotonically increasing or decreasing, then H(n) equal to a constant determines
a unique n. Taking the derivative of H(n) with respect to n, we have
∂H(n)
∂n
=
1
1 + n
∂G(n)
∂n
− n
(1 + n)2
∂G(n)
∂n
+
n
1 + n
∂2G(n)
∂n2
. (A.2.12)
The first two terms can be reduced to
1
1 + n
>
n
(1 + n)2
(A.2.13)
and therefore
∂H(n)
∂n
> 0 (A.2.14)
since ∂
2G(n)
∂n2
> 0.
Therefore the number of clients per firm is unique.
A.2.10. Proof of Proposition 20
Take (II.4.11) and suppose λlp = 0. So we can write
∂E[Πp]
∂mlp
= ρ(x+)
s
T
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)]− ρ(x−)ωlp ≤ 0. (A.2.15)
Further suppose ωlp = 0. It follows that there is a corner solution with only approved
proposals with positive verification signals and exhausted political resources.
Now suppose ωlp > 0. In this case all available policy proposals are verified and political
resources are not exhausted since proposals with negative verification signals are ignored.
Therefore, only proposals with positive verification signals are approved if there are enough
lobbying resources.
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A.2.11. Proof of Lemma 6
Suppose commercial lobbying is welfare enhancing and the constitution determines
the number of policymakers such that P¯ = P ∗∗. All political resources are exhausted and
it follows that
ρ(x+)L∗∗m∗ = P¯Ap = L#
(
ρ(x+)m# + u#
)
. (A.2.16)
If m# > m∗, then L# < L∗∗. This is independent of u#. Given the number of policymakers
and the population size, it follows that C# > C∗∗. Using lemma 5, it can be concluded
that the industry is larger, N# > N∗∗, and with symmetry, firms are larger, n# > n∗∗.
Therefore, the industry is larger and higher concentrated.
A.2.12. Proof of Lemma 7
Suppose commercial lobbying is welfare enhancing and the constitution determines
the number of policymakers such that P¯ = P ∗∗. All political resources are exhausted and
it follows that
ρ(x+)L∗∗m∗ = P¯Ap = L#
(
ρ(x+)m# + u#
)
. (A.2.17)
Suppose m# < m∗, then the following analysis depends on the level of u#.
If ρ(x+)m∗ > ρ(x+)m# + u#, then L∗∗ < L#. Given the number of policymakers and
the population size, it follows that C# < C∗∗. Using lemma 5, it can be stated that the
industry is smaller, N# < N∗∗, and by symmetry, firms are smaller, n# < n∗∗.
If ρ(x+)m∗ < ρ(x+)m# + u#, then L∗∗ > L#. Given the number of policymakers and the
population size, it follows that C# > C∗∗. Using lemma 5, it can be concluded that the
industry is larger, N# > N∗∗, and by symmetry, firms are larger, n# > n∗∗.
Therefore, if the commercial lobbying industry is larger and more concentrated or smaller
and less concentrated than socially efficient depends on ρ(x+)m∗ R ρ(x+)m# + u#.
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A.3. Calculations
A.3.1. Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium: Jacobian
Population:
g1 = T − P¯ − C − L = 0. (A.3.1)
Political access:
g2 = P¯A
p − L
(
ρ(x+)ml + ul
)
= 0. (A.3.2)
Free entry:
g3 = n
lk − F (ml)−G(nl)− f l − ρ(x
+)ml + ul
nl
pic + k = 0. (A.3.3)
with symmetry for ∀ l.
Demand for commercial lobbying services:
g4 =
P¯Ap
Lnl
pic − k = 0. (A.3.4)
Supply of commercial lobbying services:
g5 =
∂G(nl)
∂nl
− k = 0. (A.3.5)
Total number of clients:
g6 = C − nlL = 0. (A.3.6)
Verification effort per firm:
g7 =
∂F (ml)
∂mlp
− ρ(x+) s
αT
[
ρ(e+|x+)− ρ(e−|x+)− ρ(e+) + ρ(e−)] = 0 (A.3.7)
with ml = P¯mlp.
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Firm’s proposal portfolio:
g8 = n
l −ml − ul − rl = 0. (A.3.8)
The general Jacobian, J , of the system of equilibrium equations can be written as
J =

∂g1
∂L
∂g1
∂C
∂g1
∂nl
∂g1
∂k
∂g1
∂ml
∂g1
∂ul
∂g1
∂rl
∂g1
∂f l
∂g2
∂L
∂g2
∂C
∂g2
∂nl
∂g2
∂k
∂g2
∂ml
∂g2
∂ul
∂g2
∂rl
∂g2
∂f l
∂g3
∂L
∂g3
∂C
∂g3
∂nl
∂g3
∂k
∂g3
∂ml
∂g3
∂ul
∂g3
∂rl
∂g3
∂f l
∂g4
∂L
∂g4
∂C
∂g4
∂nl
∂g4
∂k
∂g4
∂ml
∂g4
∂ul
∂g4
∂rl
∂g4
∂f l
∂g5
∂L
∂g5
∂C
∂g5
∂nl
∂g5
∂k
∂g5
∂ml
∂g5
∂ul
∂g5
∂rl
∂g5
∂f l
∂g6
∂L
∂g6
∂C
∂g6
∂nl
∂g6
∂k
∂g6
∂ml
∂g6
∂ul
∂g6
∂rl
∂g6
∂f l
∂g7
∂L
∂g7
∂C
∂g7
∂nl
∂g7
∂k
∂g7
∂ml
∂g7
∂ul
∂g7
∂rl
∂g7
∂f l
∂g8
∂L
∂g8
∂C
∂g8
∂nl
∂g8
∂k
∂g8
∂ml
∂g8
∂ul
∂g8
∂rl
∂g8
∂f l

. (A.3.9)
Given the equations above, the Jacobian can be written as
J =

−1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
−ρ(x+)ml − ul 0 0 0 −ρ(x+)L −L 0 0
0 0 k − ∂G(nl)
∂nl
+
(ρ(x+)ml+ul)pic
nl2
nl + 1 −∂F (ml)
∂ml
− ρ(x+)pic
nl
pic
nl
0 −1
− P¯Appic
L2nl
0 − P¯Appic
Lnl2
−1 0 0 0 0
0 0 ∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
−1 0 0 0 0
−nl 1 −L 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 ∂
2F (ml)
∂ml2
0 0 0
0 0 1 0 −1 −1 −1 0

.
(A.3.10)
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A.3.2. Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium: Jacobian
The determinant of the Jacobian is
|J | = −
∂2F (ml)
∂ml2
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
)
nl
2 < 0. (A.3.11)
A.3.3. Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium
A.3.3.1. Cramer’s Rule
For the comparative statics with Cramer’s Rule defined by
∂y
∂x
=
|Jy|
|J | , (A.3.12)
where y is an endogenous parameter and x an exogenous variable.
A.3.3.2. Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium: Number of Policymakers
Verification per firm
∂m#
∂P¯
=
|Jm|
|J | = 0. (A.3.13)
Lobbyists
∂L#
∂P¯
=
|JL|
|J | = −
Appic
(
Lnl + P¯
)
+ Lnl
2 ∂2G(nl)
∂nl2
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
< 0. (A.3.14)
Citizens
∂C#
∂P¯
=
|JC |
|J | =
Lnl
(
Appic − nl2 ∂2G(nl)
∂nl2
)
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
R 0. (A.3.15)
The sign depends on Appic − nl2 ∂2G(nl)
∂nl2
R 0.
Clients per firm
∂n#
∂P¯
=
|Jn|
|J | =
Appicnl
(
L+ Lnl + P¯
)
L
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
) > 0. (A.3.16)
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Lobbying service fee
∂k#
∂P¯
=
|Jk|
|J | =
Appicnl
(
L+ Lnl + P¯
) ∂2G(nl)
∂nl2
L
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
) > 0. (A.3.17)
Unverified proposals per firm
∂u#
∂P¯
=
|Ju|
|J | =
Appic
(
P¯Ap + (Lnl + P¯ )(ρ(x+)ml + ul)
)
+ Lnl
2
(Ap +Apnl + ρ(x+)ml + ul)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
L
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
) > 0.
(A.3.18)
Financial contributions per firm
∂f#
∂P¯
=
pictn
l
t
2
Apt
(
L+ Lnlt + P¯
) ∂2G(nlt)
∂nlt
2
L
(
P¯Aptpi
c
t + Ln
l
t
2
(1 + nlt)
∂2G(nlt)
∂nlt
2
) > 0. (A.3.19)
A.3.3.3. Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium: Dishonesty
Verification per firm
∂m#
∂α
=
|Jm|
|J | = −ρ(x
+)
s
α2T
ψ
∂2F (ml)
∂ml2
< 0. (A.3.20)
Lobbyists
∂L#
∂α
=
|JL|
|J | = 0. (A.3.21)
Citizens
∂C#
∂α
=
|JC |
|J | = 0. (A.3.22)
Clients per firm
∂n#
∂α
=
|Jn|
|J | = 0. (A.3.23)
Lobbying service fee
∂k#
∂α
=
|Jk|
|J | = 0. (A.3.24)
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Unverified proposals per firm
∂u#
∂α
=
|Ju|
|J | = ρ(x
+)2
s
α2T
ψ
∂2F (ml)
∂ml2
> 0. (A.3.25)
Financial contributions per firm
∂f#
∂α
=
|Jf |
|J | = ρ(x
+)
s
α2T
ψ
∂F (ml)
∂ml
∂2F (ml)
∂ml2
> 0. (A.3.26)
A.3.3.4. Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium: Spillovers
Verification per firm
∂m#
∂s
=
|Jm|
|J | = ρ(x
+)
1
αT
ψ
∂2F (ml)
∂ml2
> 0. (A.3.27)
Lobbyists
∂L#
∂s
=
|JL|
|J | = 0. (A.3.28)
Citizens
∂C#
∂s
=
|JC |
|J | = 0. (A.3.29)
Clients per firm
∂n#
∂s
=
|Jn|
|J | = 0. (A.3.30)
Lobbying service fee
∂k#
∂s
=
|Jk|
|J | = 0. (A.3.31)
Unverified proposals per firm
∂u#
∂s
=
|Ju|
|J | = −ρ(x
+)2
1
αT
ψ
∂2F (ml)
∂ml2
< 0. (A.3.32)
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Financial contributions per firm
∂f#
∂s
=
|Jf |
|J | = −ρ(x
+)
1
αT
ψ
∂F (ml)
∂ml
∂2F (ml)
∂ml2
< 0. (A.3.33)
A.3.3.5. Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium: Private Benefits
Verification per firm
∂m#
∂pic
=
|Jm|
|J | = 0. (A.3.34)
Lobbyists
∂L#
∂pic
=
|JL|
|J | = −
P¯ApLnl
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
< 0. (A.3.35)
Citizens
∂C#
∂pic
=
|JC |
|J | =
P¯ApLnl
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
> 0. (A.3.36)
Clients per firm
∂n#
∂pic
=
|Jn|
|J | =
P¯Apnl(1 + nl)
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
> 0. (A.3.37)
Lobbying service fee
∂k#
∂pic
=
|Jk|
|J | =
P¯Apnl(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
> 0. (A.3.38)
Unverified proposals per firm
∂u#
∂pic
=
|Ju|
|J | =
P¯Apnl(ρ(x+)ml + ul)
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
> 0. (A.3.39)
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Financial contributions per firm
∂f#
∂pic
=
|Jf |
|J | =
nlt
2
(1 + nlt)P¯A
p
t
∂2G(nlt)
∂nlt
2
P¯Aptpi
c
t + Ln
l
t
2
(1 + nlt)
∂2G(nlt)
∂nlt
2
> 0. (A.3.40)
A.3.3.6. Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium: Population
Verification per firm
∂m#
∂T
=
|Jm|
|J | = −ρ(x
+)
s
αT 2
ψ
∂2F (ml)
∂ml2
< 0. (A.3.41)
Lobbyists
∂L#
∂T
=
|JL|
|J | =
P¯Appic + Lnl
2 ∂2G(nl)
∂nl2
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
> 0. (A.3.42)
Citizens
∂C#
∂T
=
|JC |
|J | =
Lnl
3 ∂2G(nl)
∂nl2
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
> 0. (A.3.43)
Clients per firm
∂n#
∂T
=
|Jn|
|J | = −
P¯Appicnl
L
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
) < 0. (A.3.44)
Lobbying service fee
∂k#
∂T
=
|Jk|
|J | = −
P¯Appicnl ∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
L
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
) < 0. (A.3.45)
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Unverified proposals per firm
∂u#
∂T
=
|Ju|
|J | =
−αT 2 (ρ(x+)ml + ul) ∂2F (ml)
∂ml2
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2 ∂2G(nl)
∂nl2
)
αLT 2 ∂
2F (ml)
∂ml2
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
)
+
ρ(x+)2sLψ
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
)
αLT 2 ∂
2F (ml)
∂ml2
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
) R 0. (A.3.46)
Financial contributions per firm
∂f#
∂T
=
|Jf |
|J |
=
ρ(x+)sψL
∂F (mlt)
∂mlt
(
P¯Aptpi
c
t + Ln
l
t
2
(1 + nlt)
∂2G(nlt)
∂nlt
2
)
− αpictnlt2P¯AptT 2 ∂
2F (mlt)
∂mlt
2
∂2G(nlt)
∂nlt
2
αLT 2
∂2F (mlt)
∂mlt
2
(
P¯Aptpi
c
t + Ln
l
t
2
(1 + nlt)
∂2G(nlt)
∂nlt
2
) R 0.(A.3.47)
A.3.3.7. Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium: Political Resources
Verification per firm
∂m#
∂Ap
=
|Jm|
|J | = 0. (A.3.48)
Lobbyists
∂L#
∂Ap
=
|JL|
|J | = −
P¯ picLnl
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
< 0. (A.3.49)
Citizens
∂C#
∂Ap
=
|JC |
|J | =
P¯ picLnl
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
> 0. (A.3.50)
Clients per firm
∂n#
∂Ap
=
|Jn|
|J | =
P¯ picnl(1 + nl)
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
> 0. (A.3.51)
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Lobbying service fee
∂k#
∂Ap
=
|Jk|
|J | =
P¯ picnl(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
> 0. (A.3.52)
Unverified proposals per firm
∂u#
∂Ap
=
|Ju|
|J | =
P¯
(
pic
(
P¯Ap + Lnl
(
ρ(x+)ml + ul
))
+ Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
)
L
(
P¯Appic + Lnl
2
(1 + nl)∂
2G(nl)
∂nl2
) > 0. (A.3.53)
Financial contributions per firm
∂f#
∂Ap
=
|Jf |
|J | =
P¯ pictn
l
t
2
(1 + nlt)
∂2G(nlt)
∂nlt
2
P¯Aptpi
c
t + Ln
l
t
2
(1 + nlt)
∂2G(nlt)
∂nlt
2
> 0. (A.3.54)
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER III APPENDIX
B.1. Proofs
B.1.1. Proof of Lemma 8
Suppose E[Πs∗] is the maximum for social welfare. If this holds, then 1TE[Π
s∗] is
the maximum expected individual payoff behind a veil of ignorance. It follows that no
individual would have an incentive to oppose I∗ with an expected payoff of E[Πv∗] =
1
TE[Π
s∗] behind a veil of ignorance.
Now suppose E[Πs∗∗] is the maximum for social welfare. If this holds, then 1TE[Π
s∗∗]
is the maximum expected individual payoff behind a veil of ignorance. And it follows
immediately that there is no incentive for an opposition
(
E[Πv∗∗] = 1TE[Π
s∗∗]
)
.
B.1.2. Proof of Proposition 10
For the first statement the goal is to identify whether a citizen would deviate from I∗
or not. Suppose a citizen, d, attempts to hire another citizen, h, to act as a lobbyist. This
would require that d would be better off and h not worse off. In addition a policymaker, g,
has to agree to reallocate political access and cannot be worse off. Citizen d would deviate
and attempt to hire h if E [Πc∗] < E[Πd] with
pic +
P ∗Ap
T
E [ec] < ρ(x+)pic − k + P
∗Ap − 2
T
E[ec] +
ρ(x+)E[ec|x+]
T
ρ(x−)pic + k <
ρ(x+)E[ec|x+]− 2E[ec]
T
, (B.1.1)
where h would give up a policy proposal and a policymaker g would not approve a policy
proposal with a negative verification signal.
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Since all potential Pareto-improvement are in a social optimum exhausted, there would
have to exist at least one citizen, w 6= d, h, or one policymaker, b 6= g, who would be worse
off. A citizen w is worse off if E [Πc∗] > E[Πw] = pic + P
∗Ap−2
T E[e
c] + ρ(x
+)E[ec|x+]
T ; a
policymaker b is worse off if E [Πp∗] > E[Πb] = θ + P
∗Ap−2
T E[e
c] + ρ(x
+)E[ec|x+]
T . Both can
be reduced to
2E[ec] > ρ(x+)E[ec|x+]. (B.1.2)
Since ρ(x−)pic + k > 0, there is a contradiction between (B.1.1) and (B.1.2). Since no
citizen d exists, there can be no citizen h and a citizen has no incentive to deviate from I∗.
For the second statement the goal is to identify whether a policymaker would deviate
from I∗ or not. Suppose a policymaker, i, deviates from Ap = a¯c in the following way:
one citizen, h, would not receive political access and another citizen, d, would be required
to hire h to act as lobbyist who is required to verify d’s proposal. Policymaker i has an
incentive to deviate if E[Π∗] < E[Πi] with
θ +
P ∗Ap
T
E[ec] < θ +
P ∗Ap − 2
T
E[ec] +
ρ(x+)
T
E[ec|x+]
2E[ec] < ρ(x+)E[ec|x+], (B.1.3)
which is i’s incentive condition. Citizen h would agree and not stay home if k − F (1) −
G(1) + ρ(x
+)
T E[e
c|x+] ≥ 0; citizen d would agree to pay h and not stay home if ρ(x+)pic −
k + ρ(x
+)
T E[e
c|x+] ≥ 0. Combining both inequalities with respect to k, the following can
be written
ρ(x+)
(
pic +
E[ec|x+]
T
)
≥ k ≥ F (1) +G(1) + ρ(x
+)
T
E[ec|x+]
ρ(x+)pic ≥ F (1) +G(1), (B.1.4)
which is the feasibility condition.
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If both the incentive condition and the feasibility constraint hold, then a self-interested
policymaker has an incentive to violate I∗ and require verification efforts in exchange for
political access.
Now suppose a policymaker, i, in the following way: one citizen, h, would not receive
political access and another citizen, d, would be required to hire h to act as lobbyist who
is required to make a financial contribution of f i. Policymaker i would consider this if
E[Πp∗] < E[Πi] with
θ +
P ∗Ap
T
E[ec] < θ +
P ∗Ap − 1
T
E[ec] + αf i
1
αT
E[ec] < f i, (B.1.5)
which is i’s incentive condition. Citizen h would agree to the lobbying activity and not
stay home if k − G(1) − f i + ρ(x+)T E[ec] ≥ 0; citizen d would agree to pay h and not stay
home if pic − k + ρ(x+)T E[ec] ≥ 0. The maximum feasible f i, fm, would extract all private
rents from d and h such that
fm = pic −G(1) + 2
T
E[ec]. (B.1.6)
Combining the incentive condition and fm, the following can be written
α >
(
T
(
pic −G(1)
E[ec]
)
+ 2
)
. (B.1.7)
If this condition holds, then a self-interested policymaker has an incentive to violate I∗ and
require financial contributions in exchange for political access.
B.1.3. Proof of Proposition 11
For the first statement the goal is to show that a citizen has no incentive to
deviate from I∗∗. A citizen d would want to bypass a lobbyist if E[Πc∗∗] < E[Πd] =
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pic + P
∗∗Ap−1
T E[e
c|x+] + 1TE[ec] with
E[ec|x+]− E[ec]
T
< ρ(x−)pic + k. (B.1.8)
However, a policymaker h would have to reallocate political access from a lobbyist to citizen
d but has no incentive since E[Πp∗∗] > θ + P
∗∗Ap−1
T E[e
c|x+] + 1TE[ec]. So a citizen has no
incentive to deviate.
For the second statement the goal is to identify a mutual incentive for a lobbyist and
policymaker to substitute f lp for mlp. A lobbyist h would bid or accept to pay a payment
of bh to a policymaker i if he could substitute bh for a single verified proposal, m∗−1. The
bid of bh would follow from E[Πl∗∗] < E[Πh] with
m∗k − F (m∗)−G(m∗)− f l∗ + P¯A
p
T
E[ec|x+] <
m∗k − F (m∗ − 1)−G(m∗)− αf l∗ − bh + P¯A
p − 1
T
E[ec|x+] + 1
T
E[ec], (B.1.9)
which can be written as
bh < F (m∗)− F (m∗ − 1)− E[e
c|x+]− E[ec]
T
≈ F ′(m∗ − 1)− E[e
c|x+]− E[ec]
T
. (B.1.10)
A policymaker i would bid or accept a payment of bi to allow lobbyist h to substitute bi
for a single verified proposal if E[Πp∗∗] < E[Πi] with
θ + αfp∗ +
P¯Ap
T
E[ec|x+] < θ + αfp∗ + αbi + P¯A
p − 1
T
E[ec|x+] + 1
T
E[ec]
bi >
1
α
E[ec|x+]− E[ec]
T
. (B.1.11)
An agreement, as a mutual incentive, would be feasible if bl > bi and that is if
F ′(m∗ − 1) > 1 + α
α
E[ec|x+]− E[ec]
T
. (B.1.12)
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For the third statement the purpose is to identify whether a policymaker would exploit
his powerful position. Suppose a policymaker i would attempt to gain additional private
rents. Since all proposals are verified, there would be only financial contributions to gain.
Policymaker i could threaten lobbyist h to reallocate political access to a citizen d. Citizen
d would have any incentive to take the direct political access. So lobbyist h would lose
some access and d as a client. Lobbyist h wants to avoid this if
k − F (m∗) + F (m∗ − 1)−G(m∗) +G(m∗ − 1) + 1T E[e
c|x+]−E[ec]
T
≈ k − F ′(m∗ − 1)−G′(m∗ − 1) + 1T E[e
c|x+]−E[ec]
T > 0. (B.1.13)
That is, h complies if h realizes an economic profit from client d. Policymaker i would be
able to extract h’s economic profit via financial contribution requests.
B.1.4. Proof of Proposition 12
The purpose is to identify the conditions under which I∗∗  I∗ for a representative
citizen.
First, suppose the representative citizen expects to be a citizen after a reform. If
P ∗E[ec] > P ∗∗E[ec|x+], then
E[Πc∗] = pic +
P ∗Ap
T
E[ec] > ρ(x+)pic − k + P
∗∗Ap
T
E[ec|x+] = E[Πc∗∗] (B.1.14)
and the representative citizen does not oppose. Whereas if P ∗E[ec] < P ∗∗E[ec|x+] but
E[Πs∗] > E[Πs∗∗], then the representative citizen opposes iff
ρ(x−)pic + k <
Ap
T
(
P ∗∗E[ec|x+]− P ∗E[ec]) . (B.1.15)
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Second, suppose the representative citizen expects to be a citizen or a lobbyist after
a reform. If P ∗E[ec] > P ∗∗E[ec|x+], then
E[Πc∗] = pic +
P ∗Ap
T
E[ec] > (B.1.16)
E[Πcl∗∗] =
C∗∗
T − P ∗∗
(
ρ(x+)pic
)− L∗∗
T − P ∗∗
(
F (m∗) +G(m∗) + f l∗
)
+
P ∗∗Ap
T
E[ec|x+]
and the representative citizen does not oppose. Whereas if P ∗E[ec] < P ∗∗E[ec|x+] but
E[Πs∗] > E[Πs∗∗], then the representative citizen opposes iff
pic − 1
T − P ∗∗
(
C∗∗ρ(x+)pic − L∗∗
(
F (m∗) +G(m∗) + f l∗
))
<
Ap
T
(
P ∗∗E[ec|x+]− P ∗E[ec]) . (B.1.17)
In both cases, the representative citizen opposes if the expected shares of spillover
improvements through commercial lobbying outweighs the expected private costs.
B.1.5. Proof of Proposition 13
For the first statement the goal is to identify the conditions under which I∗∗  I∗ for
a representative weaker policymaker. A representative weaker policymaker opposes I∗ iff
E[Πp∗] < E[Πcl∗∗] with
θ − 1
T − P ∗∗
(
C∗∗ρ(x+)pic − L∗∗
(
F (m∗) +G(m∗) + f l∗
))
<
Ap
T
(
P ∗∗E[ec|x+]− P ∗E[ec]) (B.1.18)
and P ∗E[ec] < P ∗∗E[ec|x+] but E[Πs∗] > E[Πs∗∗].
For the second statement the goal is to identify the conditions under which I∗∗  I∗
for a representative stronger policymaker. A representative stronger policymaker opposes
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I∗ iff E[Πp∗] < E[Πp∗∗] with
αfp∗ +
Ap
T
(
P ∗∗E[ec|x+]− P ∗E[ec]) > 0 (B.1.19)
and fp∗ ≥ 0.
B.1.6. Proof of Proposition 14
For the first statement the goal is to identify the conditions under which I∗∗  I∗
for a representative citizen and lobbyist. A representative citizen compares E[Πc∗∗] with
E[Πc∗] and opposes iff
ρ(x−)pic + k >
Ap
T
(
P ∗∗E[ec|x+]− P ∗E[ec]) . (B.1.20)
A representative lobbyists compares E[Πl∗∗] with E[Πc∗] and opposes iff
pic −m∗k + F (m∗) +G(m∗) + f l∗ > A
p
T
(
P ∗∗E[ec|x+]− P ∗E[ec]) . (B.1.21)
For the second statement the goal is to identify the conditions under which I∗∗  I∗
for a representative policymaker who expects to stay in office even after an institutional
reform. The comparison is
E[Πp∗∗] = θ + αfp∗ +
P ∗∗Ap
T
E[ec|x+] > θ + P
∗Ap
T
E[ec] = E[Πp∗], (B.1.22)
with P ∗∗E[ec|x+] > P ∗E[ec] as a necessary condition for E[Πs∗∗] > E[Πs∗] and a
policymaker has no incentive to oppose the first-best institution I∗∗.
153
B.1.7. Proof of Lemma 9
Banning commercial lobbying as a single political measure leads to a payoff of E[Πcban]
for a representative citizens. Comparing E[Πcban] to E[Πc∗], it follows that
E[Πcban] =
P ∗∗Ap
T − P ∗∗pi
c +
P ∗∗Ap
T
E[ec] < pic +
P ∗Ap
T
E[ec] = E[Πc∗]. (B.1.23)
Therefore, citizens are better off to support an institutional change with more policymakers
rather than just banning commercial lobbying.
B.1.8. Proof of Proposition 16
Suppose commercial lobbying is potentially welfare enhancing and the lobbying
institution I∗∗ is first-best. However, suppose I∗∗ is not feasible. A representative citizen
compares then the equilibrium payoff in the unregulated market outcome E[Πc#] with a
payoff without commercial lobbying. Using lemma 9, the alternative is E[Πc∗]. So whenever
Ap
T
(P ∗∗E[ec|α]− P ∗E[ec]) < pic, (B.1.24)
citizens have a political incentive to implement I∗ to constrain policymakers. This is
different to the support by citizens in the first-best, which followed from
Ap
T
(
P ∗∗E[ec|x+]− P ∗E[ec|]) R ρ(x−)pic + k∗. (B.1.25)
Therefore, the decision depends on the degree of distortions caused by self-interested
policymakers.
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APPENDIX C
CHAPTER IV APPENDIX
C.1. Equilibrium for Corner Solution: Verification Effort
The equilibrium conditions for the lobbying labor market and the market for
commercial lobbying services are not affected by a corner solution for the policymaker’s
problem with respect to verification efforts. It still holds that
n∗
1 + n∗
∂G(nl)
∂nl
∣∣∣∣
nl=n∗
=
P¯Appic
T − P¯ (C.1.1)
and the equilibrium values of k∗, L∗, C∗, and a˜∗ are identical. However, each policymaker
sets f¯ lpm = 0 and maximizes the resources available for verification efforts. Lobbyists make
no financial contributions, f∗m = f¯∗m = 0, because it would signal a waste of resources.
Equilibrium conditions of (IV.3.7), (IV.3.8), and (IV.3.9) still hold. Each policymaker sets
q¯lp such that ∂m
∗
∂q¯lp
= 0. It has been shown that there is a unique q¯∗m and therefore a unique
steady state dismissal rate of δ∗m. The steady state entry into the lobbying industry follows
from h∗m =
δ∗m
n∗+δ∗m
.
It still holds that there is a private rent dissipation for citizens as characterized in
(C.1.1) – i.e., Πct = 0 – and that Π
l = V l in steady state. The value asset equation
for a citizen follows from (IV.3.3). The steady state first-order condition with respect
to verification effort is characterized in (IV.2.39). Finally, the value asset equation for a
lobbyist without financial contributions can be written as
V l =
(1 + r)
(
kn−G (n)− F (mlp))
r + δ (q¯lp)
+
δ
(
q¯lp
)
r + δ (q¯lp)
V c. (C.1.2)
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Using (IV.3.3), (IV.2.39), and (C.1.2), the steady state verification effort is
F
(
mlp
)
+F ′
(
mlp
) r + δ (q¯lp)
δ (q¯lp)
r + h∗m + δ
(
q¯lp
)
(r − rh∗m)
(r + δ (q¯lp)) (1− h∗m)
= k∗n∗ −G
(
nl
)∣∣∣
mlp=m∗m,q¯lp=q¯∗m,nl=n∗
;
(C.1.3)
the expected lifetime payoff for a lobbyist is
V l∗ =
(1 + r)(r + h∗m)
(
k∗n∗ −G (nl)− F (mlp))
r (r + h∗m + δ (q¯lp) (1− h∗m))
∣∣∣∣∣
nl=n∗,q¯lp=q¯∗m
; (C.1.4)
and the expected lifetime payoff for a citizen is
V c∗ =
(1 + r)h∗m
r + h∗m
V l∗ > 0. (C.1.5)
Finally, u∗m = a˜∗ − ρ(x+)m∗m and r∗m = n∗ −m∗m − u∗m.
C.2. Equilibrium for Corner Solution: Financial Contribution
The equilibrium conditions for the market for commercial lobbying services are not
affected by a corner solution for the policymaker’s problem with respect to financial
contributions. It still holds that
n∗
1 + n∗
∂G(nl)
∂nl
∣∣∣∣
nl=n∗
=
P¯Appic
T − P¯ (C.2.1)
and the equilibrium values for k∗, L∗, C∗, and a˜∗ are identical. However, each policymaker
sets q¯lpf = 0 and maximizes rents through financial contributions. Lobbyists undertake
no verification efforts, m∗f = 0, and make the required financial contributions since
policymakers can identify perfectly whether or not a lobbyist made the required financial
contribution – i.e., f∗f = f¯
∗
f . The lobbyist’s equilibrium portfolios are characterized by
u∗f = a˜
∗ and r∗f = n
∗ − u∗f .
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In steady state, there is a no exit out of and entry into the lobbying industry and
political access market. It follows that δ∗f = 0 and h
∗
f = 0. The lifetime expected payoff for
a citizen follows from (IV.3.3) with Πct = 0, because of the expected private rent dissipation
for citizens, such that
V c∗ =
(1 + r)Πct
r
= 0. (C.2.2)
Using (IV.2.43), the steady minimum financial contribution is
f¯∗f =
k∗n∗ −G(nl)
1 + r
∣∣∣∣
nl=n∗
(C.2.3)
with f∗f = f¯
∗
f . Finally, the expected lifetime payoff for a lobbyist follows from (IV.2.43)
and is
V l∗f = (1 + r)f¯
∗
f (C.2.4)
with V l∗f > V
c∗
f = 0. Policymakers can extract larger rents from lobbyists because of the
better monitoring of financial contributions but they still have to share rents with lobbyists
to induce promised and legally nonenforceable financial contributions.
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